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THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

By ROBERT WATSON, LL.D.

PRINCIPAL OF THE UNITED COLLEGE OF ST. SALVATOR AND ST. LEONARDS, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

VOL. II.

THE SIXTH EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed by A. Strahan, Printers-Street,

FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES IN THE STRAND;

AND J. BALFOUR, AND W. CREECH, EDINBURGH.

1803.

S 920 Ps2w v.2
Watson, Robert, 1730?-1781.
The history of the reign of
Philip the Second, king of

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THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XI.

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1572. The revolt of Holland.

WHILE the tranſactions that have been related paſſed in Zealand, the ſame ſpirit of revolt, by which the people of that province were actuated, made rapid progreſs in ſome of the other provinces. The inhabitants of Enchuyſen were the firſt in North Holland who had the courage to plant the ſtandard of liberty upon their walls; and thoſe of Medinblinc, Edam, Purmerend, and other towns, quickly followed the example. In ſome of theſe places, part of the people were averſe to this revolution; but theſe were few, compared with their opponents, and were obliged either

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either to yield to the majority, or to ſecure themſelves by flight from their reſentment.

THE ſame meaſures were purſued, at the ſame time, in the ſouthern parts of the province. That flame which had been kindled ſome time before, burſt out at once in a thouſand different places. And in a few months, Leyden, Gouda, Dort, Haerlem, and all the other towns in Holland, Amſterdam excepted, had openly declared againſt the Spaniards, and avowed their reſolution to acknowledge no other authority in future, but that of the prince of Orange, and the States. The ſame reſolution was formed in ſeveral of the cities of Overyſſel, Frieſland, and Utrecht.

THIS revolution, ſo favourable to William's views, was not a little promoted by intrigues, which, although he himſelf was abſent, were carried on in his name, and by his authority. In letters to the principal inhabitants he had allured them to his intereſt, by flattering them with the hopes of having all their privileges ſecured; of enjoying full freedom to exerciſe their religion, whether proteſtant or catholic; and of being for ever delivered from that oppreſſive load of taxes, with which they had been overwhelmed. In order to enforce theſe exhortations, he ſent his agents throughout the provinces;

provinces; and moſt of theſe were perſons either of great addreſs, or of great authority and influence among the people[a].

His military preparations.

WILLIAM's military preparations were at this time far advanced, and he hoped ſoon to begin his march, with the probability of a more proſperous iſſue than had attended his former expedition. He had already collected a formidable army of well-diſciplined forces. Conſiderable ſums had been tranſmitted to him by the friends of his cauſe; and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances had been given him, that ſome of the principal cities in the ſouthern provinces would open their gates to receive him. But no circumſtance contributed more to inſpire him with a confidence of ſucceſs, than the new meaſures which, a little before the preſent period, had been embraced by the court of France.

The affairs of France.

IN the bloody conteſt which had ſubſiſted for ſeveral years between the catholics and pro-

[a] In Holland, the revolution was chiefly owing to the activity of Sonoy, whom the prince had ſent thither as governor ſubſtitute, till he himſelf ſhould arrive: and in Guelderland, Utrecht, and Frieſland, to the count of Berg, a nobleman of intereſt in thoſe parts, who was married to William's ſiſter, and acted in every thing by his direction.

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teſtants in that kingdom, the former had generally been victorious. But the latter, rouſed by their leaders, aided by foreign powers, animated by zeal for their religion, and inflamed with reſentment on account of the cruel perſecutions which had been exerciſed againſt them, continued to make ſuch vigorous efforts, as created in their enemies the moſt alarming apprehenſions with regard to the iſſue of the war. The court had, at different times, offered them advantageous terms of accommodation; and peace had oftener than once been eſtabliſhed between the contending parties. But their pretenſions, their intereſts, and their religious principles, were incompatible; and they remained quiet only till they were in a condition to renew hoſtilities. The court never had more reaſon to entertain hopes of being able to extirpate their opponents, than towards the end of the year one thouſand five hundred and ſixty-nine. Their brave and active leader, the prince of Condé, had been killed in the battle of Jarnac; they had afterwards received a dreadful overthrow in the battle of Moncontour; and the admiral Coligni, with the young princeſs of Bourbon, had been obliged to retire, with the feeble remains of their ſhattered army, to the mountains of Gaſcony and Languedoc. There, however, they exerted themſelves ſtrenuouſly in making preparations for trying once more

more the fortune of war; and in a few months, they drew together a force ſufficient to enable them to leave their retreat, and to enter the liſts againſt the royal army.

Queen-mother's plot againſt the proteſtants.

When intelligence of this was brought to the queen-mother, who exerciſed at that time an unlimited authority in the government, ſhe was equally exaſperated and alarmed; and ſhe reſolved to employ other means than open force to be avenged upon her enemies. She communicated her plan only to the king, the duke of Anjou, the cardinal of Lorrain, the duke of Guiſe, and Alberto Gondi, count of Retz; who all engaged to maintain the moſt inviolable ſecrecy. Time only brought to light their dark deſign. The proteſtants, they now believed, were not to be overcome by the force of arms; and it was reſolved to have recourſe to fraud and circumvention.

In purſuance of this plan, a new treaty with the princes of Navarre and the admiral was ſet on foot, and ſoon afterwards concluded at St. Germains. By this treaty, the proteſtants received a free pardon of all their paſt offences, with liberty to make public profeſſion of the reformed religion; and the princes and admiral were allowed for their ſecurity, to retain poſſeſſion of Rochelle, Cognoc, La Charité, or

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Montauban, on condition, that if the articles of the peace were obſerved, theſe places ſhould be delivered to the king within the ſpace of two years from the date of the preſent pacification.

THE proteſtant leaders entertained the ſame diſtruſt of the ſincerity of the king and queen-mother in this, as in all their former negotiations. They were ſtill afraid of putting themſelves in their power, and remained at a diſtance from court, in the places of ſtrength which had been aſſigned them. In order to remove their ſuſpicions, every ſpecies of artifice was employed. All the articles of the peace were punctually fulfilled. Strict orders were iſſued to allow the proteſtants in all places to celebrate openly their religious aſſemblies; and in all the diſputes which happened between the catholics and them, the latter were treated with indulgence, while the former had, on many occaſions, reaſon to complain of injuſtice or ſeverity. Charles embraced every opportunity to expreſs the pleaſure which he now enjoyed, in having reſtored tranquillity to his kingdom; and even when none but zealous catholics were preſent, he often declared how unalterably fixed his purpoſe was, to perform with ſtrict fidelity, his engagements with the proteſtants. He had ſufficiently experienced the folly of attempting to ſubdue men's conſciences by force; and no

no conſideration would make him return to his former unhappy meaſures; which he had found to be no leſs ineffectual for accompliſhing the end intended, than they were deſtructive of his own repoſe, and pernicious to his ſubjects. All his counſellors, except thoſe who were partners in the bloody ſecret, believed him to be ſincere; and by the accounts which they gave of his diſcourſe, added to the diſpleaſure which they expreſſed at his change of conduct, they contributed to complete the deluſion of the proteſtants. The admiral, however, ſtill retained his wonted diffidence; and when urged by the king to come to court, and receive in perſon every proof that could be given him of ſincere attachment, he declared, that it was impoſſible for him to think himſelf ſecure, where his mortal enemies of the family of Guiſe were poſſeſſed of ſo much power.

To have gratified the admiral by ſo great a conceſſion as the immediate removal of the Guiſes, Charles knew would have had a ſuſpicious p ect; and therefore he went no further at this time, than to aſſure him that his fears were groundleſs, and that his enemies were not maſters as formerly. But ſoon after the duke of Guiſe and his brother left the court, ſeemingly much diſguſted with the meaſures which were there purſued. At the ſame time, other

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means of deluſion were employed, more likely to produce the deſired effect. Charles offered his ſiſter in marriage to the king of Navarre; and an ambaſſador was ſent to England, to negotiate a match between the duke of Anjou and queen Elizabeth. But of all the inſtruments of deceit which he employed, there was none more efficacious, than the declaration which he made of his reſolution to enter into war with the king of Spain. Philip had refuſed, he ſaid, to grant him reparation for certain injuries, which his ſubjects had received from the Spaniards in America; and he was determined to take vengeance on that prince, by invading his dominions in the Netherlands. He offered the command of the army, which he talked of ſending thither, to the admiral, and aſſured him that he would be entirely governed by his counſels, and thoſe of the Prince of Orange and count Lewis, in carrying on the war.

No propoſal could be better calculated than this to blind the admiral's penetration. Conſcious of ſuperior military talents, he was naturally fond of war; ſincere in his profeſſion of the reformed religion, he was zealous to propagate and defend it; and he was ſtrongly attached by ſympathy of manners, as well as religious principles, to the princes of Naſſau. Count Lewis was with him at Rochelle, when

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the propoſal was delivered, and he contributed not a little to baniſh from his mind the remains of thoſe ſuſpicions, which he ſtill retained for the king's ſincerity. Soon afterwards they both ſet out for Paris, where they were received and treated with ſo much eſteem and confidence, as gave the admiral a full conviction that the ſentiments both of the king and the queen-mother were in reality what they ſeemed.

CHARLES thought it neceſſary for his purpoſe to wear the maſk for ſome time longer; and as he found that nothing had ſerved ſo effectually to lull the admiral's ſuſpicions as this laſt device, he affected to be extremely ſolicitous about making preparations for the war; and in the mean time deſired count Lewis to repair to the frontiers of the Netherlands, to communicate his deſign to the malecontents, and to hold them in readineſs for the admiral's arrival with the troops. There was nothing farther from his intention than to begin hoſtilities. But no ſooner were the Huguenots informed of the deſign on which count Lewis had ſet out, than great numbers of them, prompted by their religious zeal, and by the reſtleſs military ſpirit of the age, flocked after him, and offered to aſſiſt him in any enterpriſe he ſhould undertake.

LEWIS

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LEWIS was himſelf of too active a temper to ſuffer them to remain long without employment. It was of the utmoſt conſequence, he knew, towards the ſucceſs of that expedition on which his brother was about to enter, as well as of the French invaſion of the Netherlands, to acquire poſſeſſion early of ſome fortified town in the frontier provinces. With this view he had maintained a ſecret correſpondence with ſome of the inhabitants of Mons; and he made himſelf maſter of that important city by the following ſtratagem:

HAVING left the confines of France, he arrived in the evening with five hundred horſe and a thouſand muſqueteers at a wood in the neighbourhood of Mons, whence he ſent forward ten or twelve of his ſoldiers, whom he ſelected on account of their ſuperior addreſs and reſolution. They entered Mons in the evening, and lodged together in the ſame inn. They gave out that they were dealers in wine; informed their hoſt, that their ſervants were bringing a quantity of that liquor, and inquired at what hour the gate of the city, by which it was to be brought in, would be opened. They were told, that, for a ſmall reward, the keeper would open it at any time; and early next morning, having bribed the keeper to open it,

it, they ſeized upon the keys, and diſperſed the guards. Count Lewis, who was at hand with a hundred horſe, immediately ruſhed in, and having taken poſſeſſion of the gate with a part of his troops, he traverſed the principal ſtreets of the city with the reſt, and proclaimed to the inhabitants, that he was not come as an enemy, but as a friend; and that the prince of Orange was approaching with a powerful army, to aſſert their liberty, and to deliver them from all thoſe oppreſſive taxes which had been impoſed upon them by the duke of Alva.

All the citizens ſtill remained within their houſes, except a few who were privy to his deſign; but he began to grow uneaſy when he reflected on the ſmall number of men that were with him, and to wonder that the reſt of his troops were not come forward. It was to no purpoſe, he knew, to attempt keeping poſſeſſion of ſo great a town with ſo ſmall a force. He rode out therefore as faſt as he could towards the place where he had left his troops, who had loſt their way, and were wandering in the wood. He conducted them immediately to the city; not without anxiety, leſt he ſhould find the gate ſhut againſt him on his return. But ſuch was the conſternation of the citizens, and their ignorance of what had paſſed, that none

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none of them had ventured to ſtir without their houſes. The gate was ſtill open, and every thing in the town as quiet and motionleſs as when he left it. He then placed his guards at the ſeveral gates, and on the ramparts; and calling the magiſtrates together, explained to them his own, and his brother's deſigns; giving them the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that no violence ſhould be committed by his ſoldiers. After which he commanded ſuch of the citizens as he could not truſt, to deliver up their arms; and ordered all of them to proceed as formerly in the purſuit of their cuſtomary occupations. His troops did not amount to more than fifteen hundred men; but he ſoon acquired a much greater force by the acceſſion of many proteſtants, who haſtened to his aſſiſtance from Picardy and Champaign [b].

The loſs of Mons affected the duke of Alva in the moſt ſenſible manner; and it gave him the greater uneaſineſs and concern, as it was altogether unexpected. Being no ſtranger to count Lewis's enterpriſing genius, he had kept an anxious eye upon all his motions, during his abode in France; eſpecially after the peace of St. Germains, and the kind reception he

[b] Bentivoglio, p. 95. Meurſii Auriacus, p. 79. Meteren, p. 95.

had

had met with from the king. The lateſt account which he had received of him from his ſpies at Paris was, that he was playing at tennis; by which piece of intelligence they meant to inſinuate, that he was more attentive to amuſement than to any ſerious purſuit. When the duke therefore was informed of his ſucceſs at Mons, he diſcovered the utmoſt impatience and chagrin. In the rage which it excited in him, throwing down his hat, and trampling upon it, "I have been deceived, he cried, by a Tuſcan woman (meaning Catherine of Medicis), but ere long, inſtead of Tuſcan lilies ſhe ſhall feel the ſmart of Spaniſh thorns."

His vexation was much increaſed by his knowledge of the great importance of the place which he had loſt. He conſidered that Mons was not only the capital of the province of Hainault, but one of the largeſt and moſt populous cities in the Low-Countries; that, being ſituated in a marſhy ſoil, it might eaſily be rendered impregnable; that although it was not in the line of the barrier towns, yet it was removed at ſo ſmall a diſtance from the frontier, that the poſſeſſion of it muſt greatly facilitate the entrance of foreign troops into the provinces; and that either the French king, whoſe

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whoſe conduct had for ſome time paſt had ſo hoſtile an appearance, or the prince of Orange, could eaſily furniſh it with ſupplies.

THESE conſiderations made him reſolve to attempt the recovery of it without delay; but while he was making the preparations neceſſary for this purpoſe, he received intelligence of the revolution in Holland; and at the ſame time was informed, that the prince of Orange, having already collected a numerous army, was about to begin his march. Alva, far from ſhrinking at the view of ſo many impending dangers, exerted himſelf with great activity and vigour to repel them. He carried on his levies with the utmoſt diligence, and in a very ſhort time found himſelf poſſeſſed of between five and ſix thouſand German horſe, and eighteen thouſand foot of the ſame nation; beſides fifty companies of Spaniards, and one hundred and fifty of Walloons, and other natives of the Netherlands. He would gladly have ſent a part of theſe forces to recover the revolted cities in the maritime provinces, and the reſt to the ſiege of Mons; but when he reflected on the difficulty which he muſt encounter in either of theſe two enterpriſes, he apprehended that his army, numerous as it was, could not with ſafety be divided. He reſolved

ſolved therefore to employ it, whole and entire, againſt his enemies on one hand of him, before he ſhould turn it to the other.

STILL, however, he remained in great perplexity, finding it difficult to determine whether it was moſt expedient to begin with the ſiege of Mons, or the recovery of the maritime provinces. And to aſſiſt him in deciding this important queſtion, he called a council of his principal officers; when the marquis of Vitelli, one of the firſt in rank, as well as in military merit, adviſed him earneſtly to begin with the latter, and ſupported his opinion by obſerving, "That although the interior provinces were liable to be invaded from the ſide of France or Germany, yet it would not be difficult to recover whatever cities ſhould be loſt in thoſe provinces, as the inhabitants were in general more loyal than thoſe of Holland and Zealand, and much leſs infected with the ſpirit of innovation in religion. That the Huguenots under count Lewis were deſtitute of means to ſupport themſelves, and muſt ſoon be diſperſed; for he could not be perſuaded that the French king, who had hitherto ſhewn ſo much zeal for the true religion, would ever debaſe himſelf ſo far, as to favour the attempts of his rebellious ſubjects to ſubvert it. The German forces under the prince of Orange, undiſciplined and

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and tumultuary, were actuated in their preſent warfare, by no other motives but thoſe of pay and plunder. And if they were diſappointed in their expectation of theſe, there was little ground to doubt that they would chooſe rather to return home, after taking vengeance on their leaders, than expoſe themſelves to the fatigue and danger of beſieging towns and fortreſſes. "We may therefore, without anxiety," continued he, "put off the ſiege of Mons, and the defence of the inland frontier, till a more convenient ſeaſon ſhall arrive. But the ſtate of the maritime provinces admits not of the leaſt delay. The people there are univerſally infected with hereſy. They have conceived a degree of phrenzy, and indulged themſelves in the moſt extravagant exceſſes againſt the church and the king. Their ſituation, ſtrong by nature, will ſoon be rendered impregnable. Every paſſage of a river and canal will require an army to force it, and every ſiege, a campaign to finiſh it. By the ſea, and by the rivers, they can be always richly furniſhed with proviſions; they can every hour receive ſuccour from France, Germany, or England; and will be able, by their naval force, to prevent the king's army from receiving ſupplies from Spain. It is there too, the prince of Orange, for many years, was governor. There he poſſeſſes ſeveral large eſtates; and he has formed

formed there numerous and close connections with persons of the greatest influence in the country. As it was in these provinces he first erected the standard of rebellion, it is in them he intends to fix the seat of that usurped dominion which he is so ambitious to maintain. Let us attack our enemy first in his strong hold; and when we have driven him from thence, we shall find it much easier to prevent him from establishing himself in any other quarter."

Such were the reasons which Vitelli gave for advising the duke of Alva to postpone the siege of Mons; and, if his advice had been followed, it is probable that the republic of the United Provinces would never have been formed. The people had not yet had time to put the cities into a proper state of defence, and they could not have long resisted so great a force as the duke of Alva might have employed to subdue them. Amsterdam and Middleburg were still unshaken in their allegiance. With the ships belonging to these two wealthy cities, and those which he would have received from Spain, a fleet might have been equipped superior to that of the protestants; who must have been soon reduced to the necessity of submitting to whatever terms Philip might have thought fit to impose.

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No ſuch pernicious conſequences as thoſe which were foretold by Vitelli, could have followed from allowing the enemy to remain for ſome time in poſſeſſion of Mons; nor even from the conqueſt which the prince of Orange might have made of other places. In an open country, ſuch as the interior provinces, the fate of towns muſt depend entirely on the number and diſcipline of the armies employed to attack or defend them; and in both theſe reſpects, the duke of Alva had reaſon to believe that he would be at all times able to maintain his ſuperiority; eſpecially if, by firſt reducing the maritime provinces, he could keep open his communication by ſea with Spain.

But it is infinitely eaſier for men to judge concerning matters of ſuch nice deliberation, after the event has happened, than when they are about to enter upon action. It ought to be conſidered, that Alva had not yet experienced the difficulties attending the ſiege of towns, ſituated in a country ſo much interſected by the ſea, by rivers and canals, as the maritime provinces; and could not foreſee thoſe amazing exertions which the people made, firſt in their preparations for war, and afterwards in the defence of their cities when attacked. He had likewiſe reaſon to entertain ſuſpicions of the hoſtile intentions of the French king. He dreaded

dreaded the havoc which would be made by the army of the prince of Orange, in the richer and more fertile provinces; and thought it would bring an indelible ſtain upon his honour, if he did not endeavour to prevent it. Beſides theſe motives, it is not improbable, conſidering the natural violence of his temper, that he was in ſome degree influenced, in the reſolution which he formed, by his perſonal jealouſy of the prince of Orange, and his deſire of diſappointing a ſecond time the attempts of one who had formerly rivalled him in the favour of his prince.

The ſiege of Mons.

WHATEVER were his motives, he reſolved to begin his operations with the ſiege of Mons; and to delay the reduction of Holland till he ſhould diſengage himſelf from his enemies on the ſouthern frontier. In order to increaſe the number of his forces, he commanded the garriſons of Rotterdam and Delfſhaven, the only towns in Holland in which he had any garriſons left, to join him; and immediately ſent off his ſon Frederic de Toledo, accompanied by Noircarmes and Vitelli, with a part of the troops, to form the blockade of Mons.

THE inhabitants of that city, though ſuſpicious at firſt of count Lewis's intentions, were now well ſatisfied with his government, and

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Lewis had, ſome time before, ſent the Sieur de Jenlis to Paris, to inform the king of his ſucceſs, and to ſolicit the ſpeedy march of the troops which he had promiſed to ſend to his aſſiſtance. Charles received Jenlis in the moſt gracious manner, affected to be extremely happy with the accounts which he had brought him, and gave him authority to levy forces; hoping that before they could take the field, he would be able to put an end to the ſcene of diſſimulation which he had ſo long been acting. But the admiral, who was allowed to exerciſe an unlimited power in the adminiſtration, puſhed forward the levies with greater vigour than the king intended; and in a few weeks, Jenlis was ready to ſet out with between four and five thouſand foot, and four hundred horſe. The admiral and count Lewis concurred in adviſing him to direct his march by the way of Cambray, that he might avoid being intercepted by the enemy, and join the army of the prince of Orange.

Orange. But Jenlis refuſed to comply with this wholeſome counſel. He vainly hoped to be able, with his own forces alone, to oblige the Spaniards to quit the ſiege; and he wiſhed to ſecure this honour to himſelf, rather than leave it to be reaped by the prince of Orange. Notice was ſent privately to Toledo, from the court of France, of the route which he was to take, and of the time of his departure. Toledo immediately drew off his forces from the blockade, and advanced to meet him on the frontier; being deſirous to engage at a diſtance from the town, leſt count Lewis ſhould ſally out, and attack the Spaniards in the rear, when they were engaged in battle with Jenlis. Toledo had reached a village called St. Ghiſlain, at the diſtance of a few miles from Mons, when he was informed that the enemy had entered a neighbouring wood, and that upon their coming out from it he might attack them with great advantage. He ordered his cavalry to march firſt, and followed as faſt as he was able with the infantry. The cavalry had almoſt reached the borders of the wood, when they perceived a hundred of the enemy's horſe that had been ſent before to reconnoitre. Theſe the Spaniards inſtantly attacked, and drove back into the wood, purſuing them cloſely till they reached the main army, which was thrown into confuſion by the precipitate flight of the fugitives.

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In a very little time the whole Spaniſh army arrived, and began the attack before Jenlis had time to draw up his men in order of battle. The French made reſiſtance, however, for two hours with great bravery; but at laſt they gave way, and endeavoured to ſave themſelves by flight. Upwards of twelve hundred fell on the field, and many were killed in the purſuit, partly by the Spaniards, and partly by the country people, who took cruel vengeance for the injuries which they had received from them in their march. Jenlis himſelf was taken priſoner, and conducted to the citadel of Antwerp; where, having died ſuddenly, his death was aſcribed to poiſon. The loſs ſuſtained by the Spaniſh army was inconſiderable.

Alva's arrival before Mons.

TOLEDO returned to Mons in a few days after this diſtinguiſhed victory; and ſoon after the duke of Alva arrived. This cautious general having drawn a double trench and rampart round his army, by which it was rendered ſecure on one ſide againſt the ſallies of the beſieged, and on the other, againſt any ſudden attack that might be made upon it by the prince of Orange, he immediately erected ſeveral batteries, and began his fire in different quarters with great fury. The beſieged diſcovered no leſs vigour in their defence; which was conducted with great prudence, as well as the moſt

moſt indefatigable activity, by count Lewis, ſeconded in all his operations by the celebrated La Noue, who had gained diſtinguiſhed renown in the civil wars of France.

Arrival of the prince of Orange in the Netherlands.

But although the beſieged diſplayed the utmoſt ſkill and intrepidity, they had no hopes of being able to raiſe the ſiege, without the aſſiſtance of the prince of Orange. William had already penetrated into the Low Countries, and advanced as far as Ruremond. There he ſtopped, and demanded a ſupply of proviſions for his troops. The government of the town was in the hands of zealous catholics, who not only rejected his requeſt, but accompanied their refuſal with a degree of haughtineſs and inſolence by which the prince and his army were highly exaſperated. There were many of the citizens, however, with whom he had formerly held intelligence. Having at this time renewed his correſpondence with them, he made a briſk attack upon one of the gates. The catholics ſuſtained it with ſpirit; but while they were thus employed, the proteſtant inhabitants ſnatched the opportunity, and introduced the aſſailants by another gate into the city. It was not then in the power of the prince of Orange to reſtrain the fury of his ſoldiers. They plundered many of the citizens, violated the churches, and put to death, with

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1572. great barbarity, ſeveral prieſts, and other religioniſts. By ſome popiſh hiſtorians, William himſelf has been blamed on account of theſe enormities. But theſe writers ſeem neither to have known that he publiſhed an edict to prevent them, nor to have conſidered, that as he could not but perceive that violent meaſures were calculated to hurt his cauſe, by alienating the affections of the people in other cities, ſo his conduct, on innumerable other occaſions, furniſhes the ſtrongeſt proof of his utter averſion to all cruelty and outrage.

WILLIAM's acquiſition of Ruremond was of great importance, as it put him in poſſeſſion of a commodious paſſage over the Maeſe; he therefore left a garriſon to defend it, and haſtened afterwards to Hainault. The citizens of Mechlin having been gained over to his intereſt by the Sieur de Dorp, opened their gates to receive him. There he likewiſe left a garriſon. The citizens of Louvain refuſed to admit him within their walls; but, on his preparing to employ force, they conſented to grant him a contribution; of which he accepted, in order to ſave the time which the ſiege would have coſt him. Nivelle, Dieſt, Sichem, Tillemont, and ſeveral other towns ſurrendered to him; ſome through fear, and others through the affection which they bore to his cauſe or perſon.

Dendremond

Dendremond and Oudenarde were taken by ſurpriſe, and great irregularities were committed by the ſoldiers in both theſe places, eſpecially in the latter, where, notwithſtanding their leader's prohibition, they once more indulged that ungovernable fury with which their bigotry inſpired them againſt the eccleſiaſtics of the Romiſh communion.

WILLIAM made his ſtay at each of theſe places as ſhort as poſſible. He did not, however, arrive in Hainault till the beginning of September, when his army amounted to more than twenty thouſand men.

So great an army could not be ſupported long without more ample funds than he poſſeſſed. The ſtates of Holland had ſent him a conſiderable ſum. The exiles had tranſmitted to him a part of the money that aroſe from their captures. His other friends had raiſed contributions proportioned to their abilities. But ſo great had been the expence of levying, equipping, and maintaining his troops, and ſuch immenſe ſums had been laid out in purchaſing artillery and military ſtores, that he had occaſion ſtill for all the ſupplies which had been promiſed him by the court of France.

BUT his hopes of relief from that quarter were now utterly extinguiſhed. The plan of treachery

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treachery above-mentioned, which had been carried on for two years with a degree of perſeverance as well as of diſſimulation that has not its parallel in hiſtory, was at this time brought to a concluſion. The artifices employed to delude the proteſtant leaders had at length ſucceeded, and they were almoſt all caught in the net which had been prepared for their deſtruction.

The admiral had remained at court for ſeveral months, during which time Charles gave him every day freſh marks of affection and eſteem. That deceitful monarch had ſhewn likewiſe a particular attachment to the admiral's friends, and was perpetually ſurrounded with them at council, in his own apartments, and when he went abroad. With his permiſſion, the admiral had left Paris, and gone to Chatillon, where he ſtaid for ſome time to ſettle his private affairs. This indulgence was calculated to create in him the moſt aſſured confidence; ſince it could hardly be ſuppoſed, that if the king had intended him any harm, by enticing him to court, he would have allowed him to depart from it. To ſuch a height was the admiral's ſecurity now riſen, that when Charles expreſſed his deſire of having all grounds of enmity between him and the Guiſes removed, he readily conſented that they ſhould come to Paris,

Paris, and agreed to refer the ſeveral points of difference between himſelf and them to the king's deciſion. In a few days after, the duke of Guiſe arrived, attended by a numerous train of dependants; and a formal reconciliation was made in preſence of the king. But it ſoon appeared how little ſincerity there was on one ſide, in the profeſſions which were uttered on that occaſion. 1572.

As a prelude to the final cataſtrophe, the queen of Navarre, a princeſs who by her ſpirit and magnanimity had long been formidable to the catholics, died, after a ſhort illneſs, which was generally aſcribed to poiſon. And an attempt was made, by a partiſan of Guiſe, to aſſaſſinate the admiral. By this laſt event the proteſtants were greatly alarmed; but the king and queen-mother, by redoubling their diſſimulation, and aſſuming, with conſummate artifice, the appearance of deep concern for what had happened, prevented the admiral from ſuſpecting *them* to have been privy to it, and diverted him and the other proteſtant leaders from forming any vigorous reſolution of providing for their ſafety. They were all found therefore defenceleſs and unprepared.

In that horrid ſcene which paſſed on the night of the twenty-fourth of Auguſt, the duke

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of Guiſe was the principal actor. But his ſavage ſpirit quickly diffuſed itſelf into every breaſt; and no catholic declined to aſſiſt him in the execution of his bloody purpoſe. The admiral, to whom, not many days before, he had pledged his friendſhip, was among the firſt who fell a ſacrifice to his fury. This great man died with a fortitude and tranquillity ſuitable to his character. "Young man," ſaid he to La Beſme (who was ſent into his apartment by the duke of Guiſe, while Guiſe himſelf remained without till the deed was perpetrated), "you ought to reverence grey hairs; but proceed in the execution of your deſign; you can ſhorten my life but a very little." While he was ſaying this, the aſſaſſin plunged his ſword into his breaſt. At the ſame time all his domeſtics and friends were murdered; among whom was the brave Guerchy, his lieutenant, and his ſon-in-law, the amiable Teligny, who had won even the ſavage heart of Charles, and whoſe engaging aſpect ſuſpended for ſome time the lifted hands of his murderers. But it does not belong to this hiſtory to enter more particularly into the detail of this tranſaction. Upwards of ten thouſand proteſtants were maſſacred in Paris alone; and in the other cities of the kingdom, between fifty and ſixty thouſand.

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Of this horrid maſſacre, the firſt idea is ſaid to have been ſuggeſted to the queen-mother by Philip, through the duke of Alva, at conferences held at Bayonne in one thouſand five hundred and fifty-nine; and it is certain, that intelligence of it was received at Madrid with the utmoſt joy. Philip offered public thankſgiving to heaven for the deſtruction of his enemies; and wrote to Charles a congratulatory letter on the ſubject. On the other hand, it filled the proteſtants in the Low Countries with horror and conſternation. Their hopes of obtaining deliverance from the Spaniſh yoke, through the powerful aid of France, had been raiſed to the greateſt height, and their dejection now was in proportion to their former expectations.

Nothing could be more galling to the prince of Orange than the news of this diſaſter. Beſides the cruel diſappointment of finding a powerful monarch his mortal enemy, whom he had ſo much reaſon to believe to be his friend, he knew not what dangerous effect this unexpected revolution might produce upon his troops, eſpecially as ſome of them were ſubjects of France, and had entered into his ſervice, under a belief that their king was to ſupport them in their preſent enterpriſe.

Perceiv-

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1572. Operations of the prince of Orange.

PERCEIVING, therefore, the neceſſity of puſhing forward his operations with the utmoſt vigour, and being perſuaded, that, without ſome ſignal inſtance of ſucceſs, he could not long ſupport his army, he advanced without delay towards Mons; being reſolved to try every expedient, not only to raiſe the ſiege, but if poſſible to bring on a general engagement.

THE duke eaſily penetrated into his deſign, and omitted nothing in his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. After the arrival of ſeveral German auxiliaries in his camp, his army was ſuperior in number, as it had always been in diſcipline, to that of the prince; and he could not have much reaſon to dread the event of a battle, in caſe he ſhould find it unavoidable. But knowing that the fate of battles is decided ſometimes by accidents, againſt which no human prudence can provide; and conſidering, that the prince's army, through the ſcantineſs of his funds, would probably ſoon fall to pieces of itſelf, he reſumed the principles on which he had acted in the time of William's former expedition, and reſolved to avoid expoſing his troops to any unneceſſary riſk; hoping, that, by tiring out the enemy, he ſhould be able to triumph over them

them without fighting. With this view, while he inveſted the town on every ſide, and prevented any ſupplies from being thrown into it, he entrenched his camp ſo ſtrongly, as to render it entirely impracticable for the prince of Orange to force his lines. He fortified the ſeveral paſſes by which the town might be approached in the ſtrongeſt manner; watched over every operation himſelf, with indefatigable attention; and forbade his men to engage in the ſlighteſt ſkirmiſh with the enemy, whatever provocation they might receive.

After having taken theſe precautions, he ſent out five hundred horſe to reconnoitre. They were met by nearly the ſame number of German horſe, commanded by count Henry, William's youngeſt brother, who being ambitious to diſtinguiſh himſelf in this his firſt campaign, attacked the Spaniards with uncommon fury, and after killing many of them, broke their ranks, and drove them back in great confuſion. The Prince himſelf followed ſoon afterwards with all his army, and drew it up in battle array before the duke of Alva's camp.

But Alva, more determined than ever ſince the repulſe of the cavalry, to adhere to his plan, kept all his men within their entrenchments. The prince of Orange omitted nothing in his power

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power to induce him to change his purpoſe. He ſhifted his ground, intercepted the convoys of proviſions, attacked foragers, and ſent out parties on every ſide, with a view to entice the enemy to quit their lines.

THERE were perſons in the Spaniſh camp who condemned their general's conduct on this occaſion, and exhorted him to put to proof that courage of which the enemy were ſo extremely oſtentatious. Among theſe was the archbiſhop of Cologne[e], whoſe ardent ſpirit breathed nothing but war and battle, and who could not reliſh thoſe cautious maxims by which the duke of Alva had reſolved to regulate his conduct. Alva remained equally firm againſt the importunities of his friends, and the arts that were practiſed by the enemy. It was a maxim often in his mouth, that as all human events are precarious, the moſt precarious of all is a battle; to which he added, that it ought not to be the aim of a general to fight, but to overcome; and that there were other means by which this aim might be accompliſhed more effectually than by fighting.

BUT although his conduct was not approved by the archbiſhop of Cologne, he had the ſatiſ-

[e] The Count of Iſenberg.

faction

faction to know that it gave the greateſt uneaſineſs to the prince of Orange; who perceived, that if an opportunity did not offer ſoon of ſtriking ſome important blow, by which he might raiſe the ſiege, it would not be poſſible for him to keep his army together. His finances did not enable him to bring proviſions from a diſtance, and all the country round had been plundered by the Spaniards. Being driven therefore to deſpair, he made a bold effort to break through the enemy's entrenchments; but this adventurous attempt, which nothing could juſtify but the urgent motive that incited him, was attended with ſuch an iſſue as he had reaſon to expect. His men were bravely repulſed, and a conſiderable loſs ſuſtained. 1572.

He now relinquiſhed all hopes of either raiſing the ſiege, or forcing an engagement; and he reſolved to leave Hainault, after attempting to introduce ſuch ſupplies into the town as might enable the garriſon to hold out till winter, when the duke of Alva would be obliged to retire. For this purpoſe, he made choice of two thouſand horſe and one thouſand foot, the flower of his army. There was only a ſingle paſs by which they could have acceſs to the town, and at that place Alva had built a ſtrong fort, of which he committed the defence to a ſelect body of Spaniſh troops, under the com-

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mand of Sancio d'Avila and Julio Romero. Notwithſtanding this precaution, which left hardly a poſſibility of ſucceſs, the troops deſtined for the relief of Mons advanced towards the paſs with the utmoſt intrepidity. Romero and d'Avila received them with equal intrepidity; and were ſeconded by the guns of the fort. The combat was hot and furious. There was a briſk cannonading during the time of it from the two armies, and from the town; but the fire from the fort did the greateſt execution; and the Germans, after ſeveral hundreds of their number had fallen, were at laſt obliged to abandon their attempt.

The Prince is obliged to leave Hainault.

THE prince of Orange, now convinced of the impoſſibility of relieving the beſieged in oppoſition to ſo powerful an army, immediately decamped. The duke of Alva followed him next day with moſt of his forces, and in every movement diſcovered the moſt conſummate ſkill; ſo that he at once prevented the Prince from returning towards Mons, and avoided being reduced himſelf to the neceſſity of fighting. It was not long before he learned that there was not the ſame good order in the Prince's army, which had hitherto been obſerved in it. William's authority over his troops had ſuffered greatly by the failure of his late attempts; and he was unable any longer to maintain that perfect

perfect discipline, without which no army, however numerous, can be formidable.

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Alva readily embraced the opportunity which this circumstance afforded him. Having taken a view in person of the enemy's quarters, he resolved to attack them in the night. He committed the charge of this enterprise to Julio Romero, and gave him two thousand chosen infantry, who were ordered to be ready to march in the middle of the night, each with a shirt over his armour, to enable them to distinguish one another. They fell with great fury on the Germans, who were stationed to guard the camp; and as most of them were fast asleep, they made dreadful havoc among them, till the alarm was communicated to the rest, who were soon roused by the groans and shrieks of the wounded. At first, believing that the whole Spanish army had attacked them, they fled precipitately. The assailants had in the beginning set fire to the tents, and many of the Germans perished in the flames. But this circumstance, by which the horror of the scene was augmented, saved the German army from destruction. It discovered the number of the Spaniards, and made it easier for the prince of Orange to draw up his men, and to know in what quarter he might find the enemy. But the assailants perceiving that the whole camp

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THE conſequences of this diſaſter were more pernicious to the prince of Orange than the diſaſter itſelf. It filled his troops with conſternation, and gave them a formidable idea of the Spaniards, whom, on account of their having ſo often declined fighting, they had been accuſtomed to deſpiſe. Without waiting for orders, they haſtily decamped with one conſent, and left a part of their baggage a prey to the enemy. They had not candour to acknowledge, that the misfortune which had befallen them on the preceding night was owing to their negligence in obeying orders. They were diſpoſed to throw the blame of it upon their general, and began to complain, that inſtead of enriching them with ſpoil, he had brought them into the Low Countries, only to expoſe them to perpetual hardſhips and diſtreſs. He found means, however, at this time to quiet their minds, and in ſome meaſure to rectify their opinion of his conduct.

THE duke of Alva was on this occaſion urged by his officers to purſue the Prince till he ſhould

ſhould drive him entirely out of the Netherlands; but he repeated the old maxim, That it is wiſer to make a bridge for a flying enemy, than to reduce them to deſpair; and returned to the ſiege.

He diſbands his army.

THE prince of Orange led his troops to Mechlin; and having remained there for ſome days to recruit them after their fatigue, he continued his march northwards, till he had brought them as far as Orſoy in the duchy of Cleves. At that place their ill-humour broke out afreſh with greater violence than ever, and they began to hold private meetings, in which they deliberated, whether, in order to procure payment of their arrears, they ſhould not deliver him up to the duke of Alva. The principal officers received this ungenerous propoſal with horror and indignation. They were convinced that the Prince had done every thing that could have been done by a general of the moſt conſummate abilities. They knew that he had begun his enterpriſe with the higheſt probability of ſucceſs, and that his failure in it had been almoſt entirely owing to the treacherous dealings of the French king; by truſting to whom, he had engaged in a very different plan of operations from that which he would otherwiſe have adopted. By theſe conſiderations the officers were entirely ſatisfied: and

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through their influence, the common ſoldiers were perſuaded to relinquiſh their perfidious deſign. The army was immediately diſbanded; and William ſet out for Holland, where the people longed for his arrival.

The ſurrender of Mons.

His retreat from Mons gave his brother, count Lewis, who was naturally of a ſanguine temper, the deepeſt affliction. And this, joined to the extreme fatigue which he had undergone for ſeveral months before, threw him into a violent diſtemper, which prevented him for ſome time from attending to the ſiege. But during his confinement La Noue conducted the defence with ſo much ſkill and intrepidity, that Alva deſpairing of being able before winter to take the town by force, was willing to agree to ſuch terms of capitulation, as count Lewis thought it not diſhonourable to accept. Theſe were, that the French, count Lewis, the Flemiſh nobility, and all who were not inhabitants of the place, ſhould leave it with their arms and baggage; and that ſuch of the inhabitants as had borne arms might leave it with their effects, but not their arms. That ſuch of them as were catholics might remain in the town unmoleſted; but that all the proteſtants ſhould not only depart from the town, but from the Netherlands; and that all perſons, whether citizens or foreigners, ſhould take

take an oath, that they would not carry arms for the ſpace of a year, either againſt the king of France or the king of Spain; from which oath count Lewis alone was exempted. This capitulation was ſigned by the dukes of Alva and Medina Cœli, by Frederic de Toledo, and the baron de Noircarmes; and all the conditions of it were punctually fulfilled. 1572.

Enormities of the Spaniards at Mechlin.

In this manner was Mons recovered from the proteſtants, after it had been more than three months in their poſſeſſion. The duke of Alva felt no anxiety with regard to the recovery of the cities which had received the prince of Orange. They were neither ſtrongly fortified, nor ſufficiently provided with garriſons to defend them. The firſt againſt which he turned his arms was Mechlin; and he ordered his ſon to lead thither the Spaniſh troops, who having received no pay for ſome time, advanced like ſo many famiſhed wolves, with a reſolution to ſatiate their rapacity by plundering the inhabitants.

On their arrival, the garriſon which had been left in the town by the prince of Orange ſeemed determined to make reſiſtance; but finding the citizens averſe from co-operating with them, and deſpairing of being able, without their aſſiſtance, to hold out long, they de-

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ſerted the place in the night; and next morning all the prieſts and eccleſiaſtics went in ſolemn proceſſion to Toledo's tent, to deprecate his vengeance. When they were pleading the cauſe of the unhappy anxious inhabitants, and repreſenting that only a ſmall number of them had been guilty, while by far the greateſt part had preſerved their allegiance; the ſoldiers, apprehenſive that Toledo might liſten to this apology, and diſappoint them of their prey, ruſhed forward to the city, and broke into it, ſome by the gates, and others, by the help of ſcaling ladders, over the walls. Then ſpreading themſelves like a deluge, they gave a looſe to every ſpecies of violence; butchering ſome, and plundering all without mercy. There was no diſtinction made of age, ſex, or condition. Virgins and matrons were violated before the eyes of their parents and huſbands. The churches and convents were pillaged as well as private houſes; and the nuns were not exempted from that brutal luſt and fury, which the Spaniards indulged without control.

Juſtified by the duke of Alva.

THE duke of Alva was ſenſible how great an odium muſt attend ſuch a barbarous treatment of a city, which had hitherto been diſtinguiſhed for its fidelity; yet he choſe to juſtify what had been done, and in a few days afterwards publiſhed a manifeſto, in which he declared, that

that the citizens had ſuffered no more than their rebellion had deſerved; that juſtice was not yet entirely ſatisfied; that their crime merited a ſtill ſeverer puniſhment, than barely to be deprived of their effects; and that other cities which had already imitated, or ſhould afterwards imitate, their example, might expect, ſooner or later, to meet with the ſame fate. Of the ſacrilege that had been committed on the churches and convents, and the ſhocking treatment of the weaker ſex, no mention was made in the manifeſto, and no excuſe was ever offered for paſſing over theſe enormities with impunity. Great arrears, ſaid the apologiſts of Alva, were at that time due to the ſoldiers; and, as he could not ſatisfy them, he either thought it reaſonable to allow them to take a compenſation for their pay; or, being well acquainted with their ferocious tempers, he was afraid to exerciſe his authority. The Spaniſh ſoldiers themſelves, though little ſcrupulous with reſpect to crimes contrary to the laws of nature, juſtice, and humanity, were afterwards, agreeably to the character of their nation, touched with remorſe on account of their violation of the churches; and in order to atone for their guilt, they hearkened to the dictates of ſuperſtition, and laid out a portion of their plunder in building a houſe for the jeſuits in Antwerp[c].

[c] Meteren, p. 107. Campana, p. 97. Bentiv. p. 114.

ALVA

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1572. Cruelty of the Spaniards at Zutphen.

ALVA having gone to Maeſtricht, where he diſmiſſed his German horſe, went from thence to Bruſſels, while the Spaniards were permitted to remain at Mechlin for ſeveral days, which they employed in collecting their plunder, and ſending it off in boats to Antwerp, to be expoſed to ſale. Toledo then led them againſt the other cities which had received German garriſons. Theſe garriſons fled on his approach; and the people agreed to pay exorbitant contributions to ſave their cities from being ſacked: nor did he meet with any oppoſition in his progreſs, till he came to Zutphen, which was at that time a place of conſiderable ſtrength. It was defended with a wall flanked with baſtions, and ſurrounded with a deep ditch. The Iſſel waſhes the fortifications on one ſide, the Berkel on another; and the ground on the other two ſides is ſo extremely wet and marſhy as to render the place, for the greateſt part of the year, almoſt inacceſſible. But unfortunately for the proteſtants in garriſon, they could not avail themſelves of theſe advantages at this juncture, the froſt having ſet in with uncommon ſeverity ſeveral days before the arrival of Toledo. He found no difficulty therefore in approaching the place with his batteries, and he ſoon made a breach in the wall. He was preparing for an aſſault, when he received intelligence, that the garriſon, and all ſuch as had rendered themſelves

ſelves obnoxious, had gone out of the town by the oppoſite gate; and that the citizens who remained were now, when left at liberty to act agreeably to their inclination, willing immediately to ſurrender at diſcretion. But Toledo having, by the ſmall reſiſtance which the garriſon had made, got a pretext for plundering this unhappy people, refuſed to liſten to any terms of accommodation, and ordered his troops to advance. They entered the town without oppoſition, and repeated there the ſame ſhocking barbarities which they had exerciſed in Mechlin, with this difference, that as there was much leſs booty in Zutphen, to ſatisfy their rapacity, they indulged their cruelty ſo much the more. They put to the ſword all the citizens who fell in their way, men and women without diſtinction; and when they were tired with ſlaughtering, they caſt great numbers into the Iſſel, and indulged themſelves in the horrid joy of beholding the unhappy ſufferers periſh in the ſtream. By the ſword and water, above five hundred periſhed; and the reſt were obliged to redeem their lives by the moſt oppreſſive contributions, which were ſo cruelly exacted, that the living had reaſon to envy the fate of thoſe whom death had delivered from ſuch intolerable miſery [f].

[f] Meteren, p. 110. Bentivoglio, p. 115. Meurſii Auriacus, p. 98.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XII.

1572. Tranſactions in Holland and Zealand.

WHILE the Spaniſh army was employed in the ſiege of Mons, and in ſubduing the other revolted towns in the ſouthern provinces, the people of Holland and Zealand improved the leiſure which was afforded them, by taking every precaution in their power to ſecure themſelves from being again reduced under the Spaniſh yoke. They increaſed the number of their ſhips of war, completed their fortifications, and levied ſo great a number of forces, as, with the great advantages of their ſituation, they hoped would be ſufficient for their defence.

BEFORE

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1572. Philip paſſes from the taxes of the 10th and 20th penny in June.

BEFORE the duke of Alva ſet out for Mons, he had, agreeably to orders tranſmitted to him from Spain, read, in preſence of the States of Brabant, Artois, Hainault, and Flanders, a declaration, that he would paſs from the taxes of the tenth and twentieth pennies, on condition that the ſtates would deviſe ſome other means by which the money neceſſary for the king's ſervice might be raiſed. Intimation was made of this conceſſion to the States of Holland, by the count of Boſſut; who, in the name of the governor, commanded them to aſſemble at the Hague, to conſider of what other taxes they would ſubſtitute in the room of thoſe which had been formerly impoſed.

His conceſſion diſregarded by the States.

THIS conceſſion, which, if it had been made ſooner, might have prevented the revolt of the maritime provinces, was not attended with the deſired effect. It excited in the minds of the people the higheſt degree of joy and exultation; but they did not think themſelves indebted for it, either to the king or the duke of Alva. They aſcribed it wholly to the dread that was entertained of the prince of Orange, to whom alone they thought themſelves bound for this firſt inſtance of attention that had been ſhewn to their inclination or intereſt ſince Philip's acceſſion to the throne. They could not doubt, that if his apprehenſions of the German army were

were removed, Alva would be again permitted to reſume the purſuit of that plan of tyranny which he had been obliged to ſuſpend. They were well acquainted with the vindictive ſpirit which animated Philip's councils. They knew that, for much ſlighter offences than thoſe of which they had been guilty, many thouſands of their countrymen had ſuffered the moſt cruel death; and they believed, that whatever aſſurances might be given them of pardon, the memory of their guilt would never be extinguiſhed but in their blood. By the unrelenting cruelty which had been exerciſed againſt the proteſtants, added to the contempt which had been ſhewn to their fundamental rights and laws, the people were entirely alienated from Philip's perſon and government. They were convinced that he had reſolved to treat them henceforth, not as ſubjects but as ſlaves; and they had long repined and murmured at their fate.

From the time of Alva's arrival in the Netherlands, all the proteſtants who had eſcaped from the cruelty of the inquiſitors, had carefully concealed their ſentiments, and conformed to the eſtabliſhed worſhip; but having of late received a great increaſe of number, by the return of many of the exiles, they had thrown off the maſk; and it now appeared, that by

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by far the greateſt part of the inhabitants, and even of the deputies of the States, were ſtrongly attached to the reformed religion. Their religious zeal co-operated with their abhorrence of the Spaniſh tyranny; and both together inſpired them with a fixed unalterable purpoſe to defend their liberty to the laſt.

They meet at Dort,

PROMPTED by theſe motives, the States paid no regard to the order for aſſembling at the Hague, tranſmitted to them by Boſſut; and that they might the more ſtrongly expreſs their contempt of the Governor's authority, they appointed an aſſembly to be held at Dort. Of this aſſembly they gave early notice to the prince of Orange, and entreated him to ſend one of his moſt faithful friends, properly inſtructed, to aſſiſt them in their deliberations. The perſon whom the Prince made choice of for this purpoſe, was the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, the author of the compromiſe, who had long been well acquainted with William's moſt ſecret views and ſentiments.

and enter into engagements with the prince of Orange.

ST. Aldegonde readily undertook the taſk impoſed upon him; and at the firſt meeting of the States, gave them thanks, in the name of the Prince, for the intimation which they had ſent him, of their reſolution to vindicate their liberty under his direction. "The Prince was conſcious,

conſcious, he ſaid, of being ſeriouſly intereſted in the welfare of all the provinces, and of none more than thoſe of Holland and Zealand, which for ſeveral years had been the objects of his particular attention. From time to time he had heard with indignation and grief, of the diſtreſs and miſery to which they had been reduced through the Spaniſh tyranny; and there was nothing which he deſired more ardently, than to be inſtrumental in recovering for them thoſe invaluable rights, which for ages paſt had proved the ſource of their proſperity. In order to accompliſh this end, he had ſpared neither expence nor labour. He had failed in his former attempt for their deliverance, not (he hoped, they would believe) through any negligence or miſconduct, but through the ſuperior power and more copious reſources of the enemy. In his preſent armament, he had already expended all that remained of his once ample fortune; and as in levying his army, he had truſted in a great meaſure to the aſſiſtance which they had promiſed him; now was the time to fulfil that promiſe, and to enable him to begin his military operations without delay."

The States, who knew the truth of what St. Aldegonde had repreſented, and were ſenſible how much the ſucceſs of William's enterpriſe

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depended on his receiving an immediate ſupply, ſent him without delay a hundred thouſand florins, which they borrowed from the more wealthy citizens; and promiſed to ſend him more as ſoon as it could be raiſed, either from the ordinary taxes, or from the revenues of the monaſteries, which were at that time converted into a fund for carrying on the war. After this tranſaction, a ſolemn declaration in writing was delivered to St. Aldegonde, in which they engaged to acknowledge the prince of Orange as the only lawful governor or ſtadtholder of the province; appointed him commander in chief of all their forces by ſea and land; and engaged, that without his conſent, they ſhould not liſten to any terms of peace which might be offered; St. Aldegonde, on the other hand, engaging in the name of the prince, that he would not lay down his arms, nor enter into any accommodation or treaty, without the knowledge and approbation of the States[g].

Their diſtreſs.

THE States exerted themſelves ſtrenuouſly to perform their promiſes of ſupplies. They ſent him two hundred thouſand florins, which he received at Ruremonde, in his way to Mons, and gave him ſecurity for three hundred thouſand. When the news were brought them of

[g] Meurſii Auriacus, p. 84.

his

his retreat, and the neceſſity under which he found himſelf of diſbanding his army, they were exceedingly dejected; and were filled with the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions, when they conſidered that the duke of Alva, having no enemy in the field to oppoſe his progreſs, was now at liberty to employ all his forces united in taking vengeance on them for their contempt of his authority.

Amſterdam adheres to the Spaniards.

THEIR diſtreſs was much increaſed by the inflexible obſtinacy of the city of Amſterdam, in adhering to the Spaniſh intereſt; which did not proceed ſo much from the general inclination of the citizens, as from the care which the duke of Alva had taken to preſerve the government of that city in the hands of the moſt rigid catholics. By an order of the States, Lumey, count de la Marc, had beſieged it with a conſiderable body of troops; but after making ſome progreſs in his operations, he deſpaired of ſucceſs, and ſuddenly raiſed the ſiege. He aſcribed the miſcarriage of his attempt to the negligence of the States, in ſupplying him with proviſions. The States, on the other hand, threw the blame entirely upon the count. They had been for ſome time paſt extremely diſſatisfied with his conduct, on account of the cruelties which he had allowed his troops to exerciſe againſt the catholics; and they believed

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that they ſhould never be able to perſuade the people of Amſterdam to unite with the other cities in the province, while their army was under the command of a perſon who had rendered himſelf ſo exceedingly obnoxious [h].

Outrages committed by their troops.

LOUD complaints of the outrages of the ſoldiers were heard in every quarter, and many of the people began to lament the revolution to which they had given their conſent. The States dreaded the conſequences of ſo much ill-humour. But they were not poſſeſſed of power ſufficient to remedy the abuſes complained of; and La Marc, who was naturally violent and ferocious, paid no regard to their commands. In this diſtreſs, they had no reſource, but in the prudence and authority of the prince of Orange, who, they hoped, would, notwithſtanding his late misfortunes, be able to repreſs the inſolence of the ſoldiers and their general. They ſent him notice of the critical ſituation to which they were reduced; and they intreated him to come as ſoon as poſſible, to take the government of the province, and the command of the forces into his own hand.

Arrival of the prince of Orange in Holland.

WILLIAM could not, either with ſafety or honour, have left his army ſooner than he did.

[h] Meurſii Auriacus, p. 95.

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From Orſoy, where it was diſbanded, he went, attended only by his own domeſtics, and a company of horſe, to Campen in Overyſſel, and from thence he paſſed over the Zuider Sea, to Enchuyſen; where he was joyfully received, and all his directions for the greater ſecurity of the place were carried immediately into execution. After ſtaying there for ſome days, and viſiting the other towns in the province, he ſet out for Haerlem; having appointed a convention of the States to be held in that city, to conſider of the preſent ſituation of their affairs.

His magnanimity.

His arrival excited in perſons of all ranks the moſt unfeigned joy; but this joy, he perceived, was greatly allayed by their apprehenſions of being unable to reſiſt an enemy, before whom he himſelf, at the head of a powerful army, had been obliged to retire. The firſt object of his attention was to raiſe their drooping ſpirits, by making them ſenſible of the advantages which they poſſeſſed in the nature and ſituation of their country; which, while they retained their ſuperiority at ſea, and acted in concert, would render abortive all the attempts of the Spaniards to reduce them. The magnanimity which he diſplayed diffuſed itſelf into every breaſt; and the deputies unanimouſly declared, that they would be entirely governed

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by his councils in all their conduct, and would lay down their lives ſooner than abandon that invaluable liberty, without which they thought life itſelf was not deſirable.

His moderation, and ſalutary regulations.

In the preſent temper of their minds, William might have ruled the people of the maritime provinces with an abſolute ſway; but he knew there was a much ſafer, as well as a more effectual, method of exerciſing power, and wiſely reſolved to conſult the States in every matter of importance, and to take upon himſelf only the execution of their commands. For this purpoſe he frequently convened them; and in order to give greater weight to their deciſions, he perſuaded them to admit into their number the deputies of twelve other cities, beſides thoſe of whom their aſſembly had been hitherto compoſed: a meaſure which was no leſs gracious and popular, than it was wiſe and prudent. It flattered the vanity of thoſe towns on which the new privilege was beſtowed; engaged them to contribute with greater alacrity their ſhare of the public expences; and drew the ſeveral diſtricts of the province into a ſtate of more intimate union with one another.

With the States, thus increaſed in number, the prince applied himſelf to rectify the diſorders which had prevailed, and to put the province

vince into a poſture of defence againſt the Spaniards. It had been deſerted during the late commotions by many of the principal inhabitants, by ſeveral members of the courts of juſtice, and by the officers of the revenue, and others who held public employments; which they had been induced to abandon, either by their attachment to popery, or the diffidence in the duration and ſtability of the preſent government. The numerous vacancies which were thus occaſioned, were ſupplied with proteſtants; and no catholic was admitted into any office, or allowed to take any concern in the adminiſtration of public affairs.

Eſtabliſhment of the reformed religion.

THE exerciſe of the Romiſh religion was prohibited in the churches; and the only worſhip permitted to be exerciſed publicly, was the proteſtant, as taught by Calvin, and practiſed in Geneva, and the Palatinate. Thus far the prince of Orange complied with the inclination of the people, by a great majority of whom the principles of the reformers had been embraced. But all perſecution on account of religion, he diſcouraged to the utmoſt of his power. His reaſonings for toleration were more ſucceſsful now in favour of the papiſts, than they had been formerly with the ducheſs of Parma, in behalf of the reformers. The States, by his perſuaſion, reſolved that no perſon whatever

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ſhould be moleſted on account of his religion, provided that he lived quietly, kept no correſpondence with the Spaniards, and gave no diſturbance to the eſtabliſhed mode of worſhip[i].

WILLIAM found greater difficulty in reſtraining the licentiouſneſs of the army, than in ſettling either the courts of juſtice or the church. When we reflect on thoſe horrid ſcenes which were exhibited in the Netherlands by the duke of Alva and his aſſociates, it will not appear ſurpriſing, that the proteſtants ſhould have conceived the moſt violent animoſity againſt their bloody perſecutors. They had ſeen their deareſt relations and friends, beſides many perſons whom they revered on account of the innocence and ſanctity of their lives, treated like the moſt flagitious malefactors: and many of themſelves had, in order to avoid the ſame fate, been obliged to abandon their habitations, and to wander from place to place, forlorn and indigent. In the bitterneſs of their diſtreſs, they had forgotten the ſpirit of that religion for which they ſuffered; and on many occaſions, wreaked their vengeance againſt their enemies with a brutal fury. To the Spaniards who were taken priſoners at ſea, the proteſtants on board the fleet gave no quarter; while the

[i] Grotius, p. 41.

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eccleſiaſtics, and many others whoſe only crime was their adherence to the religion of their anceſtors, were treated by the proteſtant ſoldiers with equal inhumanity.

Lumey de la Marc.

THE count of la Marc, commander in chief of the forces, was ſo far from oppoſing theſe enormities, that he encouraged his ſoldiers in committing them. This nobleman's principal virtue was intrepidity, and under the cloak of zeal for liberty, and the reformed religion, he ſeems to have intended nothing ſo much as the gratification of his avarice or revenge. The prince of Orange, who, from his natural humanity, and a prudent regard to future conſequences, was utterly averſe to every ſpecies of violence, attempted to make him ſenſible of the folly and iniquity of his conduct. But finding that he was not likely to ſucceed, and that the ſoldiers ſtill indulged themſelves without controul in their wonted exceſſes, he referred the matter to the cognizance of the States, and deſired them to conſider coolly what was proper to be done. The States, who were highly incenſed againſt the count, for his contempt of their authority, deprived him of his command, and ordered him to be apprehended. William, unwilling to forget the ſervices which the count had performed in the beginning of the revolt, ſoon after interpoſed in his

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his behalf, and prevailed upon the States to releaſe him. But la Marc could not digeſt the affront which had been offered him. He complained loudly of the States for their ingratitude; boaſted of his authority in the fleet and army, and attempted to excite a ſpirit of ſedition among the people. The States were meditating to ſeize him a ſecond time, in order to bring him to his trial. But the prince of Orange, prompted by tenderneſs for his relations, and a ſenſe of his former ſervices, diſſuaded them from executing their deſign, and adviſed them to ſuffer him to leave the province. The States liſtened, though with ſome reluctance, to this advice, and the count having left the Netherlands, died ſoon afterwards in the city of Liege.

The command of the forces was conferred on the count of Battenburg, by whom they were brought under proper diſcipline; and all ſuch of the catholics as choſe to remain in the country delivered from thoſe alarms and apprehenſions with which they had been hitherto diſquieted. One cauſe of the great irregularities which had been committed by the troops, was the want of proper funds for their ſubſiſtence. The States now ſupplied this defect, as well as the preſent circumſtances of the province would allow. To the payment of the army,

army, and other public purpoſes, they appropriated the demeſnes which the king had enjoyed as count of Holland, the revenues of the Romiſh prieſts and monaſteries, and the eſtates of all ſuch catholics as had gone over to the enemy, beſides a certain proportion of the captures made at ſea [k].

Progreſs of the Spaniſh arms.

WHILE the prince of Orange and the States were thus employed in providing for the ſecurity of Holland, Frederic de Toledo had made rapid progreſs in reducing the towns which had revolted in the other provinces; nor did he find much difficulty in ſubduing them; for ſo great was the terror which they had conceived from his late ſucceſs, that of all the towns which had declared for the prince of Orange in Groningen, Overyſſel, Utrecht, and Frieſland, there was none that did not ſend ambaſſadors to Toledo, to deprecate his vengeance, and to make profeſſion of unreſerved ſubmiſſion to his will. He placed garriſons in the moſt conſiderable towns, and inflicted no other puniſhment upon the people but pecuniary fines. Had he maintained the ſame moderation in his conduct afterwards, he would not perhaps have encountered much greater difficulty in the recovery of ſome of the towns of Holland and Zealand,

[k] Grotius, p. 40. Meurſii Auriacus, p. 97.

than

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than he had met with in recovering thoſe of the interior provinces; but from natural temper, he rejoiced infinitely more in rigour and ſeverity, than in lenity and moderation; of the truth of which he gave a ſignal proof in his barbarous treatment of the inhabitants of Naerden.

Maſſacre of the people of Naerden.

THIS town was then neither large nor ſtrongly fortified, yet the citizens, prompted by ſome foreign proteſtants who reſided in it, were bold enough to refuſe admittance to a company of horſe, ſent by Toledo before his main army, to require their ſubmiſſion; but, having quickly repented of their raſhneſs, they diſpatched a deputation of the moſt reſpectable inhabitants, among whom was Lambertus Hortenſius, a man eminent for his learning, to Amersfort, where Toledo had arrived in his way to Naerden. He declined hearing the ambaſſadors himſelf, and deſired them to apply to Julio Romero, who had power, he ſaid, to grant them ſuch terms of reconcilement as *he* ſhould judge to be reaſonable. By Romero it was agreed, that the lives and fortunes of the citizens ſhould be ſpared on the following conditions: That the town ſhould be immediately delivered into the hands of Toledo; that all the inhabitants ſhould renew their oath of allegiance to the king; and that one hundred Spaniſh ſoldiers

diers ſhould be permitted to ſeize as much booty as they could carry at one time out of the city. In ratification of this agreement, Romero, having given his right hand three ſeveral times to Hortenſius, entered the town, attended by ſo ſmall a number of Spaniards as baniſhed from the minds of the citizens all apprehenſions of fraud or violence; and when he ſummoned them to meet in one of the churches to take the oath of allegiance, they ran thither unarmed, and preſented themſelves a defenceleſs prey to their bloody murderers. Whether Romero acted in concert with Toledo does not appear from the cotemporary hiſtorians. This only is certain, that while the former was employed in adminiſtering the oath; the latter, who had brought forward his troops to the gates of the town, led them directly to the church in which the citizens were aſſembled, and ordering the doors, which till then had been kept ſhut, to be thrown open, he ruſhed into it at the head of his troops, and immediately killed with his own hand the principal magiſtrate. The Spaniards were not backward to imitate the example of their general. They fell with ſavage fury on the aſtoniſhed, defenceleſs citizens, and after butchering all that were in the church, ſpead themſelves over the city, and put every perſon whom they met to the ſword. They made no diſtinction between the inno-

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cent and the guilty; the catholics, as well as proteſtants; thoſe who had preſerved their allegiance, as well as thoſe who had thrown it off, were all involved in one promiſcuous ruin. The ſoldiers then entering into the houſes, where they found the wives and daughters of the ſlain overwhelmed with anguiſh, inſtead of being ſoftened by the ſight of ſo much unmerited diſtreſs in that tender ſex, their ſavage hearts only prompted them to indulge their avarice, their cruelty, and their luſt. Even virgins under age they violated, and others they tortured in the moſt inhuman manner, either from a wanton pleaſure which they took in cruel deeds, or to extort from the unhappy ſufferers a diſcovery of the treaſure which had belonged to their murdered huſbands or parents. They ſtrangled ſome, embrued their hands in the blood of others, turned all the reſt of the city into the open fields, and then throwing fire into the houſes, reduced the town to aſhes.

THE accounts tranſmitted to us by the proteſtant writers of the horrid cruelty which the Spaniards exerciſed on this occaſion, would be incredible, if they were not confirmed by the catholic hiſtorians. There was an hoſpital in the town for old men, and at that time there were ſeveral in it above eighty years of age; even

even theſe were butchered; nor did perſons confined to the bed of ſickneſs and diſtreſs eſcape their fury. The life of Lambertus Hortenſius was ſaved by the interpoſition of the count de Boſſut; but the Spaniards made him ſuffer what was worſe than death; by murdering the ſon, and tearing his heart out of his body before the father's eyes. There is another inſtance of their cruelty recorded, which is, if poſſible, ſtill more inhuman. After having tortured in the moſt ſhocking manner one of the citizens, to make him diſcover where he had concealed his wealth, they diſhonoured his wife in his preſence, and upon his reproaching them with their barbarity, they put him to death; then having tied the woman's hands behind her, they bound her by the feet to a beam of the houſe, with her head downward, and left her to die in that poſture, with her little ſon, whom they likewiſe bound and placed beſide her, to aggravate the miſery of that dreadful death to which their cruelty had doomed her [1].

FROM this horrid maſſacre, Toledo led his army to Amſterdam, where he remained for ſome time in expectation that, from the dread of his vengeance, the other towns of the pro-

[1] Meurſii Auriacus, p. 98. Thuani, lib. liv. Bentivoglio, p. 115.

vince

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vince would be induced to make a tender of their ſubmiſſion; but the cruelty and treachery which he had exerciſed at Naerden, were not more contrary to the laws of religion and humanity, than inconſiſtent with the maxims of ſound policy, and were calculated not ſo much to excite terror as revenge and indignation. From the fate of Naerden, the people were convinced, that there was at leaſt as much to be dreaded from ſubmiſſion as from reſiſtance, and they thought it no leſs abſurd than dangerous, to enter into terms of agreement with men who had ſhewn themſelves ſo cruelly perfidious.

Siege of Haerlem.

Of this they ſoon gave a conſpicuous proof in their vigorous and obſtinate defence of Haerlem. To gain over the inhabitants of that city, Toledo had employed the mediation of the catholics of Amſterdam, and ſome of the magiſtrates of Haerlem had ſent privately three of their number to Frederic to treat with him of a ſurrender. This was no ſooner known, than Riperda, a Frieſland gentleman, to whom the prince of Orange had committed the government of the town, called together the principal inhabitants, and informed them of what had paſſed. "By a ſolemn oath," ſaid he, "the magiſtrates were lately bound not to liſten, without your permiſſion, to any propoſals,

Riperda's ſpeech.

poſals, or to engage in any deſign or enterpriſe by which the general intereſt of the city might be affected, yet, not only without your permiſſion, but even without your knowledge, they have ſent an embaſſy to treat with Toledo about delivering the city to the Spaniards. We are unable, they pretend, to withſtand ſo great a force as will be brought againſt us, and muſt be involved in all the miſeries of a cruel ſiege, unleſs we avert them by a timely application for peace and pardon. But have the Spaniards treated with greater lenity thoſe who have truſted to their faith, than thoſe who have oppoſed them? Have the people of Mechlin and Zutphen been dealt with more mercifully than thoſe of Mons? Does not the melancholy fate of Naerden ſufficiently inſtruct you how little regard is due to the promiſes of thoſe men, who have now ſhewn themſelves no leſs devoid of faith than we have ever found them of humanity? Are not the ſtreets of that unhappy city ſtill reeking with the blood of thoſe who confided in the faith and mercy of the Spaniards? By ſtanding on our defence we may elude their fury; but if we receive them into the city, we ruſh headlong upon deſtruction. They will either butcher us like ſheep, after they have ſtripped us of our arms, or reduce us to a ſtate of ignominious ſlavery and bondage. Do not flatter yourſelves with the hopes that they are

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willing to be reconciled to you. They intend only to take advantage of your ſimplicity, and to get you into their power, without expoſing themſelves to danger. Have you not already ſworn to act the part to which I now exhort you, to defend your walls againſt the Spaniards, and to preſerve your allegiance to the prince of Orange, whom you have acknowledged as the only lawful governor of the province? And in order to ſave ourſelves from the hardſhips of a ſiege, ſhall we imitate that vile example of treachery, which in our enemies appears ſo odious? Let us derive courage, my friends, from the juſtneſs of our cauſe; and rather than ſubmit to ſuch an enemy, let us reſolve to die, fighting gloriouſly in defence of our religion, our liberty, and laws."

THIS ſpeech was received with ſhouts of high applauſe by all the audience. They cried out with one voice; "No peace with the Spaniards; we will ſhed the laſt drop of our blood, rather than open our gates to ſo perfidious an enemy." Riperda then ſent information to the prince of Orange, who was at this time in Delft, of the reſolution which they had formed. And, in return, William encouraged the citizens to perſevere, by aſſuring them that the other cities in the province would exert themſelves with vigour in their behalf. Immediately

ately after which he reinforced the garriſon with four companies of Germans; and ſent St. Aldegonde with a commiſſion to put the adminiſtration of the town in the hands of ſuch as were ſincerely attached to the reformed religion. Of the three ambaſſadors who had treated with the Spaniards, one remained with Toledo, and the other two were, upon their return to Haerlem, put under arreſt, and ſent to Delft, where, after being tried, they were condemned as traitors. One of them died in priſon, and the other was executed publicly: an inſtance of ſeverity, with which the prince of Orange was not diſpleaſed, as it tended to deter the catholics in the other cities from holding correſpondence with the enemy.

THE news of theſe unexpected events excited, in the fiery tempers of Toledo and his father, the higheſt degree of wrath and indignation. They immediately gave orders for the march of the troops to Haerlem, and exerted themſelves ſtrenuouſly in making preparations for carrying on the ſiege with diſpatch and vigour.

Deſcription of Haerlem.

HAERLEM was, at the time of this memorable ſiege, the moſt conſiderable town in Holland, next to Amſterdam. It was ſurrounded with a deep ditch and a ſtrong wall, but was of

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ſo great extent, that it required a numerous garriſon to defend it. It ſtands beautifully in the midſt of an extenſive plain, having a wood on one ſide, and a branch of the river Sparen on the other; and the other branch of that river paſſes through the town, and then falls into the lake, or as it is ſometimes called, the ſea of Haerlem. Amſterdam and Leyden are nearly at the diſtance of between three and four leagues from it; the former lying towards the eaſt, and the latter towards the ſouth. From Amſterdam and Utrecht, Toledo propoſed to furniſh his army with proviſions; and the people of Haerlem expected to derive the ſame advantage from the neighbourhood of Leyden; where, in order to aſſiſt them more effectually, the prince of Orange now fixed his reſidence.

THE neareſt way by which the Spaniſh army could approach to Haerlem, was by the fort of Sparendam, the rampart of which ſtood on the dyke along which the troops muſt paſs. In this fort Riperda had placed a garriſon of three hundred men, and had begun to employ the country people in breaking down the dyke, in order to lay the country under water. But the froſt having ſet in with uncommon ſeverity, rendered all their labour fruitleſs, and gave the Spaniards eaſy acceſs to the fort. The garriſon made a vigorous reſiſtance for ſome time; but

but being attacked on every ſide, and overpowered by ſuperior numbers, they were at length compelled to retire to Haerlem.

Toledo begins the ſiege.

Toledo followed ſoon after with his army, which conſiſted of between twelve and thirteen thouſand men; ſix thouſand of whom were natives of Spain, and the reſt Walloons and Germans. He had juſt begun to aſſign them their ſeveral ſtations, when he received intelligence that a body of troops, amounting to near three thouſand men, with cannon and proviſions, were upon their march from Leyden, with an intention to enter Haerlem, before the blockade was formed. He ſet out immediately to intercept them, and had the good fortune, during a fall of ſnow, to come upon them unawares, near the village of Berkenrode. His troops being greatly ſuperior in number to the enemy, broke their ranks at the firſt onſet, and having killed between ſix and ſeven hundred, put the reſt to flight. Their officers endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. They fled precipitately, and left their cannon and proviſions a prey to the victorious army.

Progreſs of the ſiege.

Flushed with this ſucceſs, Toledo returned immediately to the ſiege. Having ſtationed the Walloons and Germans on the great road which leads to Leyden, he himſelf, with the

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Spaniards, took poſſeſſion of an hoſpital, which lay near the gate of the croſs. At this place he reſolved to begin his operations, although the gate was covered by a ſtrong ravelin, and the wall on that ſide could be more eaſily defended than in any other quarter. Into this blunder he was betrayed, not ſo much by ignorance or inadvertence, as by the contempt which he entertained for the beſieged. After the ſucceſs with which his arms had every where been attended, he did not expect to meet with the ſmalleſt difficulty in his preſent enterpriſe; and flattered himſelf that Haerlem, like the other revolted cities, would, as ſoon as he ſhould begin his attack, open her gates to receive him. From the ſame preſumption, he neglected all the precautions which are uſually taken in ſieges; and, without opening trenches to cover his men from the enemy's fire, he planted his battery, and began to cannonade the gate and ravelin. He had no ſooner made a breach, than he reſolved to ſtorm it, and for this purpoſe ordered one hundred and fifty men to croſs the ditch, by means of a portable bridge. This detachment was ordered to return, in caſe the breach ſhould be found impracticable. But the reſt of the ſoldiers, who were not leſs confident of ſucceſs than their general, and were impelled by their avidity for plunder, without waiting for the word

word of command, ran forward to the bridge, and paſſed over it in great numbers. They ſoon perceived their error. The breach was not near ſo conſiderable as they had imagined, and their ſcaling-ladders were too ſhort. The narrowneſs of the bridge, which permitted only three men to march a-breaſt, threw them into confuſion. They ſtood on the brink of the ditch, crowded together, and expoſed to the muſquetry as well as cannon of the beſieged. Still, however, the fooliſh ardor with which they were inſpired, made them unwilling to retire, till Romero, an officer whom they highly reſpected, advanced towards them, and reproached them with the madneſs of their attempt. "Do you not perceive," he cried, "that the ſmallneſs of the breach renders your aſſault impracticable? Is this the diſcipline which you have learnt in the ſchool of the duke of Alva? Thus, without orders, to expoſe yourſelves a defenceleſs prey to theſe rebels, who inſult and butcher you, while they themſelves are out of the reach of danger? You will ſoon find an opportunity to take vengeance on them. At preſent it is not in your power." At length he perſuaded them to retire, but not till he himſelf was wounded, and near two hundred private men, and a great number of officers, had fallen.

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THIS diſaſter ſerved to undeceive Toledo with regard to the facility of his enterpriſe; and he reſolved not to expoſe his troops to any further danger, till he ſhould be fully provided with every thing neceſſary for conducting the ſiege, with leſs expence of blood, and a better proſpect of ſucceſs. For this end, he gave the proper inſtructions to his agents in Utrecht and Amſterdam; but all the roads which led to his camp, were ſo much infeſted by the Hollanders, that a whole month elapſed before he was in a condition to renew his operations againſt the town.

Supplies ſent to the town over the ice.

THE prince of Orange was more ſucceſsful in his attempts to ſecure it. He could not indeed collect a ſufficient number of troops, either to raiſe the ſiege, or to force his way through the enemy's entrenchments. But the froſt having continued for ſeveral weeks, not only men, but even loaded carriages, could be conveyed over the lake with greater facility than by land. The reader need not be told with what agility the Hollanders tranſport themſelves from one place to another, over the ice, with ſcates. They exerted all their dexterity on this occaſion, and introduced into the city fifteen companies of ſoldiers, together with a great number of ſledges loaded with proviſions and ammunition.

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In the mean time Toledo had prepared every thing requiſite for reſuming the operations of the ſiege; and he now haſtened to repair the faults which he had committed in the beginning; proceeding with greater caution than before, but with the ſame activity and vigour. Having by trenches ſecured his troops againſt the fire of the beſiegers, he began to batter the town with his artillery; and at the ſame time employed his miners, of whom the duke of Alva had ſent him three thouſand from the biſhopric of Liege, in working mines, and ſapping the foundation of the walls. Neither labour nor danger was avoided. But the boldneſs and vigilance of the citizens and garriſon were in proportion to the means employed to ſubdue them. By countermines, they either prevented, or rendered ineffectual, the mines of the beſiegers; and no ſooner was a breach made in the fortifications, than ditches were dug, or ſome ſudden bulwark raiſed behind it, by which all acceſs was rendered as difficult as ever. Not ſatisfied with acting on the defenſive, they often ſallied out upon the beſiegers, deſtroyed their works, and fell upon them ſword in hand, when they were the leaſt prepared to repel their attacks.

While the Spaniards were thus kept in perpetual occupation and anxiety, the prince of Orange

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Orange laboured aſſiduouſly to increaſe their difficulties, by ſending out flying parties to intercept their convoys of proviſions. Some of theſe attempts proved ſucceſsful; and as they made it neceſſary for Toledo to ſend large detachments from his army to guard his convoys, they facilitated the introduction of ſupplies into Haerlem, and retarded the progreſs of the ſiege.

Uſeleſs cruelty exerciſed by both parties.

ALMOST all the ſupplies of the Spaniſh army came from Amſterdam, and there was but one road by which they could be conveyed. In order to take poſſeſſion of an important paſs on that road, the Prince had ſent a detachment of troops under Anthony le Peintre, who had a principal concern in the ſurpriſe of Mons. The catholics of Amſterdam having received information of this deſign, diſpatched a number of forces, ſufficient not only to ſecure the paſs, but to engage with the enemy. The two parties came to blows; the proteſtants were routed, and many of them ſlain; among whom was le Peintre their commander. In deriſion of the beſieged, the Spaniards having cut off the heads of le Peintre, and of another officer killed in that rencounter, whoſe name was Coning or King, they threw them over the walls into the city, with an inſcription tied to the head of Coning, which bore, beſides his name,

upon which they jeſted awkwardly, that he was come with two thouſand auxiliaries to raiſe the ſiege. Of this inſult the Haerlemeſe ſhewed their reſentment, by an action equally barbarous. They beheaded twelve of their Spaniſh priſoners; and then put all their heads into a caſk, which they rolled down into the trenches, after writing upon it, "The tax of the tenth penny to the duke of Alva, with the intereſt due to him on account of the delay of payment." In revenge for this barbarity, the Spaniards hung up by the feet and neck, a number of priſoners, in ſight of the beſieged; who, in return, put to death ſome more of *their* priſoners, in the ſame ignominious manner, in the view of the Spaniards. Such inſtances of barbarous and uſeleſs cruelty were often practiſed in the beginning of the preſent war; nor were they diſcontinued, till the duke of Alva and his ſon, who by their example contributed much to the ſpreading of this ſavage ſpirit, had left the Netherlands. 1572.

Toledo aſſaults the town.

THE operations of the ſiege were in the mean time carried on by Toledo with as much celerity, as the difficulty under which he laboured in furniſhing himſelf with proviſions, and the numberleſs diſeaſes which the ſeverity of the ſeaſon occaſioned among his troops, would allow. By undermining the ravelin which defended

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fended the gate of the croſs, he obliged the garriſon to abandon it; and after a cannonading, which had laſted for many days, by which he laid a great part of the wall in ruins, he at laſt reſolved to ſtorm the breach with all his forces. For this purpoſe he drew them together from their ſeveral ſtations in the night; and that he might find the beſieged unprepared, he began the aſſault before day-break. No precaution was neglected to inſure ſucceſs. The orders were explained to all the ſoldiers, particularly and diſtinctly. Each man had his ſtation and part aſſigned him. Some were appointed to ſtand at a proper diſtance from the walls, to annoy the enemy in caſe they ſhould appear; and thoſe who were deſtined for the aſſault were enjoined to obſerve the moſt profound ſilence, till they ſhould make themſelves maſters of the breach. So well was this laſt injunction obſerved, that ſeveral of the Spaniards had mounted the breach, and even ſcaled the walls, before the beſieged were appriſed of their approach. But when they had advanced thus far, they were perceived by the guards, who immediately ſounded the alarm, and tumbled them all headlong, before they had time to put themſelves into a poſture of defence.

Is repulſed.

THIS aſſault was made near the ravelin of which the Spaniards had got poſſeſſion ſome days

days before; and in order to ſecond the aſſailants, many Spaniſh officers and ſoldiers were ſtanding upon the ravelin, and a great number round it. The townſmen having reſolved to render this fortification uſeleſs to the enemy, had wrought a mine under it, and lodged there a quantity of gunpowder, and other combuſtible materials. They ſaw with joy, and ſeized inſtantly, the opportunity preſented to them, of executing their purpoſe with ſignal damage to the enemy. A part of the ravelin, with the ground adjoining to it, was blown up; and many of the Spaniards periſhed. The reſt of the army ſtood aghaſt at this unforeſeen diſaſter. The citizens left them no leiſure to recover from their aſtoniſhment, but ruſhed out impetuouſly, attacked them with irreſiſtible fury, and compelled them to retire with the loſs of a great number of officers, and upwards of three hundred private men.

He meditates the raiſing of the ſiege.

THE failure of this attempt, in which Toledo had exerted his utmoſt force and ſkill, gave him great anxiety with regard to the iſſue of the ſiege; and ſome of the principal officers adviſed him to raiſe it without delay. "All the miſeries of a ſiege," they ſaid, "were felt more by the royal army, than by the rebels who were beſieged. Through the difficult communication between the camp and Amſterdam,

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dam, the troops laboured under a perpetual ſcarcity of proviſions; and ſuffered more from the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, than from the ſword of the enemy. They would either never be able to take the place, or it would coſt them infinitely more than it was worth. In the end, the conquerors would find themſelves in as deplorable a condition as the conquered; and no army would remain, ſufficient to ſubdue the other cities which had rebelled."

THIS opinion was warmly oppoſed by other officers, who repreſented, That their ſucceſs in the further proſecution of the war, would depend on the iſſue of the preſent ſiege. "If we raiſe it," ſaid they, "we ſhall confirm all the other cities in their obſtinacy; if we perſevere, we ſhall render eaſier every future enterpriſe. The ſeaſon cannot remain long in its preſent ſeverity. One night may diſſolve the ice, of which our enemies have ſo often availed themſelves. Our loſs of men will be ſpeedily repaired by the levies which are making in the Netherlands, and by the troops which we expect from Spain. We ſhall ſoon be able to cut off the town from all communication with the other revolted cities, and when we have done this, can we doubt that the beſieged will open their gates, and throw themſelves upon our mercy?"

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Alva's letter to his ſon.

BETWEEN theſe oppoſite opinions Toledo would not take upon himſelf to decide, but referred the matter to the duke, whoſe anſwer, carrying in it the appearance of authority more than of counſel, ſhewed that he was not a little diſſatisfied with his ſon for deliberating on the ſubject. "You muſt proſecute the ſiege," ſaid Alva, in the letter which he wrote to him, "till you bring it to the deſired iſſue; unleſs you would prove yourſelf unworthy of the name you bear, of the blood from which you are ſprung, and of the command with which I have entruſted you. The more difficult this enterpriſe, the greater glory may you derive from it. In a ſiege of ſuch importance as the preſent, you ought not to conſider the number of days which it detains you, but the conſequences with which your ſucceſs or failure will be attended. You muſt now endeavour to effectuate by famine, what you have been unable to accompliſh by the ſword. You muſt blockade the town inſtead of ſtorming it; and you will be enabled to render the blockade complete, by the reinforcement which will ſoon be ſent you. But if ſtill you ſhall entertain thoughts of abandoning your enterpriſe, I will either come myſelf to the camp, ſick as I am; or if my increaſing illneſs ſhall prevent me, I will ſend for the ducheſs of

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of Alva to command the army, rather than ſuffer it to withdraw."

FREDERIC was ſtung with this reproach, and reſolved to proſecute the ſiege, regardleſs of all the difficulties and dangers which had induced him to deliberate. He proceeded ſlowly, however, on account of his want of a ſufficient number of troops to form the blockade; when, about the middle of February, the froſt went off, and changed entirely the operations of the contending parties.

Battle on the lake.

THE prince of Orange had not neglected to provide for this event. A great number of veſſels had been prepared, and as ſoon as the ice was melted, and the wind favourable, they left Leyden with a large ſupply of proviſions; and ſailing along the lake, entered into the Sparen, and got ſafe to Haerlem. In this way the beſieged were frequently ſupplied; nor could the Spaniards for ſome time procure a naval force ſufficient to prevent it. At laſt the count de Boſſut, aſſiſted by the people of Amſterdam, collected a great number of armed veſſels, with which he made his appearance on the lake. And thus the ſcene was almoſt entirely changed, and the operations of the ſiege converted, for ſeveral weeks, into the various

rencounters

rencounters which paſſed between the fleets; while the one party laboured to introduce ſupplies into the city, and the other was continually on the watch to intercept them. At firſt the actions were ſlight and unimportant, but at length the number of ſhips on both ſides being greatly augmented, they came to a general engagement; in which, after much bloodſhed, victory declared againſt the proteſtants. In this action the count de Boſſut acquired great honour, and reduced the enemy's fleet to ſo low a pitch, that henceforth they could not venture with ſafety to come within his reach. He ſoon after made himſelf maſter of a fort in the mouth of the Sparen, and having ſtationed a part of the fleet there, he rendered all acceſs to the town by water utterly impracticable.

The vigour and intrepidity of the beſieged.

During theſe tranſactions on the lake, the townſmen and garriſon exerted the ſame activity and vigour as before. They gave the beſiegers no reſpite, but haraſſed them continually, by ſallying out in ſtrong bodies, ſometimes in one quarter, and ſometimes in another. In one of the ſallies, they drove the German forces from their intrenchments, ſlew upwards of eight hundred of them, ſet on fire their tents and baggage, and carrying off a

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great number of cannon and military enſigns, returned to the town in triumph [m].

But Toledo was ſoon afterwards in a condition to prevent theſe eruptions, from which the beſieged derived ſo much glory. The reinforcement which his father had been preparing, at length arrived; and his trenches were thereby ſecured againſt any attack that could be made upon them, either from within, or from without.

Their diſtreſs.

The beſieged began to ſuffer greatly from a ſcarcity of proviſions. There was no expedient for relief, however deſperate, which they did not employ. They attempted frequently, in the night, to force the enemy's lines, and to open a paſſage for the convoys, which, agreeably to concert, the prince of Orange ſent forward, to be ready to enter the town, in caſe the garriſon could diſlodge the beſiegers from their entrenchments. But they found the enemy every where prepared to receive them, and were repulſed in all their attempts. They had then recourſe to another no leſs deſperate expedient. They broke down the dyke of the Sparen, and laid all the ground between the lake

[m] Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 218.

and

and the city under water. The Spaniards being obliged, in conſequence of this device, to quit the part of their entrenchments to which the water reached, ſome flat-bottomed boats paſſed into the town, with gun-powder and proviſions. But the relief which the beſieged received in this way was inconſiderable. Boſſut being abſolute maſter of the lake, the paſſage by which the Hollanders had entered was ſoon blocked up, and all acceſs to the town rendered as difficult as ever.

Count Battenburg defeated.

THE people of Haerlem had now no proſpect of deliverance, but from a body of troops which the prince of Orange had for ſome months been employed in aſſembling, with a view to attempt the raiſing of the ſiege. He had ſolicited aid from the queen of England, and from the French and German proteſtants. But the former was averſe at this time to declaring herſelf openly againſt Philip; and both the latter were too much occupied at home, to have either leiſure or power to afford their brethren in Holland any effectual aſſiſtance. In the mean time, the famine in Haerlem had riſen to the moſt dreadful height. Every ſpecies of ordinary food was already conſumed; and the people ſubſiſted on the roots of the coarſeſt herbs, and on the fleſh of horſes, dogs, and other animals againſt which men com-

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monly entertain the moſt irreconcilable averſion. William having got information of the extremity to which they were reduced, reſolved to make an effort in their behalf, with the forces which he had already collected. They conſiſted partly of French, German, and Engliſh proteſtants, but chiefly of raw troops, which had been levied haſtily for the preſent purpoſe in the neighbouring cities; amounting to four thouſand foot, and ſix hundred horſe. He intended to have conducted this little army himſelf, but was prevailed on by the States to give the command of it to the count of Battenburg. Notice was conveyed to the beſieged, of the time when this armament would approach Haerlem, by letters tied to pigeons, which had been brought from Haerlem to Leyden, in order to be employed as meſſengers to the beſieged, in caſe all other communication between the cities ſhould be obſtructed[n].

Battenburg ſet out from Leyden with his troops, ſeveral field-pieces, and a large convoy of proviſions, in the beginning of July. His inſtructions were, to direct his attack againſt the quarters of the Germans ſtationed towards the plain of Haerlem. The beſieged, it was expected, would ſally out upon them at

[n] Thuanus, lib. lv. c. v.

the

the ſame time, and while they were thus diſtracted by one enemy before, and another behind them, it was hoped that the convoy of proviſions would find an opportunity of entering the town. But Toledo having received intelligence of their deſign, drew up a part of his forces within their entrenchments, to repreſs the ſally intended by the beſieged, and led out the reſt to meet count Battenburg. His troops being greatly ſuperior to the enemy both in diſcipline and number, broke their ranks, and threw them into confuſion at the firſt onſet. The general, and upwards of two thouſand men, were killed; and almoſt the whole convoy of proviſions fell into the hands of the victors. 1573.

The beſieged offer to capitulate.

THIS diſaſter entirely broke the ſpirits of the beſieged, and made it neceſſary for them to propoſe a ſurrender without delay. They accordingly ſent a deputution to Toledo, with an offer to deliver up the town, on condition that the inhabitants ſhould not be pillaged, and that the garriſon ſhould be allowed to march out of it with the honours of war. Toledo refuſed to liſten to theſe, or any other conditions; and informed them that they muſt leave it to him to determine, what treatment both the garriſon and citizens ſhould receive.

His anſwer.

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THE beſieged were too well acquainted with his implacable ſpirit, not to ſhrink at the thoughts of expoſing themſelves to his mercy. They had not forgotten the diſmal cataſtrophe of Naerden. They conſidered this anſwer as a declaration, that he had devoted them to deſtruction. The people ran in crowds from every quarter of the city, to the places of public reſort, in order to learn the particulars of that fatal anſwer which the deputies had brought. The women, the aged, and all the more unwarlike part of the inhabitants, were overwhelmed with terror. As if their houſes had been already in flames, or as if they had beheld the bloody ſword of the Spaniard waving round them, there was nothing to be ſeen or heard, but tears, and ſhrieks, and groans. Their deſpair was ſoon afterwards converted into a degree of madneſs, by a reſolution formed by the governor and garriſon, to leave all ſuch as were unable to bear arms behind them, and to force their way, ſword in hand, through the enemy's lines. To prevent them from executing their purpoſe, the women haſtened tumultuouſly (many of them with their children in their arms) to the gate where the garriſon had appointed to rendezvous before their departure. It was a ſcene truly piteous and miſerable; the women either rolling in the duſt, or clinging round the necks and knees of their huſbands, fathers,

fathers, ſons, or brothers; diſſolved in tears, and imploring that they might be carried along with them, and ſuffered either to eſcape or periſh together. The men were melted at the ſight of ſo much anguiſh in perſons ſo near and dear to them, and yielded at laſt to their entreaties. It was then agreed, that one half of all the military in the town ſhould march in the front, the other half in the rear, and the women, children, and others unable to bear arms, in the middle between them. Drawn up in this form, they reſolved to attempt a paſſage with their ſwords through the enemy's entrenchments. They knew it to be impoſſible but that moſt of them muſt periſh. "But if we open our gates to the Spaniards," ſaid Riperda, "muſt we not likewiſe periſh? And if we muſt die (though ſtill it is poſſible we may eſcape), is it not better to die fighting bravely in the field; we who have exerted ourſelves ſo ſtrenuouſly in defence of our religion and liberty; than, after being ſtript of our arms, and bound like criminals, to receive an ignominious death upon a ſcaffold, or in a dungeon, from the hands of an ungenerous and unrelenting enemy?"

Toledo offers more favourable terms.

THEY were upon the point of putting their deſign in execution, when intelligence of it was carried to Toledo. He conſidered, that

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if they were not diverted from it, he ſhould, in conſequence of his victory, inſtead of a great and important city, acquire poſſeſſion only of a deſolated ruin. He reflected too on the danger to which his troops might be expoſed, from the fury of ſo many brave men animated by deſpair and vengeance; and therefore, without delay, he ſent a trumpet to the beſieged, to give them hopes of favour and forgiveneſs. There was a violent ſtruggle in their minds for ſome time between their fears, and the hopes with which he thus inſpired them. But from their knowledge of his character, their diſtruſt and diffidence prevailed; and they refuſed to hearken to his propoſal, till he engaged, that, on condition of their paying two hundred thouſand livres, the army ſhould be reſtrained from plundering the inhabitants, and that all of them, except fifty-ſeven whom he named, ſhould receive a full pardon of their offences.

THIS exception of ſo great a number of citizens, who were the moſt conſiderable perſons in the town, and had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their bravery in its defence, would have prevented the accommodation from taking place, had not the German part of the garriſon urged in the moſt determined manner, that the conditions offered ſhould be accepted. The Walloons,

Walloons, on the other hand, and the Dutch, were extremely reluctant and averſe; becauſe, as they were more obnoxious than the Germans, they believed that no mercy would be ſhewn them. The garriſon being thus divided in their ſentiments, and many of them having, with a view to make their eſcape, ſecretly withdrawn from their ſtations on the walls, the inhabitants began to dread that the Spaniards, obſerving them grown more remiſs than formerly, might take the town by ſtorm; and therefore, without further delay, they ſent a deputation of their number, to make the ſurrender on the terms propoſed.

The ſurrender.

A REGIMENT of Spaniards was immediately ſent to take poſſeſſion of the place. All perſons, whether inhabitants or foreign ſoldiers, were ordered to lay down their arms. The citizens were commanded to retire into certain churches, and the garriſon to certain monaſteries, where guards were placed over them, to prevent their eſcape. On the ſame day, Toledo entered the town with the Spaniſh troops. In order to induce the foreign ſoldiers, of whom the garriſon chiefly conſiſted, to concur with the inhabitants in the ſurrender, Toledo had given them particular aſſurances of ſafety. And although they were ſtrictly guarded, and not ſuffered to depart, yet bread had been diſtributed

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to *them* as well as to the citizens; and no violence was offered them till the third day, when the duke of Alva, who had recovered from his illneſs, came to Haerlem, on pretence of viſiting the fortifications, but in reality to inſtruct his ſon with regard to his treatment of the priſoners.

The perfidious cruelty of Alva and his ſon.

It was then, but too late, that this brave, though now defenceleſs garriſon, repented of having ſo tamely delivered up their arms; and ſaw the folly of truſting in the mercy of an ungenerous enemy, whoſe revenge and hatred were implacable. A maſſacre, which had been concerted in the interview between the father and ſon, was begun, by putting to death three hundred Walloons. At the ſame time, the brave Riperda and other perſons of note were beheaded. But the ſlaughter ſtopt not here. Several hundreds of French, Scotch, and Engliſh ſoldiers, beſides a conſiderable number of the citizens who had been ſeized in attempting to make their eſcape, were likewiſe butchered; and when the executioners were tired with ſlaughtering, they tied the unhappy victims two by two, and plunged them into the river. Even the ſick and wounded were carried out into the court-yard of the hoſpital where they lay, and put to the ſword.

Historians

HISTORIANS differ as to the number of thoſe who were involved in this diſmal cataſtrophe; and it is remarkable that ſome of the Spaniſh writers make it greater than the Dutch. By the loweſt account, nine hundred brave men were executed like the vileſt malefactors, who, truſting to Toledo's promiſe, had given up their arms, and thrown themſelves upon his mercy.

Conſequences of the vigorous defence of Haerlem.

IT would ſhock the reader's humanity to offer any excuſe for ſuch inhuman cruelty; yet it muſt not be denied that Alva had ample matter of chagrin, when he conſidered how much the length of the ſiege, and the obſtinate valour of the beſieged, had coſt him. By the inclemency of the ſeaſon, by the ſcarcity of proviſions, and by the ſword of the enemy, he had loſt four thouſand five hundred men; beſides a great number whom their diſeaſes or wounds rendered unfit for ſervice. Nor was the diminution of his forces the only loſs which he ſuſtained from this ſiege. It was attended with an expence, by which his treaſury was exhauſted. It ſunk conſiderably the reputation of his arms, and inſpired the inſurgents with hopes, that an enemy, who had found it ſo difficult to conquer, might themſelves be overcome. It afforded leiſure to the other revolted cities to ſettle their affairs, and furniſhed them with the

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the happieſt opportunity of carrying on their conqueſts in Zealand, where the city of Middleburg ſtill remained in the hands of the Spaniards [o].

Mutiny of the Spaniſh troops.

Of the ſeveral inconveniencies which the duke of Alva ſuffered from the length of the ſiege, the draining of his treaſury was not the leaſt conſiderable; as it occaſioned his falling behind in the payment of his troops, and rendered abortive all the ſucceeding operations of the campaign. He intended that they ſhould have gone from Haerlem into North Holland, to ſecure the town of Alcmaer. But when orders were given for their march, they refuſed to obey. They had been greatly exaſperated by the conditions granted to the people of Haerlem, becauſe they were thereby diſappointed in their hopes of plunder; and they reſolved to make Toledo feel their reſentment, by inſiſting on the immediate payment of their arrears. He repreſented to them the prejudice which the King's intereſt would ſuffer from their remaining inactive at the preſent criſis. But the more they perceived their importance, the higher was the gratification of their reſentment. Without regard either to Toledo's remonſtrances, or to the terms on which Haerlem had

[o] Bentivoglio, p. 117. Meteren, p. 110. Meurſii Auriacus, lib. viii.

been

been ſurrendered, they fixed their quarters in that city; laid the citizens, already exhauſted by their ſufferings, under contribution, and exerciſed over them the ſame tyrannical oppreſſion as if they had taken the town by ſtorm: thus demonſtrating to the inhabitants of the other cities, the abſurdity of ſubmitting to the Spaniards, whatever conditions might be offered; ſince, even when their commanders were willing to obſerve theſe conditions, they were violated by the ſoldiers, whoſe rapacity the general was unable to reſtrain.

THIS incident affected the duke of Alva with the moſt ſenſible concern. He was aware of the pernicious effects that muſt ariſe from it. He had ever valued himſelf, and not without reaſon, on the exact diſcipline which he had hitherto maintained. Inclined, but at the ſame time afraid, to employ rigour and ſeverity, leſt ſtill more pernicious conſequences might follow, he reſolved to make trial of perſuaſion; and with this view he employed the interceſſion of the marquis of Vitelli, who was the moſt beloved as well as the moſt reſpected of all his officers. Vitelli exerted his utmoſt art and influence; and at laſt, with infinite difficulty, he perſuaded the mutineers to accept a part of their arrears,

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and to ſubmit to the authority of their commanders [p].

The ſiege of Alcmaer.

Much time having been employed in this negotiation, the ſeaſon was far advanced before the army could be led to Alcmaer. This place (if they had attacked it ſooner) muſt unavoidably have fallen into their hands. It had been the laſt of all the cities in North Holland in ſhaking off its allegiance to Philip. The catholic inhabitants were numerous, and had been able to keep poſſeſſion of one of the principal gates of the town. They had earneſtly ſolicited Toledo to haſten to their aſſiſtance. But the mutiny of his troops having prevented him from complying with their requeſt till it was too late, the Prince of Orange had improved the leiſure which this incident afforded him; and having ſent forces to the aſſiſtance of the proteſtant inhabitants, he had wreſted the gate out of the hands of the catholics; furniſhed the proteſtants with arms, and procured for them, from the neighbouring cities, ſupplies of proviſions and military ſtores.

Toledo was aware of the diſadvantages which muſt attend his entering on the ſiege of

[p] Bentivoglio, p. 131.

a place

a place, ſituated like Alcmaer, in a marſhy ſoil, ſo late in the year. But he hoped that, with ſo great an army as he now poſſeſſed [q], he would be able to reduce it before the rainy ſeaſon ſhould begin; and he knew that the reduction of Alcmaer would greatly facilitate his conqueſt of the other towns in the province. He left Haerlem, therefore, as ſoon as Vitelli had quelled the mutiny of the troops, and marched directly towards Alcmaer [r].

HAVING planted a battery on each ſide of the town, he began a briſk cannonading, and in a few days made ſuch conſiderable breaches, that he doubted not of being able to carry the town by ſtorm. In order to divide the garriſon, he reſolved to make an aſſault on both ſides at once. The inhabitants perceived his deſign, and prepared for their defence. The Spaniards having paſſed the ditch, by means of two portable bridges, advanced to the attack with loud ſhouts, and full of confidence that there was no force in the place ſufficient to oppoſe them. But they ſoon found that courage, when grounded on deſpair, can in ſome caſes ſupply the want both of diſcipline and numbers. The garriſon, ſeconded by the

The Spaniards bravely repulſed.

[q] It amounted to ſixteen thouſand men.

[r] It lies at the diſtance of only one day's journey from Haerlem.

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townſmen, made ſo intrepid a reſiſtance, as filled the Spaniards with aſtoniſhment. They renewed the attack ſeveral times; but were at laſt obliged to retire with the loſs of ſix hundred killed, and three hundred wounded. Toledo could not, either by promiſes or threats, perſuade them to return to the aſſault. Soon afterwards the rains began to fall, and the Spaniards ſuffered greatly from the humidity of the air and ſoil. The duke of Alva too had received intelligence, that the Hollanders had formed the deſign of opening their ſluices, in order to lay the country round Alcmaer under water. To ſave his army, therefore, from deſtruction, he ſent orders to his ſon to raiſe the ſiege; which Frederick did accordingly on the eleventh of October. He then marched to the ſouthern parts of the province, and put his troops, greatly fatigued and exhauſted, into winter-quarters [s].

The ſiege raiſed.

Sea-fight near Amſterdam.

ALVA was not more fortunate at this time by ſea, than he had been by land at Alcmaer. In revenge for the aſſiſtance which the people of Amſterdam had lent the Spaniards in the ſiege of Haerlem, the inhabitants of Enchuyſen, Horn, and other proteſtant cities, had fitted out againſt them a numerous fleet, which they

[s] Meteren, p. 123. Thuanus, lib. lv. ſect. 8.

ſtationed

ſtationed in the mouth of the river Ye. With this fleet they took or deſtroyed every veſſel that attempted to paſs from Amſterdam into the Zwider ſea, and thus put an entire ſtop to the trade of that commercial city. To remedy this evil, which muſt ſoon have proved fatal to a people who ſubſiſted wholly by trade, the duke of Alva had come himſelf to Amſterdam, where he had equipped with the utmoſt expedition a fleet, conſiſting of twelve ſhips of war, of a much larger ſize than uſual, of which he gave the command to the count de Boſſut. This fleet was much inferior in number to that of the enemy; but this diſadvantage, Alva hoped, would be compenſated by the number of ſoldiers on board, added to the ſuperior ſize of the ſhips, and the ſkill and bravery of the commander.

The proteſtants victorious.

As ſoon as Boſſut approached the mouth of the river, the Hollanders left their ſtation, and retired towards Horn and Enchuyſen. Here they received a conſiderable reinforcement; and ſoon afterwards returned, under the command of Theodore Sonoy, to watch an opportunity to encounter the enemy on advantageous terms. The two fleets for ſome time lay in ſight of each other, and frequent ſkirmiſhes paſſed between them. Boſſut heſitated long, whether he ſhould venture to engage with a

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force ſo much ſuperior; and for this reaſon he kept his fleet in the open ſea, and in the deepeſt water, where he could avail himſelf of the ſize of his ſhips. But the people of Amſterdam, impatient under the interruption of their trade, having tranſmitted a falſe repreſentation to the duke of Alva of the ſtrength of the Dutch fleet, perſuaded him to ſend poſitive orders for a general engagement. Boſſut, though extremely diffident of ſucceſs, immediately ſteered towards the enemy, who lay in ſhallow water, prepared for his attack. The combat was begun with great ſpirit and intrepidity, but victory ſoon appeared on the ſide of the Hollanders; who having a much greater number of ſhips than the enemy, attacked them on every ſide; and being much nimbler in all their motions, did them a great deal of miſchief, while their own loſs was inconſiderable. Of Boſſut's fleet, one ſhip, with all the crew, was ſunk; three were ſtranded, and afterwards taken by the Hollanders; and all the reſt, except the admiral's galley, ſaved themſelves by flight. Of this veſſel, the cotemporary hiſtorians ſpeak in the ſtrongeſt terms; and repreſent her as one of the largeſt, and the beſt equipped, that had been ever ſeen. She was ſurrounded by a number of the enemy's ſmaller veſſels, which battered her furiouſly on every ſide, and at length drove her upon a bank. Boſſut, ſtill unwilling

unwilling to suffer her to fall into their hands, continued to make the most obstinate resistance [s], till, of three hundred soldiers on board, two hundred and twenty were killed, and all the rest wounded but fifteen. In this situation, one of the Spaniards, who remembered the scenes of treachery and bloodshed in which he had been concerned in Naerden and Haerlem, advised the admiral to receive the enemy into the ship, and then to blow her in the air. But Bossut, conscious of having done every thing that either his duty or his honour could require, refused to listen to so desperate a proposal, and chose rather to confide in an offer which was made him by the Hollanders, that if he would surrender without any further resistance, they would spare the lives of all that were on board. On this condition the ship was accordingly given up; and Bossut, with such of the crew and soldiers as survived, was conducted to prison in the town of Horn [t].

Bossut is taken prisoner.

Sonoy sent immediate notice of this victory to the States of Holland; who being sensible how much their safety depended on maintain-

[s] This engagement lasted for twenty-eight hours.

[t] The admiral's ship, called the Inquisition, carried only two and thirty guns.—Thuanus, lib. lv. sect. vii. Meteren, p. 125. Bentivoglio, p. 133.

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The States acquire San Gertrudenberg.

THEIR joy on this occaſion was not a little increaſed by the acquiſition of San Gertrudenberg; which gave them the command of the Maeſe, and a free entrance into the province of Brabant. It was taken by a detachment of their troops, under the command of the Sieur de Payette, a French proteſtant, who entered it in the night by ſcalade, and put the garriſon, conſiſting of a cohort of Walloons under a Spaniſh governor, to the ſword.

St. Aldegonde taken priſoner.

THIS loſs was in ſome meaſure compenſated to the duke of Alva, by an advantage which a detachment of his army gained over the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, who had marched with a body of troops to check the excurſions of the Spaniards in the ſouthern parts of Holland. St. Aldegonde's forces were cut to pieces or diſperſed, and he himſelf was taken priſoner. Alva would not have ſpared the life of a man, who, by his activity in rouſing the ſpirit of liberty among his countrymen, had rendered himſelf ſo exceedingly obnoxious, had he not been reſtrained by his regard for the preſervation of the

the count de Boſſut; upon whom the prince of Orange had declared he would retaliate, for whatever ſeverity ſhould be uſed againſt St. Aldegonde[u]. 1573.

Alva leaves the Netherlands.

Alva intended to have begun the next campaign with the ſiege of Leyden; and with this view he ſeized upon a number of ſtations in the neighbourhood of that city. But this ſiege, no leſs memorable than that of Haerlem, was reſerved for his ſucceſſor. Alva had, as mentioned above, applied to Philip for liberty to leave the Low Countries, on account of the bad ſtate of his health, occaſioned by the moiſture of the climate, and the fatigues which he had undergone. This was believed by many to be only a pretence; while his requeſt proceeded in reality from apprehenſions, that the king had liſtened to the repreſentations of his enemies, and would ſoon confer his office upon another. There is very little reaſon, however, to ſuppoſe that Philip was in the ſmalleſt degree diſſatisfied with his conduct, ſince he appears, in all his tyranny and violence, to have acted with ſtrict conformity to his inſtructions. But Philip having at laſt become diffident of the ſucceſs of thoſe cruel meaſures which he had hitherto preſcribed,

[u] Meurſii Albanus, p. 270. Meteren, p. 125.

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had reſolved, not from choice, but from neceſſity, to make trial of ſome more gentle expedients. He knew how unfit the duke of Alva was to be employed in the execution of this new plan of government; and he believed that no conceſſions would prove acceptable to the revolted provinces, that could be made by one who had rendered himſelf ſo much the object of their abhorrence. He had therefore readily conſented that Alva ſhould retire, and had, more than a year before the preſent period, appointed the duke de Medina Cœli governor of the Netherlands, in his room. This nobleman having found, upon his arrival, that the provinces were in a very different ſtate from what he had expected, and that the charge which he had undertaken would probably be attended with much greater difficulty than glory, declined entering upon it, and afterwards obtained leave from Philip to return to Spain. He remained however in the Low Countries, till towards the end of the preſent year, when the new governor Don Lewis de Zuniga, and Requeſens, arrived. And ſoon afterwards the duke of Alva, who had come to Bruſſels to receive Requeſens, having reſigned the regency into his hands, ſet out with his ſon, by the way of Germany and Italy, for Spain.

The new governor.

On this occaſion men were affected variouſly. Even all the proteſtants did not entertain the ſame ſentiments with regard to the effects which the duke's departure was likely to produce. While ſome rejoiced at it from the dread which they entertained of his abilities; others conſidered, that for ſeveral months paſt his good fortune had forſaken him; and they believed that the abhorrence which his tyranny had excited towards his perſon and government, would, by proving a powerful bond of union among his enemies, effectually prevent them from liſtening to any inſidious terms of accommodation which the Spaniards might propoſe.

Alva's boaſt.

He was regarded, both by the catholics and proteſtants, as the chief ſource of all the calamities in which the Netherlands had been involved. He had received his government from the ducheſs of Parma, in a ſtate of perfect tranquillity. By his tyranny he had thrown it into the moſt terrible combuſtion, and kindled the flames of a deſtructive war, which he was conſcious of being unable to extinguiſh, and had therefore applied for liberty to retire. He is ſaid to have boaſted to count Koningſtein [v], at whoſe houſe he lodged in his

[v] Uncle to the prince of Orange.

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way to Italy, that during his government of five years and a half, upwards of eighteen thouſand heretics had ſuffered by the hand of the public executioner; beſides a much greater number whom he had put to the ſword, in the towns which he took, and in the field of battle.

His government.

THE ſituation of the Low Countries during Alva's adminiſtration, was truly deplorable. His oppreſſion was not confined to the proteſtants; but great numbers too of the catholics were put to death, and their effects forfeited, on the pretence of their having given entertainment to heretics, or of having held a correſpondence with them in their exile. Wives were puniſhed with the utmoſt ſeverity for affording ſhelter to their huſbands, whom the council of tumults had condemned; children for performing the like kind offices to their parents; and in Utrecht, a father was executed for allowing his ſon, who had returned from baniſhment, to lodge under his roof for one night. By forcing ſo many thouſands of the moſt induſtrious inhabitants to leave the country, and by neglecting to provide a naval force to oppoſe the exiles at ſea, commerce was almoſt entirely ruined; notwithſtanding which, he impoſed upon the people more oppreſſive taxes than they could have

have borne, if they had been in the moſt flouriſhing condition. In levying his taxes, the utmoſt rigour was employed. The people were often wantonly provoked, and tumults purpoſely excited, from which occaſion was taken to puniſh them with confiſcation of their goods, and ſometimes both with death and confiſcation. From the confiſcations and taxes large ſums were raiſed; yet, by maintaining ſo numerous an army, and by building citadels to keep the principal towns in awe, as he received little aſſiſtance from the king, who was engaged in other expenſive enterpriſes, he fell behind in the payment of his troops; and in order to keep them in good humour, he permitted them to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants; againſt whom they exerciſed, on many occaſions, the moſt cruel and oppreſſive rapacity.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIII.

PART I.

BOOK XIII.

1573. Character of Requeſens.

PHILIP could not have made choice of a more proper ſucceſſor to the duke of Alva than *Requeſens*, who had acquired ſome military fame in the battle of Lepanto, and had diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the government of Milan, by his prudence and moderation; qualities from which Philip now hoped for greater ſucceſs in quelling the rebellious ſpirit of his ſubjects in the Netherlands, than had attended the violent adminiſtration of the duke of Alva.

1574. He applies himſelf to raiſe the ſiege of Middleburg.

To ſhew as early as poſſible that a change of meaſures had been adopted by the court of Spain,

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1574. Spain, Requeſens began his government with demoliſhing Alva's ſtatue above mentioned, and with repreſſing the inſolence of certain garriſons, at whoſe enormities his predeceſſor had connived[a]. He then applied with great induſtry to make the neceſſary preparations for the relief of Middleburg; which, having been cloſely beſieged by the Zealanders for more than a year and a half, was now reduced to the laſt extremity. Several vigorous attempts had been made, during the duke of Alva's adminiſtration, to raiſe the ſiege; but through the ſuperiority of the Dutch fleet, they had proved abortive; and Mondragon the governor had given notice, that if he was not relieved in a few days, he would find it neceſſary to ſurrender.

REQUESENS knew that nothing but the moſt preſſing neceſſity would have drawn this declaration from an officer of ſo great ſpirit and fortitude as Mondragon. And he was ſenſible, that, upon the preſervation of Middleburg, depended *that* of all the other towns in Zealand which retained their allegiance. He therefore poſtponed every other object of his attention; and having gone to Antwerp, he equipped there, and at Bergen-op-zoom, with the

[a] Strada, ab init. anno one thouſand five hundred and ſeventy-four.

utmoſt

utmoſt expedition, a fleet conſiſting of more than thirty ſhips, beſides tranſports, with proviſions and military ſtores [b]. 1574.

THIS fleet he divided into two ſquadrons, one of which, commanded by the vice-admiral, the Sieur de Glimes and Julio Romero, he ordered to ſail from Bergen, down the Eaſter Scheld; and the other, under Sancio d'Avila, to fall down the Hondt or Weſter Scheld, from Antwerp. By this meaſure, he intended to diſtract the enemy's attention, and to oblige them to divide their forces; and he hoped that at leaſt one of the two ſquadrons might effectuate its entrance into the canal of Middleburg.

BUT the prince of Orange, whoſe adherents were numerous in every corner of the maritime provinces, had received early information of the governor's deſign, and had likewiſe got intelligence of his plan of operations. Having paſſed over from Holland to the iſle of Walcheren, and taken up his reſidence in Fluſhing, in order to aſſiſt the Zealanders with his counſel, William ſtationed a part of his fleet on the ſouth coaſt of the iſland, to lie in wait for d'Avila; and ſent all the reſt, ſtrongly manned,

[b] Meteren, p. 131.

and

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and well equipped for fighting, up the Eaſter Scheld, with orders, as ſoon as poſſible to attack the fleet under the command of de Glimes and Romero.

Battle of Sacherlo.

THIS fleet, with the greateſt part of the tranſports, had already ſet ſail from Bergen; and Requeſens, extremely anxious for its fate, had accompanied it as far as Sacherlo. There it caſt anchor, and was waiting for the riſing tide, when the Zealanders, commanded by Boiſot admiral of Holland, arrived in ſight. De Glimes ſoon perceived the ſuperiority of Boiſot's fleet, both in the ſize and number of the ſhips, and was of opinion that he ought not to proceed in the intended enterpriſe; but he was over-ruled by Romero, who, prompted by his innate courage, and by that contempt, which, like the reſt of his countrymen, he entertained for the Dutch inſurgents, inſiſted that they ſhould try the fortune of a battle. They accordingly weighed anchor, and advanced to the enemy. In the beginning of the engagement, de Glimes's own ſhip ran foul of a ſand-bank, from which ſhe could not be diſengaged. The Zealanders perceiving her diſtreſs, attacked her on every ſide, and at length ſet her on fire. Romero haſtened to her aſſiſtance; but all his attempts to extinguiſh the flames proved ineffectual. In a few minutes ſhe

ſhe ſunk; after having communicated the flames to Romero's ſhip, that had come to her relief. Romero was obliged to jump overboard, and ſave his life by ſwimming [c]. The Zealanders had the ſame fortunate ſucceſs againſt all the other ſhips of the enemy; they ſunk ſome, burnt others, and took the reſt. Beſides De Glimes, and ſeveral other officers, near a thouſand Walloons and Spaniards periſhed. The victory was deciſive. And Requeſens had the mortification, from the dyke of Sacherlo, to be an eye-witneſs of this diſaſter, which was great in itſelf; but was rendered ſtill greater, and more afflicting to him, by the fatal conſequences with which he foreſaw it muſt be attended.

D'Avila in the mean time, with the ſquadron under his command, had ſailed from Antwerp, and advanced as far as Fluſhing. Had he proceeded in his voyage without delay, he muſt have reached Middleburg, in ſpite of the Dutch fleet which had been ſtationed to oppoſe him; for it is not probable that he would have met with great reſiſtance from that fleet, as the flower of all the forces belonging to it had been ſent with Boiſot. The prince of Orange, who knew this, was extremely apprehenſive of

[c] Meurſii Auriacus, p. 122.

the

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the iſſue, and anxiouſly longed for Boiſot's return: but he was ſoon delivered from his anxiety, by obſerving from a promontory near Fluſhing, that, inſtead of haſtening forward, d'Avila had caſt anchor, and ſeemed reſolved to wait for the arrival of De Glimes and Romero. In a few hours d'Avila received intelligence of their defeat; after which, deſpairing of being able to relieve the beſieged, he immediately ſet ſail for Antwerp. He was purſued by the enemy; but having betaken himſelf to flight in time, he arrived with very little loſs at his deſtined port.

The ſurrender of Middleburg.

THE prince of Orange conveyed intelligence to Mondragon of what had paſſed, by a Spaniſh officer whom he had taken priſoner; and at the ſame time threatened, that if he did not ſurrender the town in a few days, the garriſon ſhould be put to the ſword without mercy. Great numbers of the beſieged had already died of hunger, or of the unwholeſome food to which they had been obliged to have recourſe. Proviſions of almoſt every kind, not excepting the fleſh of dogs and horſes, were conſumed; nor had they any other food, but bread made of flax ſeed; and even this was nearly exhauſted. Mondragon, perceiving that the deſtruction of the garriſon, as well as of the inhabitants, muſt be the certain conſequence of his

refuſing

refuſing to capitulate, conſented to give up both the city of Middleburg and Armuyden, on condition that the garriſons ſhould be allowed to depart with their arms and baggage, and that the eccleſiaſtics, and all ſuch of the catholic inhabitants as inclined to withdraw, ſhould have liberty to diſpoſe of their effects, and be tranſported to the continent. William highly reſpected Mondragon on account of his gallant conduct during the ſiege, and agreed to theſe conditions; but required that he ſhould pledge his honour that he would procure the releaſe of St. Aldegonde, and two or three more of the proteſtant leaders, to return into captivity. In the ſequel, Mondragon ſhewed himſelf worthy of the confidence which was repoſed in him. By his interceſſion with Requeſens, St. Aldegonde and the other priſoners were ſet at liberty [d].

Apprehenſions of the prince of Orange.

NOTWITHSTANDING this ſignal triumph gained over Requeſens in his firſt enterpriſe, the prince of Orange was not without apprehenſions, that the difference between his character and that of his predeceſſor, added to the difference of meaſures which he ſeemed determined to purſue, might produce ſome alteration in the ſentiments of the people. The high mili-

[d] Meteren, p. 120. Bentivoglio.

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tary talents, the vigour and activity of Alva, had been objects of dread and terror. They had overawed moſt of the provinces, and rendered the efforts of others ineffectual; but as the oppreſſive violence of that tyrant had at firſt given birth to the revolt, ſo it had contributed more than any other cauſe to cheriſh and ſupport it. Under a milder and more artful governor, William dreaded not only that the inhabitants of the interior provinces would acquieſce in the eſtabliſhed government, but that even the people of Holland and Zealand would be enticed again to yield their necks to the Spaniſh yoke. And to prevent this, he employed every conſideration that could work either on their hopes or fears.

He puts the people on their guard.

THE king had ſo far complied with their wiſhes, as to remove the duke of Alva; but how little reaſon they had to flatter themſelves, that any greater regard would be now paid to their rights than formerly, was manifeſt from his choice of the new governor, who had procured his maſter's favour, by the exerciſe of cruelty over the Moors in Granada; and who, being a ſtranger and a Spaniard as well as Alva, could not be greatly intereſted in the proſperity of the provinces, nor have any other end in view, but to promote the tyrannical deſigns of the court of Spain. Requeſens indeed had a more

more benign and placid countenance than Alva; but the danger to which the provinces were expoſed, was for this reaſon the more to be dreaded by every friend of his country. Amidſt the governor's profeſſions of concern for their proſperity, no mention had been made of freeing them from that enormous load of taxes under which they groaned; or of delivering their conſciences from that reſtraint and violence, which the former governor had impoſed upon them; or of reſtoring the laws which Alva had ſo wantonly trampled under foot; or in ſhort, of diſmiſſing thoſe foreign troops, from whoſe rapacity they had ſuffered ſuch intolerable outrage. In order to accompliſh theſe important purpoſes, the provinces of Holland and Zealand had taken up arms; and although the fortune of the war had been various, yet in ſpite of the moſt vigorous efforts of the duke of Alva, with a numerous army, to reduce them, theſe provinces were governed by their own inhabitants, and enjoyed the free and full poſſeſſion of their religious and civil rights. The other provinces ought now to imitate the example of their countrymen, and they might reaſonably hope that their endeavours would be attended with ſucceſs; the king having appointed a governor over them, inexperienced in the art of war, and unacquainted with the army under his command, which was

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at preſent ſtrongly infected with a ſpirit of ſedition and diſcontent. It might perhaps appear raſh and daring for the inhabitants of ſo narrow a territory as the Netherlands, to enter the liſts with ſo potent an enemy as the king of Spain; but the power of that monarch was not in reality ſo formidable as it ſeemed. The great extent of his dominions ſerved rather to embarraſs and encumber him, than to add to his ſtrength; and conſidering the diſtance of his place of reſidence, and the difficulty of tranſporting troops either from Spain or Italy, there was little reaſon to apprehend that he would ever be able to ſubdue the people of the Netherlands; if they acted with that unanimity and ſpirit which became them, in a cauſe, wherein, not only their property, and their exiſtence as a commercial ſtate, but their religion and civil liberty, were at ſtake.

The laſt attempt of count Lewis of Naſſau.

By theſe and ſuch other arguments, did the prince of Orange animate the people to cooperate with him, in aſſerting their liberty, in oppoſition to the plan formed by the court of Spain to enſlave them.

Meanwhile, his brother count Lewis, who had reſided in Germany ever ſince the ſurrender of Mons, was employed in attempting to perſuade the proteſtant princes there, to aſſiſt him

him in his preparations for a new invaſion of the interior provinces; to which, notwithſtanding the failure of his former enterpriſes, Lewis was prompted, partly by his knowledge of the mutinous ſpirit of the Spaniſh troops, but chiefly by the proſpect of that aſſiſtance which it was now in his brother's power to afford him. It was concerted between the two brothers, that as ſoon as count Lewis had finiſhed his levies, the prince ſhould advance with a body of troops towards the interior provinces, either to make a diverſion in his brother's favour, or to unite their forces.

Lewis found it extremely difficult to procure money to defray the expence of his intended expedition. His brother's fortune, as well as his own, were almoſt ruined by their former military enterpriſes. The States of Holland were involved in greater expence than they were able to ſupport. They had, in conjunction with the prince of Orange, made application to the queen of England; but this princeſs, being unwilling to embroil herſelf with Philip, had refuſed to aſſiſt them. Lewis had begun his preparations, in hopes of receiving ſupplies from ſome German princes, who had promiſed their aſſiſtance, but who were either not inclined, or unable to fulfil their engagements. To ſave himſelf from the

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affront of abandoning an undertaking, in which a great number of French and German proteſtants had engaged at his requeſt, he opened a negotiation with Schomberg, ambaſſador of Charles the Ninth of France, who at this time courted the favour of the proteſtant princes in Germany, with a view to facilitate the election of his brother, the duke of Anjou, to the crown of Poland. Between Lewis and Schomberg, who met at Francfort on the Maine, it was agreed, That if Charles ſhould, in behalf of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, declare war againſt the king of Spain, the provinces of Holland and Zealand ſhould be immediately delivered into the hands of the French monarch; on his engaging to maintain all their rights, and in particular, the free exerciſe of the reformed religion. But if Charles ſhould not make open war, it was agreed, that count Lewis ſhould have three hundred thouſand livres to aſſiſt him in his preſent enterpriſe; that the French king ſhould have the ſovereignty of Holland and Zealand, and that ſome of the German princes ſhould be ſurety for the performance of this condition. A part of the money was paid, and Lewis was thereby enabled to complete his levies, which amounted to between three and four thouſand horſe, and ſeven thouſand foot[c].

[c] Thuanus, lib. lv. Meteren, p. 133.—Charles died ſoon after, and the treaty had no other conſequences.

He

HE began his march, accompanied by his brother Henry, and Chriſtopher ſon of the elector Palatine, in the beginning of February; and deſpiſing the rigour of the ſeaſon, he advanced with great rapidity towards the Netherlands, in hopes of finding the governor unprepared. Having croſſed the Rhine and the Moſelle, he directed his courſe towards Guelderland, with an intention to paſs the Maeſe at Maeſtricht, and to purſue his march through Brabant, till he ſhould unite his forces with thoſe which his brother had engaged to bring to his aſſiſtance. 1574.

The governor's perplexity.

WITH ſo great diſpatch and ſecrecy had Lewis conducted his preparations, that Requeſens remained ignorant of his deſign, till he was informed that he had begun his march. By this intelligence the governor was thrown into great perplexity. His troops had been lately ſo much reduced, that it was impoſſible for him to oppoſe both the brothers at the ſame time; and he conſidered that to unite his forces, and employ them againſt Lewis, would expoſe the maritime provinces an eaſy prey to the prince of Orange. His anxiety was increaſed by the diſcovery of an intrigue, which had been formed by William's adherents, for the ſurpriſe of Antwerp. Nor was he entirely free from apprehenſions that his troops might

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Lewis in the mean time advancing towards the frontier, had arrived within a few miles of Maeſtricht, where he pitched his camp; in expectation that his friends in the place would be able to make themſelves maſters of one of the gates. But Requeſens having diſcovered his intention, had diſpatched ſeveral companies of light armed troops before the main army, to ſecure the town. Theſe troops arrived in time to prevent the friends of Lewis from executing their deſign; and in a few days afterwards, they were joined by d'Avila with the reſt of the forces.

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LEWIS was not prepared for undertaking the ſiege of a place ſo completely fortified as Maeſtricht; and after ſome trials of ſtrength in two or three ſkirmiſhes with the Spaniards, he decamped, and marched down the Eaſt ſide of the river, till he came to Ruremonde; but there too, as well as in Maeſtricht, the proteſtants were intimidated and overawed, and not a ſingle perſon ventured to declare in his favour. He continued his march in the ſame direction, reſolving to haſten forward till he ſhould join his brother, who was advancing to meet him in the country which lies between the Maeſe and the Waal.

D'AVILA aimed at nothing for ſome time but to prevent Lewis from tranſporting his army over the river, and with this view he had marched as near him as poſſible, having the river between them; but receiving a reinforcement of two thouſand veteran troops, and finding, by the information of his ſpies, that Lewis had laid aſide his firſt deſign of croſſing the Maeſe, and was on full march towards the prince of Orange, he conſidered that it was of the higheſt importance to prevent their junction; and that for this purpoſe it was neceſſary to compel Lewis as ſoon as poſſible to engage. With this intention he proceeded with the utmoſt celerity down the river, and having

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have croſſed it by a bridge of boats at the town of Grave, he thus got between count Lewis and his brother's army. Lewis, anxious to prevent this, had avoided every unneceſſary delay, but his troops, chagrined at being refuſed admittance firſt into Maeſtricht, and afterwards into Ruremonde, had proceeded in their march with much leſs alacrity than the Spaniards. He received the firſt intelligence of d'Avila's having croſſed the Maeſe when he arrived at Mooch, a village at the diſtance of only one league from the Spaniſh army, and on the ſame ſide of the river. He ſoon perceived the neceſſity to which he was reduced, either to give the enemy battle, or to retire. To retire, he ſaw, muſt be extremely difficult and dangerous, on account of the diſorder and conſternation which commonly attend a retreat; and therefore he did not heſitate to try the fortune of a battle, although he knew how much inferior his undiſciplined forces were to the Spaniards, who were ſelect veteran troops, animated by the conſciouſneſs of ſuperior proweſs, and commanded by d'Avila, a perſon of extraordinary abilities, who, by merit alone, had raiſed himſelf from the ſtation of a common ſoldier, to the rank of general.

Battle of Mooch.

To enable him to reſiſt ſo formidable an enemy, Lewis reſolved to remain in his preſent ſituation

ſituation at Mooch, and to cover his infantry with a ſtrong intrenchment. His cavalry, though reduced by deſertion, was ſtill ſuperior to that of the enemy; but from this ſuperiority, the nature of the ground, which riſes into hills at a little diſtance from the river, did not ſuffer him to derive any conſiderable advantage. He drew them up as well as the unequal face of the country would permit, on the right of his camp; and upon a hill behind his main army, he placed a ſquadron of choſen troops, with which he intended either to fix the victory, if it ſhould appear doubtful; or, in caſe of a defeat, to open a paſſage through the enemy to his brother, who had now advanced as far as Nimeguen to meet him. He had juſt time to put his troops in order of battle, when d'Avila arrived, having his infantry on the right, and on the left his cavalry, flanked by a body of muſqueteers, deſigned to ſupport them againſt the ſuperior numbers of the German cavalry.

D'Avila began the engagement by ſending three hundred men to attack the enemy's lines. The troops which had been appointed to defend them, advanced briſkly towards the Spaniards, and gave them a gallant and reſolute reception; but they were ſoon compelled to retire. The Spaniards followed, and attempted to

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to enter the camp along with them. The action there was bloody and obſtinate, and freſh ſuccours haſtened from both armies to the aſſiſtance of the combatants. But the cotemporary hiſtorians differ ſo widely from each other in their accounts of this engagement, that it is impoſſible to know the truth. Some authors affirm, that the Germans acquitted themſelves with honour, and made a bold and vigorous reſiſtance. Others ſay, that only the French troops in count Lewis's army performed their duty, while the Germans refuſed to advance unleſs their arrears were paid, and remained obſtinately in their camp till the Spaniards broke into it, and, after making prodigious havock among them, put them to an ignominious flight. In the beginning of the action, the German cavalry proved an overmatch for their antagoniſts, and having fallen with great fury on that part of the enemy's horſe that was neareſt them, they drove them to a diſtance from the field of battle; but when they were forming themſelves again for a new attack, ſome freſh ſquadrons of the Spaniſh cavalry advanced, and threw them into diſorder. The Spaniſh muſqueteers, who had been placed to ſupport the horſe, were then of ſignal uſe. With their ſhot they galled the Germans in flank, and greatly augmented their confuſion. Count Lewis and the Palatine attempted, but

Lewis defeated and ſlain.

but in vain, to rally them. Theſe princes did every thing to reſtore the battle that could have been done by the moſt expert commanders, while they endeavoured to animate their troops by their example, and gave conſpicuous proofs of the moſt heroic valour. Their efforts might have been crowned with ſucceſs, if a body of Spaniſh lances had not arrived when the German reiters had begun to give way. The reiters were overpowered; above five hundred of them were killed, and of the infantry between three and four thouſand. The victory was deciſive, and the value of it to the conquerors was greatly enhanced by the deaths of count Lewis, his brother Henry, and the Palatine; all of whom the cotemporary hiſtorians deſcribe as having exerted the higheſt degree of vigour and intrepidity, although none of theſe writers were able to procure information of the manner in which they fell. Their death was matter of great lamentation to the proteſtant confederates, and eſpecially the death of Lewis, who had made ſo many great exertions in their behalf.

Mutiny of the Spaniſh troops.

As ſoon as the prince of Orange received the melancholy news of this diſaſter, he began to return towards Holland, being convinced that now, when he was deprived of his brother's

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aid, it would be in vain for him to attempt to keep the field [5].

WILLIAM expected that they would have immediately followed him, in order to improve their victory, whilſt the terror which it inſpired was recent; and they would probably have done ſo, had not the Spaniſh troops ſullied the glory which they had acquired, by rebelling againſt their officers on the next day after the battle. D'Avila could not inſtantly fulfil his engagement to pay their arrears. Almoſt three years pay was due to them. Even before the preſent expedition, their patience had been worn out, and it appears to have been the hopes of plunder, or the dread of conſequences fatal to themſelves, that induced them to march againſt the Germans, more than their confidence in the promiſe which d'Avila had made them. Being now freed from their apprehenſions of perſonal danger, and diſappointed in their expectations of being enriched by the ſpoils of the enemy, who were ſtill poorer than themſelves, they demanded from their general the immediate performance of his promiſe; and when they only received new aſſurances of the ſame kind as thoſe with which they had been amuſed before, they threatened

[5] Bentivoglio, p. 143. Thuanus, lib. lix. ſect. xv. Van Meteren, p. 132.

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to take vengeance on him for his falſehood and deceit. He and the other officers endeavoured to appeaſe them, but in vain. In order to avoid their fury, he was obliged to make his eſcape ſecretly from the camp; and immediately after his departure, they ran to arms, expelled their officers, and having from among themſelves elected other officers and a commander in chief, they quickly left Mooch, and directed their march to Antwerp, with an intention to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants of that wealthy city, till they ſhould extort payment of their arrears.

They take poſſeſſion of Antwerp.

REQUESENS having received intelligence of their deſign, had remained at Antwerp; and, if he had complied with the counſel of Champigny, governor of the town, and taken precautions for ſecuring a part of the fortifications which was unfiniſhed, he might have fruſtrated their attempt; but being extremely diffident of the Spaniſh part of the garriſon, which had the ſame ground of diſcontent with the mutineers, and flattering himſelf with the hopes of being able to appeaſe them, he ſuffered them to enter the city without reſiſtance, to the number of three thouſand men. They had no ſooner entered, than they formed themſelves in order of battle. The citizens were overwhelmed with terror, and many of them fled precipitately out

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out of the city. Requeſens rode up to the mutineers, and remonſtrating to them on the pernicious tendency of their conduct, he prayed, entreated, and threatened them; but could not, by addreſſing either their hopes or fears, draw any other conceſſion from them, but that they would abſtain from plunder, on condition that they ſhould receive immediate payment of their arrears, and that the Walloons and Germans under the command of Champigny, ſhould be ordered to quit the town. With this laſt requeſt, the governor thought it expedient to comply; and thus the mutineers were left in full poſſeſſion of the place, without any force to control them. The firſt object of their attention was to ſecure the gates, after which they diſperſed themſelves over the city, and took up their quarters in the houſes of the principal inhabitants, where they ſtudied to create expence, and night and day to give diſturbance and uneaſineſs. They were perpetually calling on the governor to fulfil his engagements; and as they daily threatened to ſack and plunder the town, if he did not ſpeedily comply with their requeſts, the people were diſquieted with continual apprehenſions and alarms. The mutineers required payment not only of their own arrears, but of thoſe too which had been due to ſuch of their companions as had died of diſeaſes or fallen in battle.

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battle. At length, the ſum of one hundred thouſand florins was raiſed by the inhabitants; and the governor was obliged to pledge his jewels and furniture for the remainder, and to grant a pardon, confirmed by a ſolemn oath, to all concerned in this ſedition; after which the mutineers returned under their former officers, and went to join the reſt of the army which was now in Holland, and had already begun the ſiege of Leyden.

May 30.

Deſtruction of the king's fleet.

FROM this mutiny, Philip's intereſt in the Netherlands ſuffered greatly in ſeveral reſpects. In the time of d'Avila's expedition againſt count Lewis, Requeſens having exerted his utmoſt vigour and activity, had equipped a numerous fleet, which he intended to employ in the recovery of Zealand. When the mutineers arrived at Antwerp, this fleet, which was not yet of ſufficient ſtrength, lay under the walls of the city. Adolphus Hanſtede, the commander, anxious for his charge, and apprehenſive that the ſeditious ſoldiers might, in order to extort compliance with their demands, take poſſeſſion of the ſhips, had removed them to a place at ſome diſtance from Antwerp, where they were out of the reach of the Spaniards. But, in avoiding this danger, he fell into a greater. The Zealanders, whoſe partiſans were continually on the watch, quickly received intel-

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WHILST the Zealanders availed themſelves of the ſedition in the Spaniſh army, by ſea, the prince of Orange had been equally intent on deriving advantage from it by land. On receiving information of the fate of his brothers, he had begun his march towards Holland; but when intelligence was brought him that the Spaniards had mutinied, he reſolved to improve the opportunity which this afforded him, by making ſome new acquiſition. Paſſing over

[g] Bentivoglio, p. 149. Meteren, p. 137.

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into the isle of Bommel, which is formed by the confluence of the Maese and the Rhine, he engaged the chief town in it to espouse his interest; and having fixed his head-quarters there for some time, he gave support to his friends in the island, and reduced to great extremity such of the people as still adhered to the Spanish government. The marquis of Vitelli was dispatched by Requesens to oppose his progress. That able commander rendered abortive a design which the prince had formed on Bois-le-duc; and the prince, on the other hand, took measures which prevented the town of Bommel from falling into the hands of Vitelli. But the attention of both was soon after this ingrossed by a more important and interesting object, the siege of Leyden, to the relation of which I shall proceed, after mentioning an attempt of Requesens to put an end to the war, by publishing a new act of indemnity in the name of the king.

Act of indemnity.

ALTHOUGH several persons were excluded from the benefit of this indemnity, yet it was much more comprehensive than that which had been published some time before by the duke of Alva. It did not however produce the desired effect. The people were not conscious of that guilt which Philip's pompous deed of clemency imputed to them; they believed that

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they had ſuffered wrong, inſtead of having done it; and they could not be grateful to him for diſpenſing with a puniſhment, which they thought it would have been in the higheſt degree tyrannical to inflict. Beſides this, the pardon was clogged with a condition, by which almoſt all the inhabitants of Holland and Zealand, amounting to many hundred thouſands, and great numbers too in the other provinces, were excluded. This was, that the proteſtants ſhould renounce their religion, and return into the boſom of the church; a condition from which Philip's bigotry would never ſuffer him to depart, nor the zeal and ſincerity of the reformers permit them to accept. Requeſens could not be ignorant of this, yet he entertained ſome hopes at this time of bringing about an accommodation, by means of St. Aldegonde, who had not as yet obtained his liberty. The governor ſent Champigny and Junius de Jong to treat with him; but when St. Aldegonde informed them that no peace would ever be agreed to by the maritime provinces, unleſs the queſtion concerning religion were left to the deciſion of the States, Requeſens, who knew that Philip would never conſent to that condition, ordered the conference to be immediately diſſolved [h].

[h] Bentivoglio, p. 150.

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He now bent his whole attention to the ſiege of Leyden. He had blockaded that city for ſeveral months in the winter ſeaſon, and reduced the inhabitants to great diſtreſs; but he had been obliged to deſiſt from his undertaking, and to call off his troops to oppoſe the German army. They left their ſtations in the neighbourhood of Leyden on the 21ſt of March, and reſumed them on the 26th of May.

In order to form a juſt conception of the operations of this memorable ſiege, it is neceſſary to remember that Leyden lies in a low ſituation, in the midſt of a labyrinth of rivulets and canals. The city was large and populous; and at the time of the ſiege was ſurrounded with a deep ditch, and a ſtrong wall, flanked with baſtions. That branch of the Rhine which ſtill retains its ancient name, paſſes through the middle of it; and from this ſtream ſuch an infinity of canals are derived, that it is difficult to ſay whether the water or the land poſſeſſes the greater ſpace. By theſe canals, the ground on which the city ſtands is divided into a great number of ſmall iſlands, united together by near a hundred and fifty ſtone bridges, that are equally ſubſervient to the beauty of the place, and the convenience of the inhabitants. Leyden is at the diſtance of a few hours journey from the Hague, Delft,

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and Gouda; and only a little farther from Rotterdam on the one hand, and Haerlem on the other. On account of its ſituation, as well as on its own account, it was deemed a place of the firſt importance, and a prize worthy of all the ardour which was diſplayed by the contending parties.

THE prince of Orange, who had received notice of the governor's intention to renew the ſiege, communicated his intelligence to the citizens; and exhorted them to furniſh themſelves with ſtores of proviſions, and to ſend out of the town all ſuch perſons as would be uſeleſs in defending it. They were not ſufficiently attentive to theſe injunctions. The prince complained of their remiſſneſs, and informed them, that for three months at leaſt it would not be in the power of the States to raiſe the ſiege.

To retard the approach of the Spaniards, he ordered ten companies of Engliſh adventurers, under the command of colonel Edward Cheſter, to take poſſeſſion of two forts, one at the ſluice of Gouda, and the other at the village of Alphen, by which the enemy muſt paſs in their way to the city. Theſe troops did not anſwer the expectation which William had conceived of their behaviour. The five companies which were

were placed at the ſluice of Gouda, after a ſhort reſiſtance, betook themſelves to flight; and the other five, after a ſkirmiſh in which no perſon fell on either ſide, baſely imitated the example of their countrymen, and retired under the walls of Leyden. The citizens, who from their ramparts had beheld their ignominious behaviour, and ſuſpected them of treachery, refuſed to admit them within the town. The Engliſh aſcribed their conduct to the inſufficiency of the fortifications which they had been appointed to defend; but not being able to wipe out the ſuſpicion entertained of their fidelity, they all deſerted to the enemy, but a few whom the people of Leyden received with open arms [i].

THE prince of Orange having intended that the Engliſh forces, after being obliged to quit their firſt ſtations, ſhould have retired into the town, had not provided any other troops to defend it. The inhabitants were therefore reduced to the neceſſity of truſting, for their defence, to their own valour and conduct: a circumſtance, which at firſt had a formidable aſpect, but which in the end proved the cauſe of their preſervation; ſince it was thereby much longer before they were reduced by famine, than it

[i] Meteren, p. 139.

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would have been, if, beſides themſelves, they had had a numerous garriſon to ſupport.

Janus Douza, chief magiſtrate of Leyden.

THE government of Leyden was committed on this occaſion to Janus Douza[k], a perſon of noble birth; and well known in the literary world, by his poetical productions. By his example, and his eloquence, this illuſtrious patriot kindled in the minds of his fellow-citizens ſuch a zeal for liberty, and ſo great an abhorrence of the tyranny of Spain, as rendered them ſuperior to every diſtreſs, and in a great meaſure ſupplied their want of military ſkill. They muſt, however, have been found inferior to the Spaniards; and if Valdez, the Spaniſh commander to whom Requeſens committed the conduct of the ſiege, had puſhed his operations with proper vigour, he muſt certainly have made himſelf maſter of the town. But whether he wanted to ſave his men, and to carry his end without bloodſhed; or deſpaired, with the ſkill and force which he poſſeſſed, to be able to reduce ſo ſtrong a place by ſack and ſtorm, he did not think of any other expedient for ſubduing it, but that of blocking it up on all ſides, ſo as to prevent the entrance of ſupplies. To this one point, all his operations were directed. By a circular chain of

The blockade is formed.

[k] Or Jean Vander Does, lord of Noordwick.

more

more than ſixty forts, which communicated with each other, and ran quite round the city, he inveſted it on every ſide, and not only rendered it impoſſible to introduce ſupplies, but even cut off all intelligence between the beſieged and their friends in the other cities, except what was conveyed by pigeons, in the manner to which the proteſtants had recourſe during the blockade of Haerlem[1].

By one of the forts called Lammen, the beſieged having been deprived of the benefit of paſturing their cattle in the neighbouring meadows, they ſallied out with great fury upon the Spaniards, and almoſt got poſſeſſion of the fort; but after an obſtinate and bloody conteſt, they were at laſt obliged to retire. The Spaniards fortified themſelves in that ſtation more ſtrongly than before; and the beſieged now deſpaired of being able, either in that, or any other quarter, to remove them to a greater diſtance from the city. Inſtead of this, they apprehended daily their nearer approach to it; and expected that they would ſoon open their batteries, in order to prepare for taking it by ſtorm. This belief ſerved to quicken the in-

Conduct and reſolution of the inhabitants.

[1] Theſe pigeons were embalmed, and are ſtill preſerved in the town-houſe of Leyden. Les Delices des Pays Bas.

habitants;

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habitants; and the women as well as the men were employed day and night, without ceaſing, in ſtrengthening the fortifications. An account was taken of the ſtock of proviſions within the town; and in order to make it hold out as long as poſſible, they began to huſband it betimes. They were perpetually exhorting and animating each other, and expatiating upon the cruelty and perfidy of the Spaniards, and the unworthy fate of the people of Zutphen, Haerlem, and other places, who had truſted to their faith and mercy. When they were ſolicited to turn to their allegiance by Lanoy, De Lique, and other natives of the Low Countries; they made anſwer, in the words of a Latin poet,

Fiſtula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps.

To other letters, in which they were deſired to reflect on the miſery to which they muſt ere long be reduced, they replied, that they had, upon the moſt mature conſideration, reſolved rather to die of hunger, or to periſh with their wives and children in the flames of the city, kindled by their own hands, than ſubmit to the tyranny of the Spaniards [m].

[m] Another ſaying, ſtill more ferocious, is recorded by ſome hiſtorians; That rather than ſubmit to ſo perfidious an enemy, they would feed on their left arms, and defend themſelves with their right. Van Meteren, ut ſupra.

THAT

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THAT miſery which, during the firſt two months of the ſiege, exiſted only in idea, was at laſt realized. Their whole ſtock of ordinary proviſions being conſumed, they were obliged to have recourſe to the fleſh of dogs and horſes. Great numbers died of want; and many by the uſe of this unnatural food. The reſolution of the people at length began to fail, and they now believed their preſent calamities to be ſuperior even to thoſe they ſhould experience under the Spaniſh government. Some of them conceived a deſign to deliver up the town, and formed a ſecret aſſociation for this purpoſe. But their plot being detected, means were taken to prevent them from putting it in execution. A great number of people having come one day in a tumultuous manner to a magiſtrate whoſe name was Adrian, exclaiming that he ought either to give them food, or deliver the town into the hands of the enemy, "I have ſolemnly ſworn," he replied, "that I will never ſurrender myſelf, or my fellow-citizens, to the cruel and perfidious Spaniard; and I will ſooner die than violate my oath. I have no food, elſe I would give it you. But if my death can be of uſe to you, take, tear me in pieces, and devour me; I ſhall die with ſatisfaction, if I know that by my death I ſhall for one moment relieve you from your direful neceſſity."

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By this extraordinary anſwer, the people, ſtruck with aſtoniſhment, were ſilenced, and their fury was for ſome time appeaſed.

The States reſolved to lay the country under water.

The prince of Orange, who was not ignorant of the extreme miſery to which the beſieged were reduced, had done every thing in his power to accompliſh their relief. He had already collected large ſupplies of proviſions; but could not, with all his activity and addreſs, raiſe a ſufficient force to open a paſſage into the city. When he found that the ſituation of the beſieged would not admit of longer delay, he convened an aſſembly of the States of the province. And the deputies, after conſidering the ſtrength of the enemy, and the amount of their own forces, perceiving it to be impracticable to relieve the beſieged, either by land, or by the river and canals, agreed to have recourſe to an expedient, which was dictated by deſpair, and was the only one at preſent in their power to employ. They reſolved to avail themſelves, againſt the Spaniards, of that furious element, from which their country had often ſuffered the moſt dreadful devaſtation; to open their ſluices, to break down the dykes of the Maeſe and the Iſſel, and by thus laying all the country round Leyden under water, to get acceſs to the beſieged with their fleet. Nothing could be more repugnant

to

to the ideas of this people, than such a resolution. To drain their lands, to exclude the water, and preserve their dykes, were then, as they are still, objects to the Dutch of almost continual attention, and which cost them annually an immense expence. But they were at present animated by objects still more important and interesting; and their love of liberty, joined to their dread of popery and the Spanish yoke, prevailed over every other consideration. The damage which it was supposed would arise from the measure adopted, was estimated at six hundred thousand guilders. But they considered, that if the Spaniards should succeed in their present enterprise, not only the region to be overflowed, but all the rest of the province, would fall under their subjection. This the States regarded as infinitely worse than either poverty or death; and in their present disposition, they would have chosen to ruin the country altogether, rather than leave it to be enjoyed by an enemy whom they held in such abhorrence. They now applied themselves to the demolition of those mounds, upon which their existence as a nation depends, with a degree of industry and ardor, equal to that which they were accustomed to employ in repairing them, after the ravages of an inundation.

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THE prince of Orange, in the mean time, was employed in preparing every thing neceſſary to carry into execution the meaſure which the States had adopted. He ordered to be built, at Rotterdam and other places, near two hundred flat-bottomed veſſels, having each of them, ten, twelve, fourteen, or ſixteen oars; and theſe he mounted with guns, and manned with eight hundred Zealanders; a rude and ſavage, but a brave and determined band, animated

mated at once by religious zeal, and the moſt implacable hatred againſt the Spaniards; and whoſe appearance was rendered horrid by the ſcars of innumerable wounds, which they had received in their late naval engagements. They were brought from the fleet by Boiſſot, the admiral of Zealand, to whom the conduct of the preſent enterpriſe was committed [n].

With ſuch of the veſſels as were already equipped, Boiſſot left Delft in the beginning of September, and directed his courſe towards Leyden. But the water had not as yet riſen to a ſufficient height, and the banks of the rivers and canals, in which only there was a proper depth of water, were ſo ſtrongly fortified, as to render his approach to the city impracticable. From ſome of their forts he obliged the Spaniards to retire, but others were of ſufficient ſtrength to withſtand the moſt vigorous attacks. In order to avoid theſe, he broke down more dykes as he advanced, and in his progreſs had ſeveral bloody engagements with the enemy. The blockade, however, remained ſtill as cloſe as ever. Boiſſot began to be apprehenſive of the iſſue. Heaven ſeemed not

[n] The ſpirit by which theſe men were actuated, may be conceived from their method of diſtinguiſhing themſelves; which was by wearing a half moon on their caps, with this inſcription, Turks rather than papiſts. Meteren, p. 140.

to

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1574. to favour his deſign. The north wind continued much longer than had been ever known at the preſent ſeaſon, and retarded the water in its aſcent. The prince of Orange, when Boiſſot entered upon this expedition, had been confined to his chamber by a dangerous illneſs. He was now recovered, and came to viſit the admiral's diſpoſition of his ſhips, which he found to be exactly conformable to the directions which the States had given him; but their deſign, the prince perceived, muſt prove abortive, and all their labour and expence be loſt, unleſs the wind ſhould change ſoon to another quarter, and the autumnal tides riſe as uſual.

The anxiety and miſery of the citizens.

WITH extreme impatience they now expected the approach of theſe tides, which are commonly the ſubject of their dread and terror. The ſituation of the beſieged was become the moſt deplorable and deſperate. During ſeven weeks there had not been a morſel of bread within the city; and the only food had been the roots of herbs and weeds, and the fleſh of dogs and horſes. Even all theſe were at length conſumed; and the people reduced to live on ſoup made of the hides of animals which had been killed. A peſtilence ſucceeded to the famine, and carried off in a few weeks ſome thouſands of the inhabitants. Thoſe who ſurvived, overwhelmed with anguiſh at the diſmal

mal ſcenes which they daily beheld, were ſcarcely able to perform the mournful office of burying the dead. In this dreadful ſituation, they ſaw from their walls, the ſails and flags of the veſſels deſtined for their relief; but had the mortification to perceive, that it was utterly impoſſible for them to approach. It is not ſurpriſing that ſome of the people, finding their miſery greater than they were able to endure, ſhould have entertained the thoughts of ſurrendering the town to the enemy. Some conſpiracies were again formed for this purpoſe; but they were diſcovered and defeated by the vigilance of Douza, ſupported by a great majority of the people, to whom neither the peſtilence, nor famine, nor death in its moſt hideous forms, appeared ſo dreadful, as the tyranny of the Spaniards.

Their deliverance,

BUT the time of their deliverance was at hand; and Heaven interpoſed at laſt in a conſpicuous manner in their behalf. Towards the end of September, the wind changing from the north-eaſt to the north-weſt, poured the ocean into the mouths of the rivers with uncommon violence; and then veering about to the ſouth, it puſhed the water towards the plains of Leyden, till they were converted into a ſpacious lake, in which the Spaniſh forts were ſeen

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ſcattered up and down, and many of them almoſt covered with the water.

BOISSOT ſeized with ardor the opportunity which was thus preſented to him. And though ſeveral of the enemy's fortifications ſtill lay in the way by which it was neceſſary for him to advance, he ſoon obliged the Spaniards to abandon them. The Zealanders purſued them, ſometimes on foot along the dykes, and ſometimes in their boats; and had ſeveral fierce rencounters with them, in which, from the advantage which their boats afforded them, they were every where victorious. The ſituation of the Spaniſh troops at this time was truly deplorable. Some were ſwallowed up in the mud and water; and others, attempting to march along the dykes, were either killed by the fire from the boats, or dragged down with hooks fixed to the ends of long poles, and put to the ſword without mercy. Fifteen hundred periſhed in their retreat.

ALL the forts were now forſaken, except the fort above mentioned, called Lammen, of which, if the Spaniards had kept poſſeſſion, they might have retarded the approach of the fleet for ſeveral days. This fort was much ſtronger, and ſtood higher than the reſt. But when the garriſon underſtood that their general had

had fled, and that the Zealanders on the one hand, and the beſieged on the other, were preparing to begin an attack, they abandoned their ſtation, and by torch-light effectuated a junction with the reſt of the forces, in the middle of the night.

In this manner was the ſiege of Leyden raiſed, in the beginning of the fifth month after the blockade was formed. Boiſſot advanced without delay to the gates of the city. The people, pale and meagre, ran, as their ſmall remains of ſtrength would allow, to meet him; and many of them ſo greedily devoured the food which he diſtributed, that what was intended for their relief, proved the cauſe of their inſtant deſtruction; for proviſions of every kind in the city had been entirely exhauſted, and the beſieged were ſo weakened, that if the blockade had continued two days longer, they muſt all have periſhed [o].

[o] They eſcaped ſtill more narrowly from falling into the hands of the enemy. In the night immediately preceding, and at the very time when the Spaniards were making their retreat from the fort of Lammen, a great part of the wall of the city having fallen down, the noiſe reached the ears of the Spaniards; who, if they had known the cauſe, might have entered the town without reſiſtance. But their dread repreſented the noiſe to their imaginations as the approach of the enemy, and ſerved only to precipitate their flight.

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When they were ſomewhat refreſhed with the food which Boiſſot had brought, they accompanied the magiſtrates to one of the churches, to render thanks to the Almighty. Never was any aſſembly more deeply agitated. By the conſideration of their ſignal and unexpected deliverance, when they were upon the brink of ruin; joined to the remembrance of the diſmal ſcenes which they had witneſſed, and of the many friends and fellow-citizens whom the famine and peſtilence had carried off, their minds were overpowered at once with gratitude and ſorrow. They were diſſolved in tears; and mingled together the voices of praiſe and of lamentation.

The cotemporary hiſtorians have further recorded, that when the prince of Orange received information of the raiſing of the ſiege, being engaged in public worſhip in one of the churches at Delft, he ſtood up, and read to the audience the letters which contained the intelligence; after which, the States being convened, a day of general thankſgiving was appointed.

The Spaniſh army took their route by the way of Amſterdam and Utrecht, and attempted to get poſſeſſion of the laſt of theſe places by ſurpriſe; but the gates being ſhut againſt them,

them, and a contribution of money offered, they were prevailed on to purſue their march towards Maeſtricht, where they were put into winter-quarters [p].

[p] Meteren, p. 139. Meurſii Auriacus, p. 130. Bentivoglio, p. 151.

The Spaniards threw all the blame of the failure of their enterpriſe upon their general; whom they accuſed of having been remiſs in his operations againſt the town, on account of a bribe of two hundred thouſand florins, which they alleged he had accepted, either from the States of Holland, or from the people of Leyden. Whether there was any ground for this accuſation, does not appear with ſufficient evidence. But the ſoldiers flew to arms, ſeized his perſon, and confined him, till he agreed to pay them the two hundred thouſand florins, which, they ſaid, he had received from the Hollanders.

PART II.

BOOK XIII.

1575. Negotiations for peace.

THE difficulties which the Spaniards encountered in the ſeveral enterpriſes that have been related, gave Philip a very different idea of the ſpirit, vigour, and reſources of the malcontents, from what he had hitherto entertained; and determined him to liſten to an offer, which his couſin the emperor Maximilian made at this time, of mediating a reconcilement. Maximilian was prompted to interpoſe his influence, partly perhaps by concern for the intereſt of his kinſman, but chiefly by his apprehenſion, that through the cloſe connection which ſubſiſted between the Dutch and German proteſtants, the flame which raged with ſo much fury in the Low Countries, might at laſt diffuſe itſelf into Germany. Having therefore interceded with Philip to grant the inſurgents favourable terms, and obtained powers to negotiate an agreement, he transferred theſe powers to count Scwartzenburg, whom he ſent into Holland, in the beginning of the year one thouſand five hundred and ſeventy-five, attended by ſeveral German nobles. On the count's arrival in Dort, he had an interview with his kinſman the

the prince of Orange; with whom he employed all his own influence, and that of the emperor, from whom he brought a confidential letter to the prince. From the reſpect due to the emperor, William conſented to a congreſs in the city of Breda. But as he could not be perſuaded, that Philip would be ever brought to offer conditions which the States could accept with ſafety, he believed that the treaty propoſed would prove abortive, and therefore he exhorted the States to keep themſelves in a poſture of defence, and to proſecute with vigour their preparations for renewing the war, when the congreſs ſhould be diſſolved. The prince himſelf was not of the number of the deputies; nor did thoſe who were appointed, though leſs obnoxious to Philip's reſentment, think it ſafe to truſt themſelves in the power of the Spaniards in Breda, till Romero, and Mondragone, and two other perſons of diſtinction, were ſent into Holland as hoſtages.

From the proceedings at this congreſs, and the mutual diſtruſt which the deputies diſcovered, the reader will eaſily perceive the cauſes which rendered ineffectual, not only the preſent attempt, but likewiſe all the endeavours which were afterwards employed, during the ſpace of forty years, to reconcile the contending parties.

BOOK XIII.

1575. March 14th.

THE demands of the States of Holland and Zealand conſiſted of two articles; that the governor ſhould immediately diſmiſs the foreign troops; and that a general aſſembly of the States of all the provinces ſhould be held to determine the ſeveral points in controverſy, whether civil or religious.

IN anſwer to theſe requeſts, the Spaniſh deputies obſerved, that it was unreaſonable to call the Spaniards by the name of foreigners, ſince they were equally the ſubjects of the king as the people of the Netherlands, and had done him the moſt ſignal ſervice, in that very country from which he was now requeſted to expel them. That the Germans, French, and Engliſh, in the ſervice of the States, might with much greater propriety be denominated foreigners. That the king did not intend, in caſe peace were eſtabliſhed, to retain the Spaniſh troops in the Low Countries longer than neceſſity ſhould require; but that it would be highly improper to urge him any further on this ſubject, as he could not, conſiſtently with honour, diſmiſs the forces in the preſent poſture of his affairs. They added, that after tranquillity was reſtored, the king would not be averſe to the convocation of the States, nor oppoſe their deliberating concerning ſuch affairs as properly belonged to them. That he would be

be ever ready to liſten to their counſel, and would regulate his conduct agreeably to it in every thing that was juſt and reaſonable. And that, in the mean time, he was graciouſly pleaſed to make them an offer of a full indemnity of their paſt offences, upon the following conditions: That all cities and forts, with their artillery and ſtores, ſhould be delivered into his hands; that every heretical form of worſhip ſhould be proſcribed; and that all ſuch perſons as were unwilling to forſake their errors, ſhould diſpoſe of their effects and leave the country.

To theſe declarations and offers of the Spaniſh deputies, thoſe of the States replied, that notwithſtanding what had been ſaid, they muſt ſtill adhere to their firſt requeſt, of having the provinces delivered from the oppreſſion of the Spaniſh and other foreign troops. Theſe troops were indeed ſubjects of the king of Spain, but they were not ſubjects of the duke of Brabant, or the earl of Flanders, Holland, or any other of the provinces, in which therefore they could not be ſuffered to remain, without a violation of a fundamental law of the conſtitution. It was true, that the French and Engliſh troops were foreigners; but theſe troops had come into the Low Countries at the deſire of the States; they had never aſſumed to them-

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1575. themſelves any ſhare in the government, and were deemed neceſſary by the States for their defence againſt the Spaniards; whereas the Spaniards had, from their firſt entrance into the Netherlands, treated the inhabitants as enemies and ſlaves; had arrogated to themſelves every important branch of the adminiſtration, and had, on many occaſions, exerciſed the moſt unrelenting cruelty, indulging, in the moſt abandoned manner, their lawleſs luſt and avarice, to the utter ruin of great numbers of the innocent and faithful ſubjects of the king. It would be impoſſible to reſtore tranquillity to the provinces while theſe men were allowed to remain, nor were they friends to the king or the peace propoſed who adviſed him to retain them. If the ſervice which the king had received from his Spaniſh troops, were compared with the miſchief of which they had been the authors, it would be found that they had done infinitely greater harm than good; and that, by the lawleſs rapine which they had exerciſed, they had received much more than a ſufficient compenſation for all their ſervices. The inhabitants of the Low Countries were conſcious of having often contributed to advance the glory of the Spaniſh crown. Nor could even their late conduct, if juſtly conſidered, be interrupted as a breach of their duty to the king, ſince they had never oppoſed his-

his exerciſing any rights which appertained to him as ſovereign of the provinces; and although they had taken up arms, they had never employed them but in vindicating thoſe rights and privileges which the king himſelf had ſworn to maintain, or in defending their lives and fortunes, their wives and children, againſt the violence and lawleſs tyranny of the Spaniards. BOOK XIII. 1575.

It gave them much concern to find, that the king would not agree to ſummon an aſſembly of the States till peace ſhould be reſtored, as they were convinced that no other means ſo effectual could be deviſed for eſtabliſhing peace on a firm and permanent foundation. It gave them ſtill greater concern to hear the deputies, in the name of the king, expreſs themſelves, as if they looked upon the States only as counſellors, whoſe advice he would or would not follow, according as he ſhould judge expedient. This they could not help conſidering as an intimation, that the ſtates were to be limited in the exerciſe of their authority; and if this was intended, no uſeful purpoſe could be ſerved by calling them together. With the conditions annexed to the proffered indemnity, it was impoſſible they could comply. They could not deliver the cities and forts into the hands of the Spaniards, without being apprehenſive

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henſive of the fraud exemplified in the fable of the war between the wolves and the ſheep, in which the latter were perſuaded to give up their auxiliaries, the dogs, into the hands of their crafty foes. For they had not forgotten the fate of the counts Egmont and Horn, and many others, who repented when it was too late of putting faith in promiſes which their enemies could violate with impunity. And with reſpect to the other condition, that all heretics ſhould quit the country; as they could not believe the religion now eſtabliſhed in Holland and Zealand to be heretical, ſo if all who had renounced the popiſh faith were to be deemed heretics, and expelled from the Netherlands, there would not be a ſufficient number left to keep the dykes in repair; the country would be ſtript of the greateſt part of its inhabitants, and ere long be buried in the waves. They concluded with entreating the deputies to take the repreſentation they had made in good part, as proceeding from their zeal for the intereſt of the king as well as of the provinces; and with praying Almighty God to inſpire the king and his miniſters with milder ſentiments than thoſe which they had hitherto embraced.

In the reply which was made to this remonſtrance, the Spaniſh deputies, after complaining of the ſpirit in which it was compoſed, ſaid

that

that the king would ſo far comply with the requeſt relative to the foreign troops, as to ſend them away immediately after the terms of peace were ſettled; provided the States would at the ſame time diſmiſs the foreigners in their ſervice, and deliver up the cities and other fortified places. He would likewiſe ſummon the aſſembly of the States, as ſoon as the preſent diſturbances had ſubſided; but he could not, conſiſtently with his dignity, ſubmit to their deciſion, the conditions on which peace was to be eſtabliſhed; ſince this would be to abandon what he regarded as his peculiar prerogative, and to allow them to preſcribe where it was their duty to obey. In particular, he was determined never to refer to their deciſion the important queſtion concerning religion. The States, as well as the king, had ſworn to maintain the catholic faith; and no conſideration would ever prevail on him to ſuffer them to depart from it in the ſmalleſt article. He was not afraid of depopulating the maritime provinces by the expulſion of heretics; on the contrary, he believed that theſe provinces would flouriſh more, for that tranquillity which unity of faith would enſure; and if the heretical miniſters were removed, he doubted not that the people would ſoon perceive the folly into which they had been betrayed, and return into the boſom of the church.

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1575. May 31ſt. Final anſwer of the States.

THE deputies of Holland and Zealand, after conſulting their conſtituents, gave the following as their ultimate reply. That they were willing to refer the ſeveral points of difference, the diſmiſſion of the Spaniſh troops, the delivering of the cities, forts, and military ſtores, the nature of the ſecurity to be given for fulfilling the conditions of the peace, and even the article of religion, to the general aſſembly of the States of all the provinces: and they were willing, they ſaid, to make the laſt of theſe conceſſions, not from any intention of giving up their religion, which no conſideration would induce them to forſake; but from the deep concern which they felt on account of the long continued calamities of their fellow-citizens; to put an end to which, they were ready to abandon their native country, if the States ſhould find it neceſſary to eſtabliſh a religion, with which their conſciences would not ſuffer them to comply.

The conferences diſſolved.

COUNT Scwartzenburg now perceived that no greater conceſſion could reaſonably be expected. He repreſented to the governor, that conſidering how deep the proteſtant religion had ſtruck its roots in the maritime provinces, the extirpation of it could not be ſpeedily accompliſhed; and he urged him to grant a truce for ſix months, during which time the exerciſe of

of that religion ſhould be permitted, and every lenient meaſure employed to ſooth and conciliate the minds of the people. But Requeſens had not authority from the king to agree to this requeſt; and he refuſed to grant even a truce of two months, except on condition that the proteſtants ſhould abſtain from their mode of religious worſhip, and oblige their miniſters immediately to quit the country. With this condition Count Scwartzenburg knew that the maritime provinces would never be perſuaded to comply. He therefore deſpaired of being able to bring his negotiation to the deſired iſſue, and ſoon after ſet out for Germany. The congreſs was diſſolved. The hoſtages were reſtored; and the contending parties, having their reſentment more inflamed than ever, applied themſelves to the proſecution of the war [q].

The war renewed.

THE deputies had no ſooner left Breda, than Requeſens publiſhed an edict, prohibiting all communication with the malcontents; and immediately afterwards ſent his troops, under the count de Hierges, to lay ſiege to the town of Buren; which they ſoon obliged to capitulate. From Buren they marched to Oude-water, and in ſpite of a brave and vigorous defence, they took it by ſtorm; exerciſing at this place their

July 12th.

[q] Meteren, p. 146—152. Bentivog. lib. ix. ab initio.

wonted

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wonted fury, and putting the garriſon and all the inhabitants to the ſword, without diſtinction either of ſex or age. Hierges proceeded next to Schowen upon the Leck. The prince of Orange made haſte to ſend a reinforcement to the garriſon. But the inhabitants, dreading the ſame fate as that of the people of Oudewater, obliged the garriſon to ſurrender. After which, Hierges directed his march towards Crimpen. Vitelli, in the mean time, with the forces under his command, reduced a number of places which lie between the Leck and the Vahal; and Mondragone was no leſs ſucceſsful in the quarter of Holland, which borders upon Brabant.

The governor undertakes the conqueſt of Zealand.

BUT Requeſens did not incline that his troops ſhould puſh their conqueſts in Holland any further at preſent. In compliance with his inſtructions, he reſolved to bend his whole attention to the reduction of ſome of the principal towns in Zealand, which Philip was deſirous of acquiring, for the reception of a fleet to be ſent from Spain. In order to accompliſh this deſign, Requeſens drew off his troops from Holland; and had, ſome time before, prepared a number of flat-bottomed veſſels, proportioned to the depth of the gulfs and canals. In theſe veſſels he intended to have tranſported his troops to Zealand; but the prince of Orange having

having received intelligence of his deſign, and collected a naval force of the ſame kind, much ſuperior in number, he relinquiſhed his firſt plan, and adopted another that ſeemed equally difficult and dangerous. This was to imitate what was done by Mondragone, when he raiſed the ſiege of Tergoes, and to make the ſoldiers wade through an arm of the ſea, which was five miles broad.

Bold and ſingular enterpriſe of the Spaniards.

In the north-eaſt parts of Zealand, there are three iſlands much larger than the reſt; Tolen, Duveland, and Schowen. Tolen, which lies neareſt to Brabant, was in the hands of the Spaniards; and between this iſland and Duveland, lies the little iſle of Philipſland, which is ſeparated from Duveland by the canal, or arm of the ſea, over which Requeſens intended that his forces ſhould paſs on foot. It was known from ſome experiments which had been made, that this canal was fordable; nor was it quite ſo broad as that which Mondragone's troops had paſſed over to the relief of Tergoes. But there was ſtill much reaſon to ſuſpect that the attempt would be found impracticable.

Such of the officers as were of this opinion, obſerved, that there was a wide difference between the enterpriſe in queſtion, and that of

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Mondagrone, whoſe men had no other obſtacles to encounter but thoſe of the paſſage, and needed only ſtrength and patience to enſure ſucceſs; whereas, in the preſent caſe, the enemy having taken the alarm, were continually upon the watch; and the ford was in a manner beſieged by their numerous veſſels, which were ready to attack the Spaniards, when they would be unable to defend themſelves. And even allowing that they ſhould ſurmount theſe difficulties, and effectuate their paſſage, yet what remained for them, on their approach to the oppoſite ſhore, but to be attacked by a freſh and vigorous enemy, advantageouſly poſted, before they could diſentangle themſelves from the mud and water.

By theſe conſiderations, ſome of the principal officers were induced to remonſtrate againſt the intended enterpriſe, as too hazardous and deſperate; and they were of opinion, that no attempt ought to be made on Zealand till the fleet from Spain ſhould arrive. But this prudent counſel was not ſuited to the bold intrepid ſpirit which animated the greater part of the Spaniſh officers. The remembrance of their former victories, joined to their contempt of the malcontents, inſpired them with confidence of ſucceſs; and they were unwilling to divide the glory of their conqueſts with their country-

countrymen, who were ſuppoſed to be on their way from Spain. If this enterpriſe, ſaid they, be impracticable in the day, why may we not undertake it in the night; when we ſhall either elude the vigilance of the enemy; or, if they get information of our deſign, yet we ſhall have little reaſon to dread their efforts, as they will be obliged to fire their guns at random, and ſpend their force in air. The troops poſted on the other ſide to oppoſe our landing, will act as their countrymen have often done on ſimilar occaſions. The boldneſs of our adventure, and the daring countenances of our men, will overwhelm their daſtardly ſpirits with diſmay and terror.

REQUESENS was not naturally fond of raſh or daring enterpriſes; but being exceedingly deſirous to carry his ſcheme of ſubduing Zealand into ſpeedy execution, he tranſported three thouſand ſelect troops, compoſed of an equal number of Spaniards, Walloons, and Germans, to the iſle of Philipſland. Then having ordered d'Avila to attend him with the fleet, on board which he put one half of theſe forces, he gave the command of the other half, deſtined to attempt the paſſage, to Oſorio d'Ulloa, a Spaniſh officer of diſtinguiſhed courage, who had warmly exhorted him to undertake this bold and ſingular expedition.

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On the 28th of September, as ſoon as it was dark, and the tide had begun to retire, Ulloa ntered the water at the head of his troops, with the guides before him. The troops were followed by two hundred pioneers; and the rear-guard was formed by a company of Walloons, commanded by an officer of the name of Peralta. They could march only three men a-breaſt, on the top of a ridge of earth or ſand, and were often obliged to wade up to the ſhoulders, and to bear their muſkets on their heads, to preſerve them from the water. They had advanced but a little way, when the Dutch and Zealanders approached, and began a furious diſcharge of their ſmall arms and artillery. And not ſatisfied with this, many of them leaped into the water, and with hooks faſtened to the ends of long poles, laid hold of the ſoldiers, oppreſſed with the weight of the element through which they toiled; maſſacring ſome, and plunging others in the waves. Nothing but the darkneſs of the night, which prevented the two ſquadrons of the enemy's ſhips from acting in concert, could have ſaved the royaliſts from deſtruction. But, notwithſtanding the difficulties under which they laboured, they perſiſted bold and dauntleſs in their courſe, exhorting and aſſiſting one another; and without quitting their ranks, repelling the enemy, and defending themſelves as well as their deſperate

circumſtances would allow. Their calamities increaſed as they approached to the oppoſite ſhore. For beſides that their vigour was impaired, they had deeper water to paſs, and the enemy's ſhips could come nearer to the ford. At laſt, however, they reached the land, in time to ſave themſelves from deſtruction. The banks were lined with a numerous body of troops; and if theſe troops had behaved with an ordinary degree of reſolution, it is impoſſible that the Spaniards, drenched as they were with mud and water, and exhauſted with fatigue, could have ſtood before them. But unfortunately, in the beginning of the attack, their commander was killed by an accidental ſhot of one of his own men. Conſternation ſeized his troops, and they fled in the moſt daſtardly manner, before an enemy unable to purſue.

This extraordinary adventure, though it ſucceeded beyond what could juſtly have been expected, was not executed without loſs. The pioneers were all either overtaken by the tide, or deſtroyed by the enemy. The rear-guard under Peralta ſaved themſelves by returning back. Of the troops under Ulloa, a conſiderable number was killed or drowned, and others wounded. But among the killed there was only one perſon of diſtinction, named Pacheco;

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concerning whom it is recorded, that being wounded by a muſket-ſhot, and unable to advance, and ſome of his men urging him to ſuffer them to bear him on their ſhoulders, he replied, "*That* would ſerve only to retard your march. My wound is mortal; I die, and not without ſome honour, in ſo glorious an enterpriſe." Saying this, he ſunk down into the water [q].

When the Dutch and Zealanders ſaw that, in ſpite of their oppoſition, the royaliſts had accompliſhed their deſign, they quitted the canal, and went to give notice of what had happened to the inhabitants of the ſea-port towns, which they ſuppoſed the enemy intended to attack. Requeſens immediately laid hold of the opportunity which their departure afforded him, to tranſport the reſt of his forces to Duveland; where they joined their companions, and ſoon compelled all the proteſtant troops on the

[q] Bentivoglio, p. 168. This hiſtorian gives the ſame authority for the above-mentioned particulars, as for thoſe of the paſſage at Tergoes; the teſtimony of Rivas, governor of Cambray, who was an actor in both.

The Spaniards were not a little encouraged by an appearance then rare, but ſince familiar and common, an Aurora Borealis, or northern light; which ſhone all the time of their paſſage, and which they interpreted as a ſign wrought by Heaven in their behalf.

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iſland to fly over to Ziricſee, the capital of Schowen.

THE reduction of that city was the immediate and principal object of the preſent expedition. For beſides that Requeſens hoped, by poſſeſſing Ziricſee, to be able to diſturb the communication between Holland and Zealand, he conſidered it as the fitteſt place for the reception of the reinforcement which he expected from Spain; and he intended to make it the ſeat of his ſtrength in that quarter, till he ſhould collect a naval force ſufficient to enſure the conqueſt of Middleburg, Fluſhing, and the other towns in Walcheren. Towards Ziricſee, the army, now commanded by Mondragone proceeding without delay. Before they could reach it, they found it neceſſary to paſs over the canal which ſeparates Duveland from Schowen, and on the oppoſite ſide of which they ſaw the enemy preparing to diſpute their paſſage. This did not deter them from the proſecution of their deſign. Animated by the example of their leaders, they leaped without heſitation into the canal, which was near a league over, having the bottom full of mud, and advanced forward with ſuch undaunted intrepidity, that the enemy, regarding them with aſtoniſhment, abandoned their ſtation, and left the paſſage free and undiſputed.

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1575. The desperate defence of Bommene.

MONDRAGONE would have immediately begun the siege of Ziricsee, but thought it necessary before-hand to make himself master of certain posts, which the Zealanders had fortified, in order to secure the communication between the inhabitants of that town, and their friends in the other islands and on the continent. These forts were three in number; one on the south near Borendam, and the other two called Browershaven and Bommene, on the north and east. Through the imprudent confidence of the Spaniards, who made an assault on the first of these forts too soon, it cost the lives of sixty of that nation, with Peralta their commander; besides a considerable number of Germans and Walloons. The fort of Browershaven submitted without resistance; but that of Bommene, which was better fortified, was likewise more valiantly defended than the other two. Du Lis, a French officer, commanded the garrison, consisting of Germans, French, and English; into whose breasts he had infused the same generous and dauntless spirit with which he himself was animated. The behaviour and fate of this brave determined garrison deserves a place in history. At the time of high water their fortification was impregnable, as at that time the sea filled both the ditch which surrounded it, and a canal which passed through it; but at low water, and for some hours

hours before and after that time, the ditch was fordable, and the enemy could advance to the very foot of the wall. Both Requeſens and Vitelli had come to direct the operations of the ſiege. Agreeably to their commands, the royaliſts, after approaching as near as poſſible to the ditch, by means of trenches, opened a large battery, which continued firing upon the fort for two days inceſſantly, till a ſufficient breach was made. Then waiting till the water had retired, they made a furious aſſault; but the beſieged withſtood their moſt vigorous efforts, and at laſt obliged them to retire, with the loſs of a hundred and fifty killed, and twice that number wounded. The Spaniards, enraged on account of their repulſe and loſs, returned to the aſſault next day, and began to ſtorm the fort on different ſides at the ſame time. Both parties were highly agitated with fury and deſpair, and both were alike determined either to die or conquer. The proſpect of the returning tide wrought equally on the fears of the aſſailants, and the hopes of the beſieged. The former knew, that if they did not carry their point ſoon, they muſt a ſecond time ſuffer the ſhame and ſlaughter of a repulſe; and the latter conſidered, that if they could hold out a few hours longer, the water would deliver them for the preſent, and the enemy be perhaps deterred from renewing the aſſault. Incited by theſe

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theſe reflections, the combatants on both ſides exerted all their vigour, and diſplayed a degree of fortitude and proweſs, which ſeldom occurs in the annals of hiſtory. Each perſon, regardleſs of his ſafety, and intent only upon annoying the enemy, the conflict was as bloody and deſperate, as the time was critical and important. It had laſted for near ſix hours, and many of the braveſt on both ſides had fallen. At laſt, the aſſailants, perceiving the quick approach of the tide, and collecting and exerting at once their whole force, overpowered the beſieged with their numbers, and burſt forward irreſiſtibly within the walls of the fort; in which the garriſon ſtill continued to reſiſt, till there was not a ſingle perſon left to enjoy the glory of ſo illuſtrious a defence. The royaliſts paid dear for their victory; above two hundred men, beſides thoſe who had fallen in the firſt aſſault, were killed upon the ſpot, and a much greater number wounded [r].

The ſiege of Zirickſee.

THEY now proceeded to the ſiege of Zirickſee; and in this undertaking their difficulties were greatly augmented, and the ſiege prolonged, by a reſolution of the inhabitants, who had broken down the dykes of the canal, and laid the adjacent country under water. This

[r] Meurſii Auriacus, p. 147.

meaſure,

meaſure, of which the States of Holland had lately ſet the example during the ſiege of Leyden, ſhewed how firmly determined the citizens were to make a vigorous defence, and rendered impracticable all the ordinary methods of conducting ſieges, by trenches, batteries, and aſſaults. Mondragone perceived, that the reduction of Ziricſee muſt be a work of conſiderable time, and that the only expedient which he could employ, was to block it up on every ſide, ſo as to prevent the entrance of ſupplies. Theſe it could receive only by the way of a ſmall canal, dug from Ziricſee to the great one above mentioned, which ſeparates Schowen from the iſle of Duveland. 1575.

In order to ſecure the communication between theſe canals, the Zealanders had fortified the banks of the ſmaller, where it is joined to the greater; and while they retained poſſeſſion of the batteries which they had planted there, they ſecured a free entrance to the ſhips which were ſent from Holland and Walcheren with ſupplies. To deprive them of this reſource, and lock up the mouth of the ſmall canal, was the firſt and principal object of Mondragone's attention. For this purpoſe he ſtationed his ſhips in thoſe parts where the water was deepeſt; and formed in the moſt ſhallow parts an eſtacade, a work of a prodigious labour, which employed

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employed his troops for ſeveral months, and was attended with conſiderable bloodſhed. By perſeverance, however, he brought it at laſt to a concluſion; and then having drawn another ſtacado of the ſame kind, from an iſland which lay in the entrance of the canal, he joined the two ſtacados together by ſtrong iron chains, and thus rendered all acceſs impracticable.

During the progreſs of theſe operations, the proteſtants embraced every opportunity of introducing ſupplies into the city; and they were greatly favoured by the ſeaſon, which was ſo much milder than uſual, as to leave the river and canals navigable through the whole of winter. But in the beginning of February, the enemy's works were completed, and from that time, all attempts to relieve the beſieged, by the way of the ſmall canal, proved ineffectual. Their friends were therefore obliged to turn to another quarter.

In the beginning of the ſiege ſeveral cuts had been made in the dyke of the great canal on the ſide of Schowen, in order, as was mentioned above, to overflow the country. Through one of theſe cuts, near the village of Dreiſcher, the prince of Orange propoſed to convey ſupplies to Ziricſee acroſs the inundation; and he committed

committed the execution of his design to count Hohenloe, a German nobleman of the most unquestionable spirit and resolution; but a storm arising, and the Spaniards having encamped most of their forces, and planted batteries on the dyke, close by the cut, they obliged Hohenloe to retire. The prince, not discouraged by this check, prepared to make a second attempt with a more powerful armament. And in order to animate his troops, he resolved to conduct the enterprise himself. 1575.

The prince of Orange attempts in vain to relieve it.

He reached Dreischer, and approached the cut, at the time of high water. In the beginning of the attack he threw the enemy into confusion, made considerable slaughter among them, and carried off some pieces of cannon from their batteries. But the Spaniards, rouzed by the danger which threatened them, quickly recovered their stations, and made a bold and vigorous resistance, till the tide began to retire; when the prince perceiving it to be impracticable to advance, was obliged, in order to save his fleet from destruction, to return into the great canal. Boissot, the admiral, whose ship was much larger than the rest, did not retreat in time; and his ship having stuck against the bottom, he himself, and about three hundred of his crew, either perished in the waves, or were killed by the enemy. This was the

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the laſt attempt for the relief of the beſieged; who being at length overpowered with their miſeries, agreed to ſurrender the town into the hands of Mondragone; and that general, deſirous to put a period to ſo tedious an enterpriſe, granted them ſuch favourable terms as they were willing to accept [s].

THIS ſiege had laſted near nine months, and during all that time had occupied the greateſt part of the Spaniſh army.

Death of Vitelli.

BUT before the ſurrender of Ziricſee, other events had happened which rendered thoſe that have been related of ſmall importance to either party; and which, while they diſappointed the hopes entertained by the Spaniards of completing the conqueſt of Zealand, in a great meaſure delivered the confederates from thoſe diſquieting apprehenſions which the late ſucceſs of the Spaniſh arms was calculated to excite. The firſt of theſe events was the death of Vitelli, who was, without controverſy, the ableſt and moſt experienced general at that time in the Netherlands.

Death of Requeſens.

VITELLI's death was quickly followed by that of Requeſens. In carrying on the ſiege of Ziricſee, much greater ſums had been neceſſary

[s] Meteren, p. 155. Bentivoglio, p. 170.

than

than he was able to ſupply. From Spain, he knew that, conſidering the exhauſted condition of the king's finances[t], occaſioned by his war with the Turks, no money could be expected; and the States of ſuch of the provinces as retained their allegiance, were either unwilling, or unable, to comply with his demands. Thus, great arrears were due to his troops, and they had already began to mutiny, and to exerciſe the moſt intolerable oppreſſion on the people; to whom he had been obliged to grant the liberty of wearing arms for their defence, from a well-grounded apprehenſion, that if he had not permitted them to do this, they would have done it without his authority[u].

Requesens had too much ſenſibility, and too little ſtrength of mind, either to endure patiently the mortifications, or to encounter reſolutely the difficulties, to which he was expoſed. His vexation and chagrin preyed inceſſantly on his health and ſpirits, and at length brought on a fever, of which he died in a few days; leaving behind him a much higher character for civil, than for military accompliſhments, in which he was confeſſedly much inferior to his predeceſſor the duke of Alva[w].

[t] Meteren, p. 156.

[u] This liberty had been taken from them by the duke of Alva.

[w] Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 464. Strada, tom. ii. p. 35.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

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1576. The government in the hands of the council of ſtate.

AFTER the death of Requeſens, who had been prevented from nominating his ſucceſſor by the violence of his diſeaſe, the council of ſtate aſſumed the reins of government; and as the king heſitated for ſome time in his choice of a governor, he found it neceſſary to confirm their authority.

THIS revolution afforded great ſatisfaction to the people of Holland and Zealand; who flattered themſelves with hopes, that now, when the adminiſtration was lodged in the hands of their fellow-citizens, the war would not be carried on with the ſame animoſity and ardor as

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before. At firſt, however, the council entered heartily into the late governor's deſigns, and proſecuted with vigour the plan of operations which he had left unfiniſhed. And they continued to do ſo till their attention was called to objects of a ſtill more intereſting nature, than the reduction of the maritime provinces.

Mutiny of the Spaniſh troops.

THE Spaniſh cavalry had, as already mentioned, begun to mutiny before the death of Requeſens. During the ſiege of Ziricſee, the infantry remained obedient to their commanders, partly from being kept in perpetual employment, and partly from the hopes of enriching themſelves by the plunder of that city; but being diſappointed in theſe hopes by the articles of the capitulation, and large arrears being due, to the payment of which even the contributions of the people of Ziricſee were not applied[a], they flew to arms, depoſed their officers, elected others, and a commander in chief from among themſelves; and then having ſworn mutual fidelity over the ſacred hoſt, they abandoned all their conqueſts which had coſt them ſo much labour and blood, and paſſed over to Brabant; intending to take poſſeſ-

[a] Meteren ſays, that the Walloons laid hold of the money, and with great dexterity excluded the Spaniards from the town.

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sion of some considerable fortified place, from whence they might make excursions, and plunder the neighbouring towns and villages.

They seize on Alloſt.

The council of state sent count Mansvelt to appease them; but no offers or promises which the count was empowered to make, could divert them from their design. They hoped, by the rapidity of their march, to have entered Brussels by surprise; but both the inhabitants and garrison were prepared to oppose them. They failed likewise in an attempt on Mechlin. Then leaving Brabant, they turned suddenly towards Alloſt in Flanders; and made themselves masters of that town, by climbing over the walls in the middle of the night, when the citizens were off their guard. They could not have acquired possession of a place more suitable to their design; as it was situated in the midst of a rich and fertile country, and lay at nearly an equal distance from Brussels, Ghent, and Antwerp. They had no sooner displayed the standard of rebellion in Alloſt, than they were joined by most of the other Spanish troops in the Low-Countries; after which they began to exercise every species of violence and outrage, both against the citizens and the inhabitants of the country round.

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THE prince of Orange remained not idle or unconcerned in this critical conjuncture. He had too much ſagacity not to diſcern, and too much zeal and dexterity not to avail himſelf of ſo favourable an opportunity of advancing his deſigns. By his letters, and emiſſaries, he endeavoured to rouſe the ſpirit of the people, and to perſuade the council, "That now was the time when they might deliver themſelves for ever from the tyranny of Spain. By the good providence of God, the government had fallen into their own hands. It ought to be their unalterable purpoſe, to hold faſt the power which they poſſeſſed, and to employ it in delivering their fellow-citizens from that intolerable load of miſery under which they had ſo long groaned. The meaſure of the calamities of the people, and of the iniquities of the Spaniards, was now full. There was nothing worſe to be dreaded than they had already ſuffered; and nothing to deter them from reſolving either to expel their rapacious tyrants, or to periſh in the glorious attempt."

They are declared rebels by the council.

THESE exhortations, enforced by accounts which were propagated of the enormities committed by the Spaniſh troops, found an eaſy admittance into the minds of perſons of all ranks. The council of ſtate were no leſs inflamed

flamed than the people; and reſolved to publiſh an edict, declaring the Spaniards to be rebels againſt the king. Barlaimont, Manſvelt, Viglius, even the Spaniſh officers of the higheſt rank, and Rhoda, preſident of the council of tumults, ſeemed at firſt inclined to concur with the other counſellors; but perceiving that their reſentment was not confined to the mutineers, but extended likewiſe to all the friends of the Spaniſh government, they began to alleviate the outrages of the ſoldiers, and openly oppoſed the publication of the edict; alleging, that troops which had mutinied on account of not receiving their pay, could not juſtly be conſidered as rebels; and that the edict would ſerve only to exaſperate them ſtill more againſt the people, while the council was not provided with force ſufficient to reſtrain their exceſſes. But theſe reaſons were held in great contempt by a majority of the council; who, having expelled the diſſenting members, accuſed them of holding correſpondence with the mutineers, and threw them into priſon. Then having elected the duke d'Arſchot for their preſident, in the room of Viglius, they publiſhed an edict in terms ſtrongly calculated to increaſe the odium againſt the Spaniſh troops; calling on the people to concur with them in driving out that lawleſs and rapacious crew, who, under the pretext of procuring payment of their ar-

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rears, would, if they were not ſpeedily prevented, bring utter ruin upon the Netherlands.

Hoſtilities between the Spaniards and Flemings.

NOTHING could have been more conſonant to the general ſpirit of the Flemings, than the ſentiments contained in this edict. It ſerved as fuel to that flame which was already kindled, and which now burſt out with redoubled violence. To give greater weight to the meaſures which had been already taken, and to thoſe which they intended to purſue, the council called an aſſembly of the States; and all the provinces, Luxemburg excepted, ſent deputies to attend. This aſſembly had no ſooner met than hoſtilities were begun. The citadels of Antwerp, Ghent, Valenciennes, and Utrecht, were in the hands of the Spaniards. Romero commanded in Lieres; and Maeſtricht was garriſoned by ſome companies of German infantry. To acquire poſſeſſion of theſe important fortreſſes, and to prevent the Spaniſh troops from uniting themſelves into one body, were the objects upon which the States beſtowed their firſt and principal attention. They were ſucceſsful in gaining over to their ſide the regiments of Walloons in the Spaniſh ſervice; and they raiſed ſo great a number of militia of the country, as, when joined with the Walloons, formed a conſiderable body of troops.

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THE Spaniards, on the other hand, prompted by Rhoda, and animated by the brave and active d'Avila, exerted themſelves no leſs ſtrenuouſly in counteracting their deſigns. An officer of the name of Vargas, having drawn together eight hundred horſe in the neighbourhood of Maeſtricht, had advanced as far as Viſenach, in his way to Alloſt, in hopes of prevailing on the mutineers to act in concert with him. At Viſenach he was met by two thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, which the States had ſent to oppoſe him. But the Spaniards were not ſo much inferior in number, as they were ſuperior in military diſcipline. Vargas ſupplied his want of infantry by making a company of Burgundians quit their horſes. The Flemiſh troops, though they began the attack with great impetuoſity, fell ſoon into diſorder; and the Spaniards broke in upon their ranks, and put them to flight, with conſiderable ſlaughter.

VARGAS continued his route to Alloſt; and was ſeconded in his applicatiod to the mutineers, by d'Avila and Romero; but neither the importunity of their officers, nor a regard to the honour of their nation, or to their perſonal ſafety, could overcome their obſtinate reſolution to remain in Alloſt, till they ſhould receive payment of their arrears. From Alloſt,

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Vargas led his troops, with the utmoſt expedition, to Maeſtricht, which, he was informed, the Germans in garriſon there had agreed to deliver to the States. The execution of their deſign had been retarded by ſome companies of Spaniards, a part of whom were in poſſeſſion of one of the gates, and the reſt ſtationed in the town of Vich. This town lies on the eaſt ſide of the river, and is connected with Maeſtricht by a bridge over the Maeſe. Vargas, having tranſported his troops, and joined his countrymen at Vich, had a ſharp engagement with the townſmen upon the bridge; but as they were not ſupported by the Germans, he ſoon compelled them to retire. They paid dear for this attempt to aſſert their liberty. The Germans, inſtead of acting as their friends, united with the Spaniards, and both together plundered the town without mercy [b].

The ſacking and plunder of Antwerp by the Spaniards.

But the memory of the calamities which the people of Maeſtricht experienced on this occaſion, was effaced by thoſe which ſoon afterwards befel the citizens of Antwerp. The States had laboured in vain to perſuade the Spaniſh garriſon in the citadel to deliver it into their hands. They now reſolved to compel them; and, with this view, they had brought

[b] Meteren, p. 164. Bentivoglio, p. 178.

into

into the city a numerous body of Walloons and other troops. They had much reaſon for that ſolicitude with which they deſired to get poſſeſſion of this important fortreſs; which, on the one ſide, communicated with the town, by a ſpacious eſplanade, and on the other, with the adjacent country. The States were not ſufficiently aware of the danger to which, from theſe two circumſtances united, the city of Antwerp was expoſed. Champigny[c] the governor had endeavoured to rouſe their attention to this danger, and had earneſtly exhorted them to block up the eſplanade by batteries and trenches; and, at the ſame time, to order all the troops that could be ſpared, to encamp without the town, ſo as to prevent the Spaniards at Alloſt and other places from entering the citadel. But they wholly neglected the latter part of this advice, and they were too late in beginning to put the former in execution. They believed that the garriſon would not venture to ſally out upon the town, in which there was ſo great a number of troops to oppoſe them; and they flattered themſelves with the hopes of being able to compel them to ſurrender, before they could receive aſſiſtance from their countrymen. For this purpoſe, two

[c] He was brother to cardinal Granvelle, and was as averſe from the Spaniſh intereſt as his brother was attached to it.

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ſtrong batteries were planted on the eſplanade; while the townſmen were employed, either in puſhing forward the trenches, or in raiſing mounds for the ſecurity of the town.

THE ſiege of the caſtle of Ghent was carried on at the ſame time, and the States had conceived the moſt ſanguine expectations of ſucceſs; when the noiſe of the artillery reached from both places to the mutineers in Alloſt; and, awakening in them ſome ſparks of their native warlike ferocity, produced a more powerful effect upon their minds, than all the exhortations and entreaties of their commanders.

NAVARESE, their leader, ſeized dexterouſly this opportunity which their preſent diſpoſition afforded him; and, calling them together, exhorted them to reflect upon the folly of ſuffering the fortreſſes beſieged to fall into the hands of the Flemings. "That artillery," ſaid he, "which is now thundering in our ears, is levelled againſt us, no leſs than againſt the garriſons of Ghent and Antwerp. When the Flemings ſhall have ſubdued the reſt of our countrymen, can we doubt that they will next turn their arms againſt us, who are the principal objects of their reſentment? Can you imagine that the States will then lend a more favourable

favourable ear, than at preſent, to your requeſts? Believe me, they will ere long extinguiſh the debt which they owe you, in your blood. Let us march inſtantly to the relief of the citadel of Antwerp. We ſhall ſoon oblige the enemy to raiſe the ſiege. We ſhall, in ſpite of the townſmen, and the raw troops which they have brought to their aſſiſtance, make ourſelves maſters of the richeſt city in the world, and take ample revenge for the unworthy treatment we have received."

He would have proceeded; but was prevented by ſhouts of applauſe, and exclamations from every quarter, to arms! to arms! They were now as impatient to leave Alloſt, as they had formerly been reluctant. On the third day of November, and only a few hours before ſun-ſet, they began their march; hoping to reach the citadel of Antwerp early next morning, unobſerved by the enemy. Having found greater difficulty in paſſing the Scheld than they expected, they did not arrive till noon; notwithſtanding which, being joined by four hundred horſe, under Vargas and Romero, who had acted in concert with Navareſe, they entered the citadel, without meeting with the leaſt oppoſition. The citizens were no ſooner informed of their arrival, than they ſuſpected their deſign, and were filled with the moſt dreadful

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dreadful apprehenſions. Champigny the governor, whoſe advice had been ſo unfortunately diſregarded, ſaw the approaching ſtorm, and did every thing in his power to avert it.

But the impetuoſity of the mutineers did not leave him time for completing the arrangements which he intended. Theſe men, impelled at once by avarice and revenge, rejected with diſdain the invitation given by d'Avila to repoſe and refreſh themſelves after their march. With rage and fury in their countenances, they demanded the ſignal to advance; calling out, that they were determined, before night, either to periſh in the conflict, or to fix their quarters in the city. They were in number between two and three thouſand, and the garriſon, together with the troops brought by Vargas and Romero, amounted nearly to the ſame number. Navareſe led on the mutineers, and the remainder were commanded by Romero. Nothing could exceed the intrepidity with which theſe two determined bands, vying with each other, attacked the trenches. The citizens diſplayed, at the firſt onſet, great bravery and reſolution; but being unable long to withſtand the impetuous attack of the Spaniards, and being galled at the ſame time by the artillery of the citadel, they at length gave way, and fled with precipitation along

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the two ſtreets which lead from the parade into the centre of the city. The Spaniards were ſeconded by their cavalry; which bore down all before them, and followed cloſe upon the rear of the vanquiſhed, till they reached the great ſquare, in the centre of which ſtands the Guild-hall or Palace. There the fugitives, being joined by ſome freſh troops, made a halt, and rallied; but they were ſoon broken a ſecond time, and would have been all cut to pieces, if they had not taken ſhelter in the palace, and in houſes of the ſquare. From the windows they kept, for ſome time, a briſk fire upon the enemy, and did conſiderable execution; but the Spaniards, who were accompanied by the retainers of their camp, ſet fire to the houſes, with hay, ſtraw, and other combuſtible materials, not ſparing even the palace itſelf; which was eſteemed one of the richeſt and moſt magnificent in the world. It was quickly reduced to aſhes; and of thoſe who had taken refuge in it, ſome periſhed in the flames, and ſome by the ſword in attempting to eſcape, while others frantic with deſpair flung themſelves headlong from the windows [d].

THE Spaniards then diſperſed themſelves over the city; overpowering all oppoſition with

[d] Thuanus.

irreſiſtible

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irreſiſtible impetuoſity. Had their number been ſufficient either to murder, or to overtake the multitude that fled before them, the carnage of that memorable day would have been ſtill more dreadful. Of the citizens near ſeven thouſand periſhed; while the loſs of the Spaniards amounted only to two hundred men. So great is the ſuperiority in battle, of regular diſcipline, and prompt obedience to command. For though the citizens fought with extraordinary courage, like men whoſe all was at ſtake, they acted not in concert; and although they had been marſhalled by Champigny, as well as the time would allow, yet, from want of practice, they were ſoon thrown into confuſion, and, from the ſame cauſe, they were unable to recover their ranks, or return to the charge.

JUSTICE would oblige us to beſtow on the Spaniſh troops the praiſe due to the moſt heroic valour, if, beſides the rapacity which impelled them, they had not diſfigured the luſtre of their victory by exerciſing a degree of barbarous cruelty, of which, at that period, the Spaniards alone, of all the nations in Europe, ſeem to have been capable. Antwerp, at the time of this cataſtrophe, was in the moſt flouriſhing condition. Companies of merchants from almoſt every commercial nation, reſided in

in it, poſſeſſing ſtorehouſes and factories filled with the moſt precious commodities. Great numbers of the citizens too were the wealthieſt in Europe. Their magnificent houſes were adorned with the moſt coſtly furniture; and their ſhops and warehouſes ſtored with gold and ſilver ſtuffs, and all other kinds of valuable effects, collected from every corner of the globe. Upon theſe the Spaniards ſeized, without any diſcrimination of the owners, and without conſidering whether the perſons, whom they pillaged, were friends or enemies. The plunder that lay open and unconcealed was immenſe; but was far from being ſufficient to ſatiate the avarice of the Spaniards. They exerciſed the moſt unrelenting cruelty upon all whom they ſuſpected to have concealed their treaſures; and nothing was to be heard in the city, but either the ſhrieks and groans of the ſufferers, or the lamentations of thoſe whom they compelled to behold the torments of their huſbands, wives, or children. Cotemporary hiſtorians have deſcribed ſome of the ſeveral ſpecies of torture which they inflicted; but the reader's modeſty would be offended, and his humanity ſhocked, by the recital [e].

In this manner were theſe men, for three days and nights, employed in plundering and

[e] Thuanus and Meteren.

butchering

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butchering by turns, a people who were ſubjects of the ſame prince as themſelves, and from whom (whatever ground of complaint they might pretend againſt the council of ſtate) they had never received the ſmalleſt injury or provocation. Nor does it appear that their officers interpoſed to moderate their exceſſes, till the ſoldiers, exhauſted with fatigue, were about to give over of themſelves.

THE money in ſpecie which was extorted, amounted at leaſt to eight millions of guilders, beſides an immenſe quantity of gold and ſilver, in plate, ſtuffs, and furniture, which the owners were not able to redeem. The loſs which the people of Antwerp ſuſtained by the burning of ſo many buildings, was not leſs than what they ſuffered by the rapacity of the ſoldiers. The moſt beautiful part of the city was burnt to the ground; and great numbers of ſhops and warehouſes, containing the richeſt goods, were conſumed to aſhes [f].

The States receive aſſiſtance from the prince of Orange.

WHILST the barbarity exerciſed againſt the inhabitants of Antwerp, excited ſentiments of compaſſion towards the unhappy ſufferers, it greatly augmented that abhorrence which the

[f] Meteren, p. 164. Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 471. Bentivoglio, p. 178.

Flemings

Flemings already entertained towards the Spaniards, and made them more ſolicitous than ever to deliver themſelves from a yoke which was now become intolerable. But the great ſuperiority which the Spaniſh troops diſcovered on every occaſion over the raw undiſciplined forces of the States, created much anxiety with regard to the ſucceſs of their endeavours. The council of ſtate perceived the neceſſity of having recourſe to foreign aid; and they willingly accepted an offer, which was made them at this juncture by the prince of Orange, of ſome cannon, ammunition, and troops, with which they puſhed forward the ſiege of the citadel of Ghent, and ſoon obliged the garriſon to capitulate.

THIS ſeaſonable aſſiſtance contributed not a little to advance the prince's views. Immediately after the death of Requeſens, he had projected a ſcheme of uniting all the provinces, and had exerted himſelf with great activity and addreſs, in carrying it into execution. The States entered readily into his ideas. Deputies were appointed, and inveſted with proper powers, by the ſeveral provinces; and in the congreſs, which was held at Ghent, a treaty of confederacy was concluded, under which all the provinces, except Luxemburg, were comprehended.

The confederacy of Ghent. November 8th, 1576.

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In this confederacy, ſo well known in the hiſtory of the Netherlands by the name of the Pacification of Ghent, it was agreed between the Catholic provinces on the one hand, and thoſe of Holland and Zealand, with the prince of Orange, on the other, that there ſhould ſubſiſt between them an inviolable alliance, peace, and friendſhip; that all paſt injuries ſhould be buried in oblivion; that all priſoners, and in particular the count de Boſſut, ſhould be ſet at liberty without ranſom; that the contracting parties ſhould, to the utmoſt of their power, aſſiſt each other in expelling the Spaniards from the Netherlands; that as ſoon as the provinces ſhould be delivered from theſe bloody oppreſſors, and tranquillity eſtabliſhed, a general aſſembly ſhould be held of the States of all the provinces, for redreſſing grievances, reforming abuſes, and reſtoring the conſtitution to its primæval ſtate; that the prince of Orange ſhould remain high admiral and governor of the maritime provinces; and that he, and all others, whoſe property had been confiſcated, ſhould be reinſtated in their poſſeſſions and dignities; that all the decrees of the duke of Alva, relative to the tumults and hereſy, ſhould be aboliſhed; but that in the Catholic provinces, only the Roman catholic religion ſhould be exerciſed; while in thoſe of Holland and Zealand, all matters, whether civil or religious,

religious, ſhould remain on their preſent footing, till a general aſſembly of all the States ſhould be held [f].

Arrival of Don John of Auſtria.

THE deputies who were now convened, whom the hiſtorians call likewiſe by the name of the States, entered immediately upon the execution of the articles of this confederacy, by tranſporting to the frontier of France ſuch of the Spaniards as had been taken priſoners in the citadel of Ghent: and they had begun to make preparations to diſlodge them from other places, when they were informed that Don John of Auſtria, whom Philip had made choice of for governor, had arrived in the province of Luxemburg. In ſome reſpects Don John was admirably qualified for this new ſtation, to which his brother had appointed him. His affable and inſinuating manners were fitted to conciliate the affections of the people whom he had been ſent to govern; and his military accompliſhments qualified him to purſue the war with vigour, againſt the revolted provinces. But in the critical ſituation into which the late enormities of the Spaniards had brought the Netherlands, other talents beſides theſe were requiſite; ſuch as prudence, patience,

[f] Meteren, p. 169. Bentivoglio, l. 9. ſub fine. Thuanus, l. 62. ſect. 13.

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and ſelf-command, together with ſkill and dexterity in managing the paſſions and the prejudices of men; qualifications which Don John poſſeſſed not in an eminent degree.

His prudence.

HIS conduct upon his firſt arrival was ill calculated to allay thoſe ſuſpicions which the Flemings entertained of the king's deſign in ſending him to the Netherlands. Having ſtopt at Luxemburg, he wrote letters to the council and the States, in which he informed them, that he would not come to Bruſſels, the uſual reſidence of their governors, unleſs hoſtages were given him for their peaceable behaviour, a guard appointed for the ſecurity of his perſon, and the ſame unlimited command of the fleet and army conferred upon him, which the preceding governors had enjoyed. He lamented the outrages which had been committed by the Spaniſh troops; and promiſed, that, if the States and people ſhould maintain their obedience to the king, and their profeſſion of the catholic faith, the injuries which they had ſuſtained, ſhould not paſs unpuniſhed. But he added, that if they failed in either of theſe reſpects, they ſhould, in that event, find him no leſs prepared for war, than he was inclined to peace[g].

[g] Meteren, p. 174.

THE

1576. The States apply for advice to the prince Orange.

THE States and council were ignorant, till they received theſe letters, of the light in which their late conduct was conſidered by the court of Spain. They believed that, as the ſteps which they had taken were neceſſary for the preſervation of the people, it was impoſſible they could be offenſive to the king; and they were extremely ſurpriſed, thus to meet not only with diſtruſt, but even threats, and a defiance where they were conſcious of having merited approbation and applauſe. They trembled therefore at the thoughts of putting themſelves in the power of the new governor, and were greatly at a loſs to determine what anſwer they ſhould return to his demands. On this occaſion they had recourſe to the prince of Orange for advice. And William readily embraced the opportunity, which was thus preſented to him, of confirming his countrymen in thoſe ſuſpicions to which the governor's conduct had given riſe.

His advice, dated Nov 30, 1576.

"As it was but too manifeſt," he ſaid, "from the ſtrain of Don John's letter, that he intended to tread in the footſteps of his predeceſſors, the States and council had much need to exert all their firmneſs, prudence, and circumſpection. They ought ſeriouſly to conſider the important charge with which they were entruſted; and to remember, that upon their

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preſent conduct it depended, whether they, and their wives, and children, and fellow-citizens, ſhould for the future enjoy thoſe rights which belonged to them as natives of the Low Countries, or ſhould be again expoſed to the lawleſs tyranny of the Spaniards. They ought to exerciſe with vigour the power which they poſſeſſed, and reſolutely reject all terms of agreement with the governor, by which the fundamental laws of the State might be brought into danger, or their own authority abridged. Enter not, ſaid he, into any accommodation with him, till the Spaniards, and all other foreign troops, be actually diſmiſſed. Truſt not to any ſoothing promiſes which he may give you, of diſmiſſing them at a more convenient ſeaſon. Remember how the king himſelf, when he went to Spain, aſſured you, that the troops which he then left behind him, ſhould, in three months afterwards, be withdrawn, and yet they were ſuffered to remain for more than a year and a half; and would, notwithſtanding your ſolicitations, have ſtill remained, if the calamity which befel his army in Africa, had not made it neceſſary for him to remove them. Let no conſideration perſuade you to liſten to Don John's requeſt of the unlimited command of your forces. By granting this, you will furniſh him with weapons againſt yourſelves. Nothing can expreſs his diſtruſt more

more ſtrongly, than his unprecedented requiſitions of hoſtages, and a guard for the ſecurity of his perſon. If you comply with theſe demands, you will enable him to annihilate your authority and to trample under foot your moſt ſacred rights and laws. It is impoſſible to believe that one who diſcovers ſo much ſolicitude to ſtrip you of your power, can ſeriouſly intend your welfare. Is it not more reaſonable that the governor ſhould truſt the States, than that the States ſhould lay themſelves at the mercy of the governor? ſuch demands were never made, even by your princes themſelves; whoſe practice always was, to come unarmed to your aſſemblies, and to take an oath to maintain your privileges, before they received from you any promiſe of obedience. Conſent not to put yourſelves under the power of John of Auſtria, upon eaſier terms than have been ever inſiſted upon with your native princes. Require him, previouſly to his admiſſion, to interpoſe his authority for the immediate departure of the Spaniſh troops; and ſolemnly to engage to govern the State according to its fundamental laws [h]. To theſe conditions, your late fatal experience will juſtify you, if you add, that you ſhall have the power of aſſem-

[h] Here the prince mentions the particular privileges to which he alludes, and the times when they were obtained. Meteren, p. 175.

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bling yourſelves twice, or even thrice a year, if you ſhall judge it to be expedient; that the citadels ſhall be raſed to the ground; that the right of appointing the governors and magiſtrates ſhall be veſted in you; and that, without your conſent, no military force ſhall be levied, and no garriſons ſtationed in the towns or forts. At preſent, it little imports you to conſider whether or not this conduct will give offence to the king, for it is mere deluſion, if you flatter yourſelves that you have not already offended him. Promiſes, ſoothing ſpeeches, and profeſſions of affection on his part, will not be wanting; but you will diſcover the laſt degree of weakneſs, if, after what you have experienced for ſeveral years paſt, you are not ſenſible, that nothing now remains for you, but either miſerably to bend under the yoke, from which you have ſo happily eſcaped, or to employ with vigour and fortitude the means with which providence has furniſhed you; and which, I doubt not, may yet prove effectual for your ſecurity, provided you maintain harmony and concord among yourſelves[i]."

The States apply for aid to foreign powers.

THIS letter, in ſome meaſure, produced the deſired effect. It put to ſilence all thoſe who were for receiving Don John on his own terms;

[i] Meteren, p. 175, 176. Bentivoglio, lib. ix. ab initio. Thuanus, l. lxii. ſect. 15.

and

and the States, more ſuſpicious than ever of his deſign, reſolved to inſiſt upon the dimiſſion of the troops, and the confirmation of the pacification of Ghent, as conditions, without which they would never agree to acknowledge his authority. And that they might not be found unprepared, in caſe of his refuſal, they gave orders for making new levies; drew together an army at Wavre, between Bruſſels and Namur; and diſpatched ambaſſadors to ſolicit aſſiſtance from foreign courts.

In Germany, where they were powerfully ſeconded in their applications by the prince of Orange, they engaged in their intereſts John Caſimire, count palatine of the Rhine. In France they did not confine their application to the Calviniſts, but likewiſe prevailed upon the duke of Anjou, the king's brother, to eſpouſe their cauſe, by ſetting before him the proſpect of an eſtabliſhment in the Low Countries, more ſuitable to his rank than he could expect to obtain in his brother's dominions. From the queen of England, their envoy met with the moſt gracious reception. It was matter of the higheſt ſatisfaction to this ſagacious princeſs, to ſee her inveterate enemy thus embroiled with his Flemiſh ſubjects; but, as ſhe was ſtill deſirous to avoid an open rupture with Philip, ſhe choſe to aſſiſt them with money

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rather than with troops, and gave them forty thouſand pounds, with a promiſe of continuing her favour, on condition (which ſhe added in order to ſave appearances) that they ſhould adhere to the pacification of Ghent, and not throw off their allegiance to their legal ſovereign.

Their negotiation with Don John.

WHILE the States were making theſe preparations to vindicate their rights by force of arms, they ſincerely deſired to attain their end, by negotiation with the governor. For they had too long groaned under the calamities of war, not to wiſh moſt earneſtly for peace, provided that bleſſing could be ſecured without making a ſacrifice of their liberties. Don John, on the other hand, diſcovered an extreme reluctance to comply with the conditions which they required of him; but he endeavoured to diſſemble his ſentiments, and attempted, by fair ſpeeches, to cajole and deceive them. Still, however, he continued to ſhew his diffidence, by inſiſting upon having a numerous guard for his perſon; and by refuſing his conſent to the departure of the Spaniards, unleſs the States ſhould at the ſame time diſmiſs the foreign troops in their ſervice, and give hoſtages, to remain in the hands of a neutral power, till their engagements ſhould be fulfilled.

THE

THE States, whoſe jealouſy was kept alive by the repeated warnings of the prince of Orange, eaſily penetrated into Don John's deſigns; and they reſolved, if poſſible, to convince him, by one deciſive ſtep, that it was in vain for him to expect that they would ever depart from the terms propoſed. In their aſſembly at Bruſſels, on the fifth of January one thouſand five hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, they drew up a new deed of union, in which they engaged in the moſt ſolemn manner, to maintain inviolably for ever the pacification of Ghent; to ſpare neither their goods, their perſons, nor their lives, in order to fulfil it; and to regard as perjured traitors, all thoſe who, participating in the preſent union, ſhould by word, deed, or counſel, counteract it. A copy of this deed, ſubſcribed by the governor and deputies of all the towns and provinces; by the nobility, prelates, and other dignified eccleſiaſtics; and by the members of tribunals, councils, colleges, and chapters, together with a ſolemn ratification of it by the council, was ſent by the States to Don John, as their final anſwer to his demands [k].

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THIS meaſure contributed not a little to promote the end propoſed. It gave Don John a

Their agreement with him.

[k] Meteren, p. 179.

proof

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1577. proof of firmneſs on the part of the States, which he little expected, and ſhewed him the neceſſity of either agreeing to the conditions which they ſo earneſtly required, or of reſolving inſtantly to have recourſe to arms. Inflamed by ambition and the love of war, he would not have heſitated a moment what part to act, had not his inſtructions from the king required that he ſhould avoid coming to an open rupture with the Catholic provinces. He conſidered likewiſe, that the States had got the ſtart of him, and were already well prepared to repel force by force. Nor was he ignorant of the encouragement which they had received, to hope for ſuccour from the neighbouring powers; or of the danger to which great numbers of the Spaniſh troops, ſurrounded by their enemies, were expoſed, of being reduced by famine. Influenced by theſe conſiderations, and truſting that ere long, after quieting their ſuſpicions, opportunities would offer of depriving the States by degrees of that power of which they were at preſent ſo tenacious, he entered into a negotiation with their deputies at Marche en Famine, a city in Luxemburg; and after many obſtructions and difficulties, concluded a treaty with them, which they fondly termed the perpetual edict.

March 12.

In

In this treaty he engaged, that all the foreign troops in the ſervice of Spain ſhould leave the Netherlands, and never return thither without the conſent of the States; that the Spaniards and Italians ſhould depart within the ſpace of forty days, and the Germans, immediately after receiving ſatisfaction with regard to their arrears; and that all the cities and forts poſſeſſed by theſe troops ſhould, as ſoon as they were relinquiſhed, be delivered to the States, together with the ſtores of ammunition, arms, and proviſions. He ratified the pacification of Ghent. He conſented that all priſoners detained on account of the late diſturbances, ſhould immediately be ſet at liberty, except the count of Buren[1]. And he promiſed that diligent inquiry ſhould be made concerning the outrages lately committed by the troops; that juſtice ſhould be executed againſt the guilty, and a reaſonable compenſation made to the ſufferers, either in the Netherlands, or in Spain, according as the king ſhould be pleaſed to determine.

The States, on the other hand, engaged to preſerve inviolable their allegiance to the king, to maintain the profeſſion of the Roman Catholic faith throughout all the provinces; to

[1] Son of the prince of Orange.

receive

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receive Don John as governor general of the Netherlands; and immediately to furniſh him with ſix hundred thouſand florins, for the payment of the Italian and Spaniſh troops, in order to prevail on them the more eaſily to depart for Spain or Italy.

The States of Holland refuſe to concur.

As ſoon as this treaty was concluded, ambaſſadors were diſpatched by the catholic States, who alone were concerned in it, to the prince of Orange and the States of Holland and Zealand, to deſire their concurrence. It might eaſily have been foreſeen, that this application could not be attended with ſucceſs. For although the maritime provinces had conſented, in the pacification of Ghent, to ſubmit the queſtion of religion to the deciſion of a general aſſembly, to be held after the departure of the Spaniards; yet in that aſſembly they knew that they would have leiſure to employ all their influence in behalf of their religion, and to offer ſuch reaſons againſt proſcribing it, as they hoped would prove a ſufficient counterpoiſe to the religious zeal of the popiſh States. Without this expectation it can hardly be ſuppoſed that proteſtants, whoſe ſincerity in their profeſſion was ſo unqueſtionable, would ever have agreed to leave to others the determination of a matter in which they were ſo deeply intereſted; and therefore it is not ſurpriſing, that they declined acceding

acceding to the treaty now preſented to them, in which this important point had, without obtaining their conſent, been ſo haſtily decided. But leſt they ſhould alarm the bigotry of the catholic provinces, they took no notice, in their anſwer, of this, which was their principal objection. They began with ſaying, that they could not enough praiſe that generous zeal which the States had diſplayed, in delivering their country from the tyranny of the Spaniards; and they rejoiced to find that they ſtill perſiſted in their reſolution of adhering to the pacification of Ghent. But after conſidering attentively the treaty which had been tranſmitted to them, they were ſorry to obſerve, that it was extremely ill calculated to anſwer the laudable intentions of the States. For beſides ſeveral other objections of great weight, there was no proper proviſion made, in this treaty, for the regular calling of aſſemblies; in a convention, held on purpoſe to reſtore and ſecure their rights, an open infraction of them was ratified, by their conſenting to the unjuſt detention of the count of Buren; the States had failed in the reſpect and gratitude which they owed to the queen of England and the duke of Anjou; and certain articles of the treaty were derogatory to the honour of the Netherlands; particularly that article, by which, inſtead of inſiſting upon a reſtitution of thoſe invaluable effects,

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effects, of which the Spaniards had plundered the inhabitants, they had promiſed money to thoſe men, notwithſtanding their having been ſolemnly declared traitors and rebels by the States themſelves, and by the council of State, when clothed with the authority of the King.

Departure of the Italian and Spaniſh troops.

THE Catholics could not but be ſenſible of the ſtrength of theſe objections. Their impatience to be delivered from the Spaniſh troops, and their eager deſire of peace, had betrayed them into that precipitation of which they had been guilty. They could not avail themſelves now of the ſuperior penetration of the prince of Orange. The treaty was already concluded, and nothing remained for them but to watch the governor's motions, with an attentive eye, till the troops were removed to ſuch a diſtance, that they could not eaſily be recalled. Don John was at great pains to diſpel their ſuſpicions. For that purpoſe he employed all his influence to perſuade the Spaniards to depart; and he at length prevailed, though not till he had diſtributed among them the money which he had received from the States. This brave, but ferocious and ſavage band, then ſet out upon their march for Italy, like an army in triumph; loaded with the ſpoils of their fellow-ſubjects, and without compunction for the rapacity

rapacity and violence which they had exercised [m].

THEIR departure diffused universal joy throughout the Netherlands, and the people indulged the flattering hope, that the king, having been at last touched with their calamities, had resolved to treat them with greater lenity and moderation than they had experienced since the beginning of his reign. Their satisfaction was heightened by the popular character of the governor, who was in the prime of life; elegant and graceful in his person and deportment; lively, facetious, and affable, and who gained exceedingly from the comparison which men naturally formed of his insinuating manners, with the reserve and austerity of the king. He was received in Brussels with such marks of respect as had never been shewn to any former governor; and persons of all ranks flattered themselves with the prospect of a just and mild administration.

Don John's admission to the government.

THEY did not long enjoy this soothing prospect. Although Philip himself had ratified the perpetual edict, and Don John had, before his admission to the regency, sworn in the most solemn manner to observe it, it soon appeared

His impolitic conduct.

[m] Thuanus, lib. lxiv. sect. vi.

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1577. that nothing was farther from the intentions of either. The limitations which that edict impoſed upon the ſovereign's authority, were utterly repugnant to Philip's temper, as well as to the plan which he had formed for the government of the Netherlands; nor would he ever have empowered his brother to make ſo many conceſſions to the States, as the perpetual edict, or pacification of Ghent, contained, but in order more effectually to ſtrip them afterwards of that very power which he now conſented they ſhould enjoy. But Don John was, from his natural impetuoſity, incapable of executing this ſcheme, which required a much higher degree of circumſpection and experience, as well as patience and diſſimulation, than he poſſeſſed. His court was perpetually filled with Spaniards, and other foreigners, who had rendered themſelves obnoxious to the natives; nor were any of the Flemings admitted into his confidence, but ſuch as had ſhewn themſelves devoted to the Spaniſh intereſt; while thoſe who had diſcovered an attachment to the liberty of their country, were kept at a diſtance, and treated with indifference or contempt. This circumſtance contributed not a little to revive that jealouſy of his deſigns, which he had been ſo ſolicitous to allay. But the States were ſtill more alarmed, when he made them the following propoſals: that they ſhould not any longer

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withhold from him the authority which his predeceſſors had enjoyed, but allow him to act as captain-general, as well as governor of the provinces: that they ſhould empower him, without waiting for the determination of the general aſſembly of the States, to execute the two articles of the late treaty, which related to the obedience due to the king, and the re-eſtabliſhment of the Catholic religion; and that, if the prince of Orange would not immediately agree to accede to the perpetual edict, the States ſhould break off all correſpondence with him, and reduce him and the maritime provinces to obedience by force of arms. With theſe propoſals the States refuſed to comply, but expreſſed their refuſal in the ſofteſt terms; and without taking notice of his demand, to be allowed to act as captain-general, they repreſented to him that, by the pacification of Ghent, both he and they were bound to wait for the meeting of the general aſſembly of the States; to whoſe deciſion the prince of Orange, and the States of Holland and Zealand, had engaged to ſubmit.

Don John perceiving that he was not likely to perſuade them, grew more impatient than ever under his preſent reſtraints, and reſolved now to employ either force or fraud, as opportunities ſhould offer. The States could not thoroughly

His duplicity.

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that a much greater ſum was neceſſary to ſatisfy the German troops, than could be procured in the Low Countries; and offering to ſend his ſecretary Eſcovedo to repreſent their ſituation to the king. This artifice was not altogether without effect. The States could not believe that Don John was capable of ſo great a deceit as he was now practiſing againſt them. They agreed to his propoſal, and, as an expreſſion of their gratitude, they ſettled a penſion of two thouſand ducats on Eſcovedo, who ſet out immediately for Spain; but with a deſign extremely different from that which was pretended.

He ſeizes on the caſtle of Namur.

Don John in the mean time carried on his intrigues with the German officers, and hoped ſoon, by their means, to get poſſeſſion of the fortified towns in which they lay. But before any of the plans which he had formed with this view were put in execution, he judged it neceſſary to withdraw from Bruſſels, and, if poſſible, to make himſelf maſter of ſome place of ſtrength near the frontier, where he might remain in ſafety till he ſhould find himſelf in a condition to take the field. Of all the frontier towns, Namur appeared the fitteſt for his purpoſe; being conveniently ſituated for the reception of the troops, to which he expected the king would ſoon give orders to return from

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1577. Italy. It happened that Margaret de Valois, queen of Navarre, intended at this time to paſs through Namur, in her way to Spa. On pretence of paying his reſpects to Margaret, he left Bruſſels, and arrived in Namur, with a great number of the nobility and others, who were favourable to his deſign. But as the governor of the caſtle was a perſon of ſtrict fidelity, Don John was obliged, in order to accompliſh his aim, to have recourſe to the following ſtratagem. Feigning to ſet out in the morning for the chace, he took his way by the caſtle; where having ſtopt, and inquired for the governor, he pretended a curioſity to ſee the fortifications of the place. The governor, flattered with this viſit, and ſuſpecting nothing hoſtile from men who ſeemed equipped only for hunting, readily admitted, not only Don John himſelf, but his attendants; ſome of whom having arms concealed under their apparel,

July 24. immediately ſeized upon the gate [n].

JOHN having thus ſecured poſſeſſion of the caſtle, the town was, by the aſſiſtance of count Barlaimont, governor of the province, ſoon ſubjected to his authority. He obſerved with triumph, that the day on which this event happened, was the firſt day of his regency. It

[n] Bentivoglio, lib. x. p. 192. 195. Meteren, p. 185.

might

might with greater propriety have been ſaid, that it was the firſt of thoſe calamities which purſued him to the grave.

AFTER ſuch an open violation of his faith, there could be little room for any future negotiation with the States. Yet, in a letter which he wrote to them on this occaſion, he regretted that the plots which had been laid to deprive him of his life or liberty, had obliged him to have recourſe to ſo hoſtile an expedient, and he affirmed, that he was ſtill ready to obſerve the conditions of the perpetual edict; but declared, that he would not quit his preſent ſituation, till they ſhould make proviſion for the ſecurity of his perſon againſt the machinations of his enemies.

The aſtoniſhment of the States.

THE States and council were greatly aſtoniſhed, when they received intelligence of this event. They had wiſhed for nothing ſo much as to preſerve the provinces from being plunged afreſh into the calamities of war. They conſidered that ſome of the principal cities in Brabant were in the hands of the Germans. They knew not what part theſe troops might act, if hoſtilities with the governor ſhould take place; and they could not imagine that he would have ventured on ſo manifeſt a breach of the perpetual edict, without the proſpect of

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ſome powerful ſupport. They immediately diſpatched ambaſſadors to remonſtrate with him on the nature and conſequences of his conduct, and to requeſt him to return to Bruſſels. They promiſed to make the moſt ſerious inquiry into the machinations of which he complained, deſired that he would name the perſons guilty, and aſſured him, that nothing ſhould be wanting on their part to provide, in the moſt ſatisfactory manner, for the ſecurity of his perſon.

Of the reality of theſe machinations he could produce no other evidence, but ſome anonymous letters, which, he ſaid, had been tranſmitted to him. But as no perſon was named in theſe letters, and the authors of them were utterly unknown, all men believed them to be a forgery of his own, or of his courtiers, deſigned to ſerve as a pretext for his preſent treachery.

The anſwer which he made to the States ſhewed clearly, that, in the ſteps which he had taken, he had been influenced by a motive very different from that which he pretended—That the States ſhould put him in full poſſeſſion of the authority, which the preceding governors had exerciſed; that they ſhould give him the entire command of the army; break off all communi-

communication with the prince of Orange, and the provinces of Holland and Zealand, and compel them to accede to the perpetual edict; theſe were ſome of the conditions, to which if they did not agree, he acquainted them, that he was unalterably determined not to return. The States repreſented the inconſiſtency between the former of theſe demands, and the perpetual edict; and reminded him of the utter impoſſibility, under which they found themſelves, of complying with the latter, without violating their faith, which, in the pacification of Ghent, they had pledged to the maritime provinces. He ſtill perſiſted in his reſolution; and the States were equally inflexible.

Diſcovery of his deſigns.

THEY were confirmed in their purpoſe, by ſome letters writ by Don John and Eſcovedo to the king, and Antonio Perez, his ſecretary, which were intercepted in Gaſcony by the king of Navarre, and ſent by him to the prince of Orange, who tranſmitted them to the States. In theſe letters, the neceſſity of the ſpeedy return of the Italian and Spaniſh troops was urged with the utmoſt earneſtneſs and importunity. The diſeaſes of the Netherlands, ſaid Don John, admit of no other cure, but lopping off the parts affected: and, to the ſame purpoſe, Eſcovedo obſerved, That fire, and the ſhedding of blood, were the only means by which the diſorders

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diſorders that prevailed could be remedied. For no man here, ſaid he, whether among the nobility or people, performs the duty that he owes either to God or the king. Opinions the moſt abominable univerſally prevail; and every man lives as he liſts without law or rule. To which he added, That if the king did not ſend the neceſſary troops and money ſoon, he was afraid that Don John, who could not endure his preſent ſituation, would quit the Netherlands, and try his fortune elſewhere.

The States get a number of towns into their poſſeſſion.

WHILE theſe letters ſerved to alienate the Flemings more than ever from Don John, they raiſed to the greateſt height their admiration of the penetration and ſagacity of the prince of Orange, who had given them early warning of the governor's duplicity, and whoſe predictions were now ſo remarkably fulfilled. They entered with greater ardor than ever into his views, and in conformity with his advice, they reſolved to loſe no more time in negotiating, but without delay to put the provinces into a poſture of defence, before the return of the Spaniſh forces. Whilſt their levies, and other military preparations, were going on, they laboured with great ſolicitude to perſuade the Germans to deliver up the towns in their poſſeſſion. Their ſucceſs was in ſome meaſure retarded by the governor's intrigues with the officers; but the

the States, having at this time greater facility than Don John, in employing either money or force, according as the one or the other was moſt likely to prove effectual, had greater influence with the ſoldiers; who not only refuſed to liſten to their officers, but put ſome of them under arreſt, and gave them up to the States, together with the towns and citadels. In this manner the States recovered Bergen-op-zoom, Tolen, Breda, Bois-le-duc, and ſeveral other places; and they had the good fortune likewiſe to defeat a body of Germans, in the governor's intereſt, who were upon their march to ſurpriſe the citadel of Antwerp. After which, prompted partly by the apprehenſions which this attempt, though unſucceſsful, had excited, and partly by the remembrance of the many calamities which the citadels, in other places as well as Antwerp, had occaſioned to the inhabitants, they reſolved to demoliſh theſe fortreſſes; and gave orders for this purpoſe, which were executed by the people with inexpreſſible alacrity [o].

Don John, in the mean time, endeavoured to make himſelf maſter of ſome places in the neighbourhood of Namur; and he ſucceeded in his attempts upon Marienburg and Charlemont.

[o] Meteren, p. 187. Bentivoglio, tom. ii. p. 212.

But,

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But, being forſaken by the duke of Arſchot, and almoſt all the other nobility who had attended him to Namur; and perceiving that the States were much farther advanced than himſelf in their military preparations, he ſent them word that he had ſolicited the king for liberty to leave the Netherlands; and would immediately retire to Luxemburg, to wait the iſſue of his application, provided the States would agree to deſiſt from hoſtilities till the king's inſtructions ſhould arrive. But the States, ſuſpecting from their former experience that he intended nothing by this propoſal but to render them more remiſs in their preparations, replied, that before they could liſten to any terms of accommodation, he muſt deliver up the city and caſtle of Namur. To this Don John refuſed to conſent; and thus the negotiation was broken off, and all hopes of terminating the diſpute amicably were extinguiſhed [p].

The States invite the prince of Orange to reſide at Bruſſels.

THE States, conſidering war now as unavoidable, reſolved to invite the prince of Orange to reſide at Bruſſels; and accordingly five of their number were appointed to carry him an invitation, couched in terms ſo flattering and reſpectful, and ſo expreſſive at the ſame time of their gratitude for his former ſervices, that it was impoſſible he could heſitate to comply

[p] Bentivoglio, p. 198.

with

with their requeſt. Having obtained the conſent of the States of Holland and Zealand, he went firſt to Breda and thence to Antwerp and Bruſſels. His reception in the places through which he paſſed, was ſuch as might be expected from a people, by whom he was held in the higheſt reſpect and veneration. Ardent to behold him, after an abſence of ſeveral years, during which he had undergone ſo many labours, and been expoſed to ſo many dangers in their ſervice, they poured out in multitudes, to the diſtance of ſeveral miles, to meet him. In his paſſage from Antwerp to Bruſſels, one ſide of the canal was lined by the inhabitants of the former of theſe places, and the other, by thoſe of the latter; while the banks reſounded with the joyful ſhouts of a grateful people, who ſaluted him with the glorious appellations of the Father of his Country, and the Guardian of its liberty and laws. Nor were theſe demonſtrations of joy confined to the vulgar, who are always ſincere, but often precipitate and inconſtant in their applauſes; perſons of all ranks vied with each other in teſtifying their reſpect and gratitude; and immediately after his arrival, the States of Brabant and the States-general concurred in electing him governor of the province of Brabant[q]; a dignity which had been

His reception.

[q] Vide Hiſt. Metallique, tom. i. p. 235.

hitherto

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hitherto beſtowed only on the viceroys, or governors-general, of the Netherlands.

The promiſing condition of the Netherlands.

By his wiſdom and moderation, as well as by his vigilance and induſtry, William fulfilled the moſt ſanguine expectations of his countrymen. But, notwithſtanding his addreſs and prudence, and ſkill in managing the minds of men; qualifications which he poſſeſſed in the moſt eminent degree; he could not preſerve that unanimity among the Flemings, which it was of ſo much conſequence for them in the preſent juncture to maintain. At no period had they enjoyed ſo fair a proſpect of ſecuring their liberty on a firm and permanent foundation. Beſides the advantage of having a perſon of ſo great experience and abilities to guide their counſels, the Spaniſh troops were entirely withdrawn, the king's finances were greatly exhauſted with the wars in which he had been continually engaged; almoſt all the fortified places were in the hands of the States; and the people were animated univerſally with the moſt violent abhorrence of the Spaniſh government. But the States were prevented from improving the opportunity which this fortunate concurrence of circumſtances afforded them, by a ſpirit of diviſion and animoſity, which ſprung up, partly from the jealouſies of the nobility, and

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and partly from the intemperate religious zeal and bigotry of the people.

Sources of animosity and discord.

PHILIP de Croy duke of Arschot, the marquis of Havrée his brother, the count de Lalain, and several others of the Catholic nobility, had, since the death of Requesens, distinguished themselves as strenuous asserters of the liberties of their country. They had promoted with all their influence the pacification of Ghent, and had concurred with their countrymen in the invitation given to the prince of Orange to reside at Brussels. But when they reflected upon the extraordinary marks of attachment which William had received, and saw him vested with an authority and dignity in Brabant, which only the sovereign or his viceroys had hitherto enjoyed; above all, when they contemplated his great abilities and experience in the conduct of affairs; they foresaw that they must content themselves with acting a subordinate part in the government, and that the States would, in every branch of administration, be directed by the prince of Orange, who must therefore reap the glory of whatever should be atchieved, and, without the name of sovereign, exercise a supreme and sovereign authority. Stung with envy, and desirous to conceal the motive of their conduct, they began to affect an extreme anxiety at the danger to which the

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the catholic faith was expoſed, by the States repoſing ſuch unreſerved confidence in one who was an avowed friend of the new religion. On this pretence, which never received any colour from the prince's conduct, they formed themſelves into a confederacy, with a deſign to counteract him. And in order to give their party conſiſtency, weight, and influence, they reſolved to invite the archduke Matthias, brother of the emperor, to take upon him the government of the provinces.

The Flemiſh nobles give an invitation to Matthias.

THIS reſolution they not only formed, but executed, without the knowledge or authority of the States, and they diſpatched a meſſenger to Matthias with the greateſt ſecrecy, to entreat him to leave Vienna without delay.

NOTHING could exceed the temerity of thoſe who gave this invitation, but the imprudence of Matthias in accepting it. For, beſides, that he was called only by the leaſt powerful of the two parties into which the Flemings were divided, he could not be ignorant how injurious and affronting his conduct muſt be thought by his kinſman the king of Spain. It is ſome alleviation of his folly, that he was only twenty-two years of age; and that, conſidering the numerous progeny which his father left behind him, there

there was little probability of his obtaining any settlement in Germany, suitable to his rank. At the time of the death of Requesens, he had made an offer of his service to the States, and he accepted greedily of the present invitation. His enterprise being of such a nature that he durst not discover it to the emperor, he set out from Vienna in the middle of the night, with a small number of attendants. No sooner was his brother apprised of his design, than messengers were dispatched to bring him back, and letters sent to the princes whose states he must pass through, intreating them to stop him; but Matthias travelled faster than the messengers, and, in a few days, reached the town of Lierres in Brabant. 1577. His arrival.

The States, astonished at the news of his arrival, and highly incensed against those who had invited him, complained loudly of the insult offered to their authority; and would have instantly formed the resolution of rejecting him, had they not been dissuaded from it by the prince of Orange. William foresaw the advantages which might arise from that rivalship, into which Matthias had entered with his kinsman Don John, and from the seeds of enmity which were thereby sown between the German and Spanish branches of the house of Austria. He reckoned it rather fortunate, that Don He is admitted governor by the States.

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John had received ſo unpardonable an offence from the Catholic nobility; and he conſidered how fatal to the general intereſt of the provinces all diviſion muſt neceſſarily prove, in the preſent critical conjuncture of their affairs.

INFLUENCED by theſe conſiderations, he exhorted the States to overlook the injurious treatment which they had received, and perſuaded them to agree, not only to receive Matthias with all the reſpect due to his high rank, but even to elect him governor, on ſuch conditions as they ſhould judge proper to require. This conduct, the moſt prudent that could have been adopted in the preſent circumſtances, furniſhed no ſort of triumph to the duke d'Arſchot, and the other Catholic nobility. On the contrary, it mortified them exceedingly, to obſerve that Matthias owed his election not to them, but to the prince of Orange; whoſe authority, which they intended to have controlled, was now conſiderably augmented, and more firmly eſtabliſhed than before.

Mortifications of the nobility.

SOON after this, they received a ſtill more ſenſible mortification. The duke d'Arſchot having lately been appointed governor of Flanders, had gone to the city of Ghent, to take poſſeſſion of his government. Not long after his arrival, a deputation of the inhabitants having urged

urged him with much importunity to reinſtate them in their ancient privileges, of which they had been deprived in the time of Charles V. he was heard to declare, that that ſeditious multitude, which made ſo much noiſe about their privileges, ſhould ere long be puniſhed as they deſerved, notwithſtanding their being ſupported by the prince of Orange. This ſaying being repeated by ſome who heard it, and circulated all over the city, inflamed the minds of the people with rage and indignation. They ran to arms, ſurrounded the governor's houſe, and threw him, and his friends and attendants, into priſon. The prince of Orange, dreading the conſequences of ſo violent a procedure, and believing the duke to be now ſufficiently humbled, interceded with the Ghenteſe, and procured his liberty; but no ſolicitations could induce them to releaſe his adherents. In this manner was the duke d'Arſchot's importance in the Netherlands almoſt annihilated. Matthias perceiving this, ſaw it to be his intereſt to connect himſelf with the party of which the prince of Orange was the head; and readily accepted the government, with a condition to which the States required his conſent, that the prince ſhould be his lieutenant-general in all the branches of adminiſtration.

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MATTHIAS made his joyful entry into Bruſſels in the beginning of the year one thouſand five hundred and ſeventy-eight, when both he and the prince of Orange were admitted to their reſpective offices, after taking an oath to maintain the laws, and to regulate their conduct according to the inſtructions which ſhould be given them by the States[r].

Application of the States to Philip.

DON JOHN ſent an ambaſſador to proteſt in his name againſt theſe proceedings. But the States had ſome weeks before this time declared him an enemy to the Netherlands, and paid no regard to his proteſtation. As they were perſuaded, however, that they had done nothing but what was authoriſed by the fundamental laws of the conſtitution, they wrote an account of their proceedings to the king, declaring that they ſtill held their allegiance to him inviolable; and praying, that he would confirm their election of his kinſman Matthias, as the moſt likely means of reſtoring tranquillity to the provinces. They had very little reaſon to expect that Philip would liſten to this requeſt. He looked upon their conduct in a light extremely different from that in which they themſelves regarded it; and conſidered their preſumption in rejecting the governor whom

[r] Meteren, p. 196. 202.

he

he had appointed, and ſtill more that of nominating another without his conſent, as an act of the moſt audacious rebellion. The States were too well acquainted with his character, not to entertain ſome apprehenſions that ſuch might be his ſentiments; and therefore, while they omitted nothing in their power to aſſuage his reſentment, they endeavoured to ſecure themſelves againſt the effects of it, by intereſting the neighbouring powers in their behalf, and by eſtabliſhing unanimity between the religious parties into which the provinces were divided.

In order to accompliſh this laſt and moſt important object, a new treaty of union was concluded, in which, beſides confirming the pacification of Ghent, the Catholics and Proteſtants promiſed mutually to ſupport each other; and engaged, that they would join together in oppoſing all perſecution on account of religion, from whatever quarter it ſhould come[s].

The neighbouring powers were not unconcerned ſpectators of theſe tranſactions. The emperor[t] ſaw with much anxiety, that thoſe flames which had burnt ſo long in the Netherlands, were now likely to burſt out with greater

The emperor.

[s] Meteren, p. 197.

[t] Rodolph II.

violence

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violence than ever. But having been educated at the court of Madrid under Philip, with whom he wiſhed to live on amicable terms, he had ſhewn himſelf exceedingly diſpleaſed with the conduct of Matthias; had given Philip entire ſatisfaction with regard to his own intentions; and had reſolved to take no other part in the diſſenſions of the Netherlands, but that of employing his interceſſion and advice. He did not however oppoſe the levies which the count Palatine was making for the ſervice of the States, either becauſe he knew that his prohibition would not have been regarded, or becauſe he deſired to preſerve a ſtrict neutrality between the contending parties.

Henry III. of France.

HENRY III. of France was too much occupied in his own dominions, to have leiſure to enter deeply into the affairs of the Netherlands. For many ages, France had ſeen no king of whoſe reign the people entertained more ſanguine expectations. Having, in his early youth, been appointed commander in chief by his brother Charles, he had given ſignal proof of uncommon abilities. The French had flattered themſelves with the hopes of ſeeing their kingdom reſtored by him to its ancient ſplendor; his fame was univerſally diffuſed, and the Poliſh nobility had, with general applauſe, conferred upon him their elective crown. But when,

when, upon his brother's death, he left Poland, and ſucceeded to the crown of France, it is inconceivable how great a change he ſeemed to have undergone. Irreſolute, inconſtant, indolent, and voluptuous, with a mixture of the moſt ridiculous ſuperſtition, he loſt the confidence of the Catholics as well as Proteſtants, whom he favoured and betrayed by turns. The unſteady and unſkilful hand, with which he held the reins of government, added daily new force to the virulence of faction, till every member of the ſtate, and almoſt every individual in the kingdom, was infected. The Queen-mother employed all her art and influence to ſupport his authority, but could not reſtrain her younger ſon, the duke of Alençon, now duke of Anjou, from putting himſelf at the head, ſometimes of one party, and ſometimes of another, in oppoſition to the king. To this prince, who was now the preſumptive heir of the crown, the Flemings addreſſed themſelves, after having in vain applied to the king himſelf for protection. Anjou liſtened with much pleaſure to their application; and having conceived hopes of obtaining the ſovereignty of the provinces, he made them the moſt flattering promiſes of aſſiſtance. Henry, far from oppoſing the duke's deſigns, conſidered his leaving France as the moſt fortunate event that could happen; ſince he would be thereby delivered from a great

The States apply for aid to the duke of Anjou.

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number of reſtleſs intriguing ſpirits, by whom the tranquillity of his kingdom had been diſturbed. But as he declined on this occaſion to aſſiſt his brother in levying forces, partly from inability, and partly from the dread of embroiling himſelf with Philip, Anjou was not in a condition, till ſome time after the preſent period, to fulfil his engagements.

They receive aſſiſtance from Elizabeth.

THE Flemings mean-while received the moſt ſeaſonable aſſiſtance from the queen of England. Don John had, ſome months before, endeavoured to prepoſſeſs Elizabeth in *his* favour; by repreſenting, that the diſturbances in the Netherlands were entirely owing to the prince of Orange and his adherents, who had broken the pacification of Ghent, and by their intrigues prevailed upon the States to violate the perpetual edict. Elizabeth pretended to give credit to this repreſentation, and ordered her ambaſſador to reproach the States with their infidelity, and even to threaten them with her reſentment, in caſe they ſhould refuſe to adhere to their engagements. Thus far this artful princeſs went, in order to perſuade Philip, that ſhe ſeriouſly deſired his ſubjects in the Netherlands to maintain their allegiance. But in reality ſhe wiſhed for nothing leſs. In a political light (that light in which the conduct of Elizabeth ought almoſt always

to

to be conſidered) nothing could be more deſirable to her, than that the troubles of the Low Countries ſhould continue; and, if either of the two contending parties ſhould finally prevail, that victory ſhould fall rather on the ſide of the people, than of the king. But when ſhe conſidered the inequality of the diſpute between him and the Flemings, ſhe dreaded that the latter, if left to themſelves, muſt ſoon be compelled, either to relinquiſh their pretenſions, or to throw themſelves for protection into the arms of France. She had therefore reſolved to watch carefully over their conduct, and to afford them, from time to time, ſuch aſſiſtance as their circumſtances ſhould require. She lent a favourable ear to the defence which was made by the prince of Orange and the States againſt Don John's accuſations; and ſhe admitted of their juſtification the more willingly, as in the repreſentation given her of Don John's conduct on this occaſion, ſhe found reaſon to believe that his intentions were no leſs hoſtile with regard to herſelf, than with reſpect to the States and the prince of Orange. For William had taken particular care to inform her of ſome intercepted letters of Don John's, from which it appeared, that he entertained a ſecret correſpondence with the queen of Scots; that he had formed a plan, to which the pope was privy, for ſetting that princeſs

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ceſs at liberty; and that he was incited to attempt this, not only by the deſire of diſtreſſing Elizabeth, but likewiſe by the wild ambition of marrying the Scottiſh queen, and attaining, through her, poſſeſſion of the Britiſh crowns.

AFTER this diſcovery, Elizabeth reſolved no longer to keep any meaſures with Don John, but to exert herſelf with vigour in oppoſing his re-admiſſion into the government of the Netherlands. With this intention ſhe gave the moſt gracious reception to the marquis d'Havrée the ambaſſador of the States, and entered readily into a treaty, by which ſhe engaged to furniſh them with an immediate ſupply, both of money and troops; upon condition, that the commander of theſe troops ſhould be admitted into the council of ſtate; and that, during the continuance of the war, no ſtep ſhould be taken, nor any alliance formed, without her conſent [u].

ELIZABETH had no ſooner ſubſcribed this treaty, than being ſtill deſirous to avoid an open breach with Philip, ſhe diſpatched an ambaſſador [w] to Madrid, to repreſent to him, that in her late tranſaction with the States, it was far

[u] Meteren, p. 197. Bentivoglio, p. 202. Camden, anno 1577, &c.

[w] Thomas Wilkes, clerk of the council.

from

from her intention to encourage them to withdraw their allegiance; that, on the contrary, ſhe had employed the only means likely to prove effectual to prevent them from caſting themſelves in deſpair into the hands of ſome other power. She was deeply intereſted, ſhe acknowledged, in ſaving her neighbours from oppreſſion; eſpecially the Flemings, with whom the commercial intereſts of her ſubjects had long been, and ſtill were ſo cloſely connected. This ſhe hoped would plead her excuſe for exhorting him to ſubſtitute in the room of his brother, a governor in whom the people could repoſe greater truſt and confidence; and with whom ſhe herſelf could maintain a more friendly intercourſe than ſhe could ever hold with Don John, after having diſcovered his deſign to invade her dominions. She concluded with intreating him to redreſs the grievances of his Flemiſh ſubjects; offering to mediate between him and them, if her mediation could be of uſe; and declaring, that if they ſhould refuſe to fulfil their late engagements, or attempt to make any innovation contrary to the pacification of Ghent, ſhe would aſſiſt him in reducing them to obedience by force of arms[x].

[x] Carte, book xviii. Camden.

ELIZABETH

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ELIZABETH could not mean any thing by this embaſſy, but the fulfilling of an empty ceremonial, which was received by Philip, and performed by her, with equal inſincerity. She did not wait for a return to her embaſſy, but proceeded inſtantly to carry into execution her treaty with the States. Both the troops and money which ſhe engaged to furniſh, were immediately ſent over; and the latter was remitted by the States to prince Caſimire, to enable him to complete his levies.

Imprudent delays of the States.

THE States had collected a conſiderable body of forces, which they ſtationed in the neighbourhood of Namur; and if they had followed the counſel of the prince of Orange, who exhorted them to lay ſiege to that important fortreſs, they might have made themſelves maſters of it, and prevented the return of the Spaniſh troops. But many among them being ſtill unſhaken in their allegiance to the king, as well as in their attachment to the popiſh faith; nothing but their remembrance of the cruelties of Alva, and the late enormities of the Spaniards, could have induced them to concur in the meaſures which the majority had adopted. Theſe men fondly imagined, that Philip would be moved with their calamities, and perſuaded to comply with their requeſts. Being for this reaſon

reaſon unwilling to begin hoſtilities, they urged ſtrongly the expediency of a defenſive war: and thus the army was ſuffered, for ſeveral months, to remain inactive, and time imprudently given for the arrival of the Italian and Spaniſh troops [y].

The return of the Spaniſh troops.

ALTHOUGH Philip did not entirely approve of his brother's conduct, and deſired to have obtained his ends by negotiation and artifice; yet, having failed in this way, he reſolved, without heſitation, to employ force; and he had accordingly ſent orders to Alexander Farneſe, the prince of Parma, to lead back the troops from Italy, to the Netherlands, without delay. On their arrival at Namur, being joined by other troops, which Don John had levied in the neighbouring provinces, they compoſed an army of fifteen thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe; while that of the States amounted only to ten thouſand foot and one thouſand five hundred horſe; and was no leſs inferior to the enemy in diſcipline than in number. The States now ſaw their folly in having neglected to make themſelves maſters of Namur, as an entrance had thereby been ſecured for the Spaniards into the centre of the Netherlands.

[y] Meteren, book viii. ab initio.

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THE ſituation in which Don John found himſelf at this time, was much more ſuitable to the talents which he poſſeſſed, than thoſe negotiations and treaties in which he had been hitherto engaged. He had longed with extreme impatience for the arrival of the forces, and ardently deſired to be revenged upon the States for the injurious treatment which he imagined he had received. Having got information that their army, commanded by the Sieur de Goignies, had left their camp in the neighbourhood of Namur, and were retiring towards Bruſſels, he reſolved to attack them on their march. With this intention he ſent his cavalry before, under the prince of Parma, and followed them himſelf, as quickly as poſſible, with the foot. Farneſe executed the truſt committed to him with great valour. At the head of his battalion, he attacked the Flemiſh cavalry with uncommon fury; and though they gave him a ſpirited reception, he ſoon compelled them to retire. In the mean time Don John came forward with a choſen body of infantry, and afforded him ſuch a powerful ſupport, as enabled him to drive the enemy's horſe before him, till he entered along with them into the ranks of their main army. The Flemings believing the whole Spaniſh forces to be at hand, and being utterly unprepared for ſo ſudden an attack, were ſoon thrown into confuſion and diſperſed. About three

The battle of Gembloux.

1578. January 31.

three thouſand were killed, and a great number, with the commander in chief, were taken priſoners. The loſs on the ſide of the conquerors was inconſiderable.

AFTER this victory, Don John reduced Gembloux, Louvain, Sichem, Nivelle, and ſeveral other places, both in Brabant and Hainault. He deſired likewiſe to have laid ſiege to Bruſſels; but his council of war were of opinion, that his ſtrength was not adequate to ſo great an enterpriſe, and thought it more expedient to aim at eaſier conqueſts, till his army ſhould be reinforced.

Amſterdam accedes to the confederacy. February 8.

THE States in the mean time received an abundant compenſation for their loſſes in the ſouthern provinces, by the acquiſition of Amſterdam. To this wealthy city, which even then was the greateſt in the northern provinces, the duke of Alva had, as mentioned above, given the moſt particular attention; having expelled the proteſtants, and put the government entirely into the hands of rigid catholics. Theſe men, ſupported by a numerous garriſon, had baffled all the attempts which had been made by the States of Holland to reduce them. But being now hemmed in by their countrymen both by ſea and land, and their trade almoſt ruined, they at laſt conſented

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to accede to the pacification of Ghent, and agreed to diſband the popiſh garriſon, to recal the proteſtant exiles, and to allow them to hold their religious aſſemblies without the city. It was not long before they repented of theſe conceſſions. The proteſtants being inflamed with zeal for their religion; impatient under the reſtraints which in the late agreement had been laid upon them, fired with reſentment for former injuries, and ſuſpicious that the Catholics were again meditating ſchemes for their expulſion, they flew to arms; and having ſuppreſſed the exerciſe of the popiſh faith, they drove all the prieſts, and others whom they ſuſpected of malignant deſigns, out of the city [z].

Philip's anſwer to the States.

In the midſt of theſe tranſactions, John de Noircarmes, Baron de Selles, arrived from Spain, with Philip's anſwer to the application which the States had made to him ſome months before. It was ſuch as they had reaſon to expect, and contained an abſolute denial of their requeſts, with regard to the removal of Don John, and the ratification of the election of Matthias.

The States proſecute the war.

Convinced by this denial, of the folly of thoſe hopes which they had entertained, that

[z] Van Meteren, p. 207.

the

the king would yield to their intreaties, and ſenſible that they had ſuffered conſiderable loſs, from that want of diſpatch and ſecrecy which is incident to the procedure of a numerous aſſembly; they enlarged the powers of Matthias and the prince of Orange, and inveſted them, and the council of ſtate, with authority to conduct the operations of the war, without having recourſe on every occaſion to the aſſembly of the States.

No time after this was unneceſſarily loſt. The troops which had been diſperſed at Gemblours were collected, and of theſe, and the new levies, an army was compoſed, amounting to eight thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, partly Flemings, and partly Scots and Engliſh. This army was ſtationed in the neighbourhood of Lierres, in the centre of Brabant, under the command of the count de Boſſut. Don John's army, after he had put garriſons into the towns which he had taken, was ſtill ſuperior in number; and therefore he reſolved to march towards Boſſut, before the auxiliaries, which the States expected from France and Germany, ſhould arrive. But he ſoon found that he had now to contend both with troops and a general much ſuperior to thoſe whom he had encountered at Gemblours. Boſſut, from a ſenſe of the inferiority of his forces, had

Battle of Rimenant.

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pitched his camp near the village of Rimenant, in a ſituation extremely advantageous for preventing the enemy from penetrating further into the provinces. On the one ſide it was defended by the Demer, and on the other by a wood; and was fortified both before and behind with ſtrong intrenchments. Notwithſtanding this, Don John reſolved to attack it, unleſs he could provoke the count to quit his lines, and give him battle. The prince of Parma, who from his early youth was no leſs wiſe than brave, remonſtrated againſt this reſolution as being dangerous and deſperate. But Don John, being confirmed in his purpoſe by the other officers, gave orders for his army to advance, after having ſent before a ſelect body of troops, to attack an important poſt without the camp, which was guarded by ſome Engliſh and Scotch forces, under colonel Norris. Among the aſſailants was Don Alphonſo Martinez de Leyva, at the head of a company of two hundred men, whom he maintained at his own expence, and who were all either gentlemen, or ſoldiers who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in former wars. Theſe men attacked the Britiſh troops with uncommon fury. After a ſhort reſiſtance, the latter began to retreat, but in good order, and with their faces turned towards the enemy. The Spaniards, to ſecond whom Don John had ſent ſeveral battalions of freſh troops, not ſuſpecting

The prince of Parma.

ſuſpecting any artifice, and believing the enemy to be intimidated, followed them with much precipitation, till they had paſſed a narrow defile within reach of the artillery of the Flemiſh camp. Norris then returned to the charge, and the combat was renewed with greater fury than ever. He was reinforced with troops ſent him from the camp, and both parties being nearly equal, ſeemed determined to die or conquer. This gallant Engliſhman animated his army by his own example, and had three horſes killed under him. The Scots, impatient of the heat, fought in their ſhirts, and aſtoniſhed the enemy with the ſingularity of their appearance. In the mean time, a body of troops, which had been placed in ambuſh, attacked the Spaniards in flank, and Boſſut continued to fire upon them inceſſantly with his artillery. They muſt all have periſhed, had not the prince of Parma obtained liberty from Don John to advance at the head of the cavalry to their relief. By his ſuperior prudence, he would have prevented this inconſiderate enterpriſe; and now, by his prudence and bravery united, he ſaved the troops from thoſe fatal conſequences, to which, through their own and the general's confidence, they had been expoſed. About nine hundred men, however, fell on the field of battle,

The Spaniards repulſed by the Engliſh.

Auguſt 1ſt.

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and a considerable number were taken prisoners [a].

Don John having thus failed in his attempt, and being sensible that he could not, with his present army, keep the field against the numerous forces that were ready to pour in upon him from France and Germany, retreated, with the resolution of acting for the future on the defensive only, and pitched his camp under the fortifications of Namur.

Treaty of the States with Anjou.

The States concluded about this time their treaty with the duke of Anjou, which consisted of the following articles:—That under the title of protector of the Netherlands, the duke should furnish, at his own expence, ten thousand foot and two thousand horse: that all the conquests which he should make on the Flanders side of the Maese, should belong to the States; and those on the other side to himself: that, for the accommodation of his troops, Landrecy, and Quesnoy in Hainault, and Bapaume in Artois, should be put in his possession: that the States should not enter into any agreement with Don John, without the duke's consent; and that, in case they should

[a] Bentivoglio, book x. Strabo, l. iii. Meteren, p. 225. Thuanus, lib. lxvi. sect. xii.

hereafter

hereafter think proper to elect another sovereign, they should make choice of the duke; but that in the mean time the government should remain entire in the hands of the States.

Designs of the States.

AGREEABLY to the first article of this treaty, Anjou had assembled a considerable body of troops in the neighbourhood of Mons, to which place the States sent a solemn embassy to intreat that he would quicken his march into the interior provinces. They intended, that their own army should unite with his, and that of Casimire, and that all the three armies should act in concert with one another, in expelling Don John, before he should receive a reinforcement from Spain or Italy. Nor was it without apparent reason that they entertained the hopes of accomplishing this design. Prince Casimire had passed the Rhine and the Maese, and advanced as far as the town of Diest, in Brabant. His army, when joined with that of the States, amounted nearly to forty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and was greatly superior to any which Don John could muster to oppose it.

Their numerous army.

Its operations rendered ineffectual.

BUT a variety of causes concurred in rendering almost useless these mighty preparations; and a spirit of division arose, by which the people in the more fertile provinces lost for

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ever that liberty for which they had ſo ſtrenuouſly contended, at the very time when it was moſt in their power to ſecure it on a firm and permanent foundation. For although, according to the teſtimony of the catholic, as well the proteſtant hiſtorians, nothing could exceed the prudence and moderation with which the prince of Orange conducted the affairs of government, it ſoon appeared, that no human wiſdom was ſufficient to preſerve harmony and concord, where there were ſo many grounds of jealouſy and diſcontent. Of this diſcontent and jealouſy, religious bigotry was the principal, but not the only cauſe. Ambition and intereſt joined their influence to that of religion, and not only divided the people themſelves into factions, the moſt inveterate and hoſtile, but created ſuſpicion and diſcord between them and the foreign powers which they had called to their aſſiſtance.

THE queen of England had heard, with great uneaſineſs, of the late treaty between the States and the Duke of Anjou. She knew not, at this time, how far Henry was concerned in his brother's enterpriſe, nor what ſchemes of conqueſt theſe two princes might have formed. She conſidered what great advantages their neighbourhood afforded them for the execution of theſe ſchemes; and foreſaw the prejudice which

which might accrue to the Engliſh nation, if the Netherlands were to fall under ſubjection to the crown of France. In order to prevent this, and counterbalance the power and influence of Anjou, ſhe had made ſuch ample remittances of money to prince Caſimire, as had enabled him to augment the number of his army, which conſiſted wholly of proteſtants, conſiderably above what the States had either expected or deſired. This alarmed the jealouſy of all the catholics in the Low Countries, who dreaded the approach of ſo great an army of reformers, and ſuſpected that Caſimire, in concert with Elizabeth, had conceived the deſign of extirpating the popiſh faith. They did not conceal their apprehenſions. Even the prince of Orange, and other moderate proteſtants joined in remonſtrating with Caſimire, on the neceſſity of his diſmiſſing a part of his forces. But this remonſtrance ſerved only to alienate him from the prince of Orange and the council, and to render him leſs attentive to their inſtructions with regard to the conduct of the war. He was likewiſe highly offended with the preference which the States had given to the count of Boſſut, by appointing him commander in chief of the army; and he made them feel his reſentment, by the ſlowneſs of all his military operations, and his continual demands of ſupplies for the payment of his troops [b].

[b] Reidanus, p. 25, 26.

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1578. Intemperate zeal and ambition of the proteſtants.

But the intemperate zeal and ambition of the proteſtants were productive of ſtill more pernicious effects. Not ſatisfied with the ſecurity from perſecution which they had enjoyed ſince the pacification of Ghent, they took courage from the great number of proteſtants in the army, and petitioned Matthias and the States, to be allowed to hold their religious aſſemblies openly in churches, and to be admitted, on the ſame footing with the catholics, to the ſeveral offices of government. They ought certainly to have remained ſilent, as they had done hitherto, till the common enemy had been expelled, and the public tranquillity eſtabliſhed. Yet their conduct admits of ſome apology: their party had greater influence now than it was likely to poſſeſs, if the catholics were delivered from their dread of the Spaniards, and they could not foreſee thoſe fatal conſequences with which their application was afterwards attended.

But whatever judgment may be formed of their diſcretion, the States thought it neceſſary, leſt the army ſhould have proved refractory, to comply with their requeſts. The pacification of Ghent required that religion ſhould remain on the ſame footing on which it ſtood at the time of that treaty, till the States of all the provinces ſhould be aſſembled; yet the States, now partially aſſembled, conſented, not only that

that the proteſtants ſhould have acceſs to all public offices, but likewiſe that they ſhould have churches allowed to them in every place where a hundred families reſided; upon this condition, that in Holland and Zealand the ſame indulgence ſhould be granted to the catholic inhabitants. To this decree they gave the name of the Peace of Religion; and each of the provinces was left at liberty to accept or reject it, as they ſhould judge expedient.

The unhappy conſequences.

In ſome cities it proved a ſalutary remedy for the diſorders with which they were diſtracted; but, in many others, it added malignity to that poiſon, which raged in the minds of the more violent religioniſts, and was the ſource of the moſt pernicious animoſity and diſcord. It gave no contentment to the zealots of either party, but contributed to inflame them more than ever againſt each other, by adding freſh materials to that inveterate jealouſy and rancour which their bigotry inſpired, but which had been laid aſleep for ſome time paſt, by their apprehenſions of the common danger. The catholics every where, but in a few cities of Flanders and Brabant, oppoſed the execution of this decree; and the reformers derived little advantage from it, except in thoſe places where they overpowered their antagoniſts by ſuperior numbers. In the provinces of Artois and

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and Hainault, where the Reformation had never made any conſiderable progreſs, the people rejected the decree with the moſt determined obſtinacy, and refuſed to allow the exerciſe of any other religion but the catholic within their territories; while the people of Ghent and other places, in which the majority were proteſtants, actuated by the ſame intolerant and bigoted ſpirit, expelled the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, ſeized their effects, and ſpoiled the churches of their ornaments.

Diſcord between the Walloons and Flemings.

BETWEEN the people of Ghent and the Walloons [c] a particular ground of enmity had ſubſiſted, ever ſince the former had caſt the duke d'Arſchot and his attendants into priſon. For moſt of theſe were perſons of rank in the Walloon provinces; and the Ghenteſe had not only rejected every ſolicitation in their behalf, but had even treated them with ſeverity during their confinement. The Walloons were, for this reaſon, the more readily incenſed by the accounts which they received of the late enormities committed againſt the catholics, which they juſtly regarded as a violation, on the part of the proteſtants, of their late engagements. Forgetful therefore of the danger which threatened them, and liſtening only to the voice of

[c] The natives of Artois, Hainault, and the other ſouthern provinces.

indignation

indignation and resentment, they began to separate themselves from the other provinces, and refused to contribute their share of the money necessary for the payment of the troops. "We "took arms," said they, "to vindicate our li- "berty; but what will it avail us to be deli- "vered from the Spanish yoke, if we must "submit to a yoke no less galling and intole- "rable, imposed upon us by our countrymen; "who, under the pretext of zeal against the "tyranny of the Spaniards, shew now that their "only design has been to tyrannize over us "themselves?" The other provinces represented to them the mischievous consequences with which their conduct must be attended, and accompanied their representations with prayers and threats; but the Walloons remained inflexible, and soon afterwards they gave a striking proof of their hostile disposition, by refusing to deliver the towns of Landrecy, Quesnois, and Bapaume, to the duke of Anjou, in conformity to the treaty above recorded. Not satisfied with this, they began to prepare openly for war, and employed the contributions, which had been raised for paying the army of the States, in levying forces against the Flemings. The Flemings quickly armed themselves in their defence, and several rencounters happened between the Walloons and them, that were equally pernicious to both.

PRINCE

BOOK XIV.

1578. The effects of that diſcord.

PRINCE Caſimire's troops and thoſe of the States had been for ſome time paſt united, and Don John was not poſſeſſed of a force ſufficient to oppoſe them; but the factious and refractory ſpirit of the Walloons and Flemings had diffuſed itſelf into almoſt every part of the Netherlands, except the provinces of Holland and Zealand. Many cities withheld their contributions, and the army was extremely ill provided with every thing neceſſary to render the operations of the campaign effectual. Boſſut's principal object was to compel the enemy to a general engagement; and for this purpoſe, after taking two or three towns of little conſequence, he led his troops within view of the camp in which Don John had entrenched himſelf, under the fortifications of Namur. With an army ſo much ſuperior in number to the enemy, the count might have forced the entrenchments; but being neither furniſhed with pioneers, cannon, or a ſufficient quantity of ammunition, and finding Don John unalterably determined to keep within his camp, he was obliged to retire. His troops, in the mean time, were highly diſcontented, on account of their want of pay. His diſcipline was unavoidably relaxed. The country was oppreſſed and plundered. Caſimire accepted of an invitation from the Ghenteſe, to aſſiſt them with a part of his forces againſt the Walloons. It became dangerous

dangerous to keep the remainder of the army any longer in the neighbourhood of the Spaniſh camp, and it was ſoon afterwards found impracticable to ſupport it. A part of the troops therefore was diſbanded, and the reſt were put into garriſon in the fortified towns.

THE duke of Anjou's army was not better provided with the means of ſubſiſtence than that of the States, and its operations were equally inſignificant. Conſcious of his inability to fulfil his engagement, Anjou graſped at thoſe pretexts for eluding them, which the conduct of Caſimire, and that of the Walloons, afforded him. He complained bitterly of the treatment which he received from the latter, who not only refuſed him admittance into the towns which the States had promiſed for the accommodation of his troops, but ſhewed themſelves no leſs unwilling to furniſh him with proviſions, than if he had come to invade, and not to protect and defend them. He ſeems likewiſe to have ſuſpected, and not without ſome reaſon, that Caſimire had formed ſome private deſigns, inconſiſtent with that eſtabliſhment which he himſelf had in view in the ſouthern provinces; and that he had carried his troops to the aſſiſtance of the people of Ghent, in order to pave the way for executing thoſe deſigns. He therefore refuſed to join his army with that of Boſſut, unleſs

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unleſs Caſimire ſhould return to it; and when Matthias and the prince of Orange failed in their endeavours to prevail on Caſimire (to whom the Ghenteſe had advanced a conſiderable ſum of money, to induce him to remain with them), Anjou broke up his camp, and ſuffered a part of his army to go over to the baron de Montigny, who was commander in chief at that time of the forces of the Walloons [d].

Concluſion of the campaign.

SUCH was the concluſion of this campaign, and ſuch the iſſue of all the mighty preparations which the States had made for a vigorous proſecution of the war. The people themſelves, inſtead of uniting their efforts againſt the common enemy, wage war with one another, in violation of the moſt ſolemn engagements, into which they had entered only a few months before; and the princes, who had undertaken to deliver the Flemings from the Spaniſh yoke, inliſt themſelves, in oppoſition to each other, under the banners of thoſe inveterate factions, which threaten this unhappy people with deſtruction.

CASIMIRE went over to England to juſtify his conduct to Elizabeth, and Anjou ſent an ambaſſador to the States to make an apology

[d] Meteren, p. 233. Grotius, p. 60.

for

for *his*, by repreſenting, that his troops had joined thoſe of Montigny without his conſent; but that the States had no reaſon to dread the conſequences of that ſtep, ſince the Ghenteſe would be thereby more eaſily reſtrained from their exceſſes. The States, thinking it prudent to diſſemble their reſentment, admitted of his apology; and, that they might ſtill remain on friendly terms with him, they aſſured his ambaſſadors, that they had a juſt ſenſe of gratitude for the efforts which the duke had made in their behalf; that, as ſoon as poſſible, they would refund his expences; and that, if they ſhould ever find it neceſſary to elect another prince, in the place of the king of Spain, they would make him an offer of the ſovereignty.

Death of Don John of Auſtria.

DURING the courſe of the tranſactions that have been related, Don John had kept his troops within their camp at Namur. They might now have left it without danger; but Don John had been ſeized, ſome weeks before, with a violent illneſs, which cut him off before he had reached the thirtieth year of his age. His death was by ſome aſcribed to poiſon; but, according to others, it was owing partly to diſeaſe, and partly to that chagrin which he conceived from the negligence with which his repeated applications for money and troops were treated

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treated by the Spaniſh miniſters. Fond to exceſs of military glory, and conſcious of talents which would probably have enſured ſucceſs, he lamented bitterly the neceſſity which the weakneſs of his army impoſed upon him, of remaining ſo long inactive, and ſolicited his brother for a reinforcement with the moſt earneſt importunity. Nor was it only becauſe Philip was averſe to a vigorous proſecution of the war, that he deferred complying with his requeſt. After that renown, which Don John acquired in the battle of Lepanto, his conduct, as above related, contained ſo clear a diſcovery of his views, as could not but alarm the ſuſpicious temper of the King, who thenceforth kept a watchful eye upon all his brother's moſt ſecret motions; and when he ſent him to the Netherlands, reſolved never to intruſt him with ſuch a numerous army as might enable him to execute any ambitious deſign. Philip's ſuſpicions, during his brother's reſidence in the Low Countries, were kept perpetually awake, by reports of his having formed a deſign of marrying the queen of Scots. To theſe reports Philip gave credit, perhaps too eaſily. By *his* orders, Don John's ſecretary Eſcovedo, who had fomented his maſter's ambition, was privately put to death. It was believed by many, that he iſſued the like orders with regard to his brother, and that this young

young heroic prince died of poiſon, given him by certain popiſh eccleſiaſtics, inſtigated by the court of Spain. But whatever ground there was for this perſuaſion, there is little room to doubt that, from jealouſy of his brother, more than any other cauſe, Philip withheld the ſupplies neceſſary for carrying on the war. And to this circumſtance the troops of the States were indebted for their preſervation from that ruin, to which their diviſions had expoſed them [d].

[d] Meteren, p. 234. Grotius, &c.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XV.

DON JOHN having on his death-bed appointed the prince of Parma to succeed him, his choice was soon afterwards approved, and ratified by the king. 1578. The prince of Parma governor.

THIS young prince had, on many occasions since his arrival in the Netherlands, given proof of consummate prudence, and the most intrepid valour. Temperate, vigilant, and indefatigable, he could descend to the most minute detail in all military operations, and was always the first to expose himself to toil and danger, and the last to retire. Pliant in his manners, and insinuating in his address; he His character.

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could ſpeak moſt of the European languages, and accommodate himſelf to the ſoldiers of all the different nations of which the army was compoſed. He poſſeſſed a vigour of bodily conſtitution equal to that of his mind, joined with an elevated martial air and aſpect, which ſerved, in time of battle, to fill the enemy with terror, and to inſpire his own troops with courage and confidence of ſucceſs.

He had no ſooner performed the laſt offices of his friend and kinſman, than he applied himſelf aſſiduouſly to fulfil the duties of that important ſtation to which he was now advanced. While the army of the States remained in the field, he was obliged, through the ſmallneſs of his numbers, to follow the ſame plan which his predeceſſor had purſued, and to keep his little army ſtrongly fortified within their camp; but when, from the cauſes above explained, not only the army of the States, but likewiſe the Germans and French under Caſimire and Anjou, were all either diſbanded, or put into winter-quarters, Farneſe, conſidering this as the proper ſeaſon for action, reſolved to undertake the ſiege of ſome important place, by the acquiſition of which he might increaſe his reſources for carrying on the war.

He hesitated for some time, whether he should enter first upon the siege of Maestricht, or that of Antwerp. The benefit which he would have derived from the possession of the latter of these places, was greater than any which could arise from that of the former; as Antwerp was the principal seat of wealth and commerce in the Netherlands, and was situated in the most advantageous manner for prosecuting the conquest of the maritime provinces; but having weighed attentively the difficulties to be surmounted in the siege of a place of so great extent and strength as Antwerp, he wisely resolved to begin with the siege of Maestricht, in which he could engage with fewer forces, and a greater probability of success[a].

In order to conceal his design from the States, he directed his march towards Antwerp, and had a sharp rencounter with a body of French and British forces, which were sent out to obstruct his approach. These he forced to retire under the fortifications of the city; immediately after which he turned back suddenly, and invested Maestricht, before the States had time to furnish that town with the necessary supplies of stores and provisions.

[a] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

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1579. He lays ſiege to Maeſtricht.

THE inhabitants were not numerous in proportion to the extent of the place[b]; but it was ſtrongly fortified, and the want of numbers was abundantly ſupplied by the martial ſpirit of the people, who, being expoſed by their ſituation to frequent invaſions from foreign enemies, were well accuſtomed to the uſe of arms. About fifteen hundred of them were enrolled; and by theſe, and a thouſand regular troops, together with two thouſand of the country people, who ſerved as pioneers, Maeſtricht was defended for almoſt four months, againſt an army of fifteen thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, the beſt diſciplined and braveſt troops in Europe, whoſe operations were directed by the greateſt military genius of the age. Amongſt the beſieged there were two perſons, Scwartzenbourg de Herle, a Fleming, and Tappin, a Frenchman, who conducted the defence with a degree of wiſdom and intrepidity that excited univerſal admiration and applauſe.

Conduct of the ſiege.

THE prince of Parma, having arrived before the town in the beginning of March, ſent Mondragone, with a part of the army, to the eaſt ſide of the river, to inveſt the town of Vich; whilſt he himſelf remained on the other

[b] It is five Italian miles in circumference.

ſide,

ſide, where he intended to make his principal attack. His firſt object was to prevent the States from introducing any ſupplies or reinforcements. With this view, he ſhut up the Maeſe with two bridges of boats, one above and the other below the town, and drew quite round his camp, on both ſides of the river, ſtrong lines of circumvallation. Immediately after taking this precaution, he began to make his approach to the walls by trenches. The garriſon had the courage to make ſeveral ſallies, by which his operations were retarded. At length, however, when by perſeverance, and the power of ſuperior numbers, his trenches were ſufficiently advanced, he planted two batteries, one againſt the gate of Tongres, and the other againſt the curtain, between the gate of Hoxter and that of the Croſs. While the batteries were played off with great ſucceſs, the Royaliſts puſhed forward the trenches, and were ready to enter into the ditch. The breach at the gate of Tongres was the firſt made practicable, and Farneſe reſolved to aſſault it with a ſelect body of troops, drawn from the ſeveral nations of which his army was compoſed. By thus mingling them together, he inflamed their ardour and emulation; but they met with equal ardour on the part of their opponents, and, after an obſtinate and bloody conflict, were obliged to retire.

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1579. Brave defence of Maeſtricht.

THE prince, believing that this firſt attempt had failed through the ſmallneſs of the breach, renewed the fire of his batteries with redoubled fury, and prepared for a ſecond attack. In order to weaken the garriſon by dividing it, he reſolved to make an aſſault at each of the two breaches at the ſame time. His troops advanced in the face of the enemy's cannon, with the moſt undaunted intrepidity. The beſieged ſtood undiſmayed till they approached, and nothing could exceed the fury with which both parties began the combat. Their fire-arms ſoon ceaſed to be of uſe to them; for they came immediately to cloſe fight in which they could employ only their pikes and ſwords. In one of the breaches De Herle, and in the other Tappin, gave the moſt ſplendid proofs of capacity and valour. The aſſailants, enraged at meeting with ſuch obſtinate reſiſtance from an enemy ſo much inferior in number, exerted their utmoſt vigour to overpower them. The action was furious and deſperate. The ruins of the wall, and the ground on both ſides, were ſtrewed with the dead and dying. Stones hurled down from the bulwarks, and artificial fires, which the beſieged launched among the aſſailants, increaſed the confuſion. Thoſe fires happened to lay hold of the barrels of gunpowder, which ſtood near for the uſe of the combatants. The exploſion was terrible, and

many on both ſides periſhed by this fatal accident. The air reſounded with cries, and ſhrieks, and groans. The earth was covered with mangled carcaſes; yet thoſe who ſurvived ſtill maintained their ground with the ſame unconquerable obſtinacy as before, and from the horrid ſcene which lay around them, ſeemed only to derive freſh rage and fury. The prince of Parma gave orders at laſt, with much reluctance, for ſounding a retreat. The reſolution and fortitude of the beſieged, he perceived, were not to be overcome. Even if he could have mounted the breach, and kept poſſeſſion of it, this would not have availed him, as other fortifications had been raiſed within, which rendered the town almoſt as impregnable as before.

Upon reviewing his troops, the prince found that many of his beſt officers had fallen, and that the regiments of Spaniſh veterans were extremely diminiſhed. He ſoon completed his numbers, by making draughts from the garriſons of the towns in his poſſeſſion. But when he reflected on the character of the beſieged, he perceived the neceſſity of laying aſide all thoughts of taking the town by ſtorm, and reſolved to content himſelf with the ſlower method of undermining the fortifications, employing for this purpoſe a prodigious number of pioneers,

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pioneers, and taking effectual care, in the mean time, to render it impoſſible for the beſieged to receive any reinforcement or ſupplies.

The States attempt in vain to relieve it.

THE States were not neglectful of the preſervation of a place, where both the garriſon and inhabitants had ſhewn themſelves ſo worthy of their attention. Having ſome time before received the celebrated La Noue into their ſervice, they had appointed him governor of Maeſtricht, and given him the charge of conducting thither the reinforcements which they intended for the relief of the beſieged. Nothing was omitted by La Noue to fulfil their expectations; but ſo pernicious were the conſequences of that ſpirit of diſcord, which ſtill raged as furiouſly as ever, between the proteſtants and catholics, that, although the council of ſtate, ſeconded by the prince of Orange, gave him all the aſſiſtance in their power, he was never able to collect a force ſufficient to execute his purpoſe. The ſituation therefore of the beſieged was become extremely deplorable. The garriſon, which in the beginning of the ſiege conſiſted of a thouſand men, was now reduced to four hundred, and the citizens and country-people had ſuffered a proportionable diminution. Their proviſions began to fail, and their ſtore of gunpowder was nearly exhauſted.

THEIR

THEIR diſtreſſes we much augmented towards the middle of June, by the loſs of a ravelin, which had enabled them to give great annoyance to the enemy. To acquire poſſeſſion of this ravelin had been the chief object of the prince of Parma's operations for ſeveral weeks; and, though he met with the moſt ſpirited reſiſtance, he at length accompliſhed his deſign, and could, with a large cavalier which he conſtructed, overlook the walls, and ſcour the town with his guns, almoſt from the one end to the other. Still however the beſieged, animated by the hopes of relief, refuſed to capitulate.

Maeſtricht taken by ſurpriſe.

BUT the ſiege was brought to a concluſion much ſooner than either of the two contending parties had reaſon to expect. On the 29th of June, it was ſuſpected by ſome Spaniſh ſoldiers, that the wonted vigilance of the garriſon was relaxed. In order to know the truth with certainty, theſe men crept ſilently to the top of the rampart, and found that the defendants were not only few in number, but overpowered with fatigue and heat, and buried in ſleep. Of this they carried information to the general; who, without delay, ordered ſuch of his troops as were neareſt, to aſcend the rampart with as little noiſe as poſſible. They were immediately followed by all the reſt of the army. The

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The garriſon were thus ſuddenly overwhelmed, and almoſt all of them were put to the ſword. The inhabitants fought deſperately; but they ſunk at laſt under the ſuperior force of the aſſailants, who ſpared neither ſex nor age; and continued the ſlaughter, till of eight thouſand citizens, only three hundred remained. De Herle eſcaped by diſguiſing himſelf in the habit of a menial ſervant; and Farneſe iſſued ſtrict orders to ſpare the life of the valiant Tappin [c].

The prince of Orange labours to quell the tumults in Ghent.

DURING the ſiege of Maeſtricht, various political negotiations were carried on by the oppoſite parties. The prince of Orange had at this time the chief direction of all the meaſures that were purſued by the States and council; Matthias having, from a conſciouſneſs of his own want of experience, left the entire adminiſtration in his hands. The diſſenſions between the Walloons and Flemings had from the beginning given him deep concern, and he had omitted nothing in his power to heal them. Among the Walloons he had little influence, by reaſon of their abhorrence of his religion, and the jealouſy which they had conceived of his deſigns. On the other hand, the Ghenteſe, who, in that age, were noted for their turbulent

[c] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. Meteren, lib. ix.

and

and ſeditious ſpirit, had been wrought up by certain factious leaders to a degree of madneſs, and were long deaf to all the remonſtrances which he could employ. St. Aldegond, whom he ſent to deal with them, exerted, but in vain, all the addreſs and eloquence for which he was ſo highly celebrated. The interpoſition of Matthias and the States was equally ineffectual. Nor did they pay any greater regard to the repreſentations and threats of Elizabeth, who ſent over an ambaſſador [d] on purpoſe to perſuade them. At length, the prince of Orange went himſelf to treat with them. They had lately inveighed againſt him, with great ſeverity, for his moderation towards the catholics; and had ſuffered ſome of their preachers to arraign him on this account, as inſincere in his religious profeſſion. But, being flattered with that regard and confidence of which his preſent viſit was expreſſive, they reſumed their wonted affection to his perſon; and, after he had ſtaid among them ſome weeks, they complied with the ſeveral requeſts which they had hitherto rejected. They conſented to make reſtitution of the goods of which they had plundered the popiſh eccleſiaſtics; permitted the re-eſtabliſhment of the rites and ceremonies of the Romiſh church, forbad all abuſive lan-

[d] Mr. Davidſon.

guage,

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guage, whether in the pulpit or in private aſſemblies, and engaged to yield a more prompt obedience for the future to the authority of the States [c].

It ſoon however appeared, that nothing but William's perſonal influence had induced them to make theſe conceſſions. In a few months afterwards, being incited by the ſame factious leaders to whom they had formerly liſtened, they indulged themſelves in the moſt unjuſtifiable exceſſes; they plundered the churches and monaſteries, expelled the eccleſiaſtics from the town, and ſeized their effects, which they diſtributed among the Germans, whom they had called to their aſſiſtance againſt the Walloons. Theſe and other enormities occaſioned the prince of Orange to viſit the Ghenteſe a ſecond time; when they made him an offer of the government of the province. He prudently declined accepting this offer; but having again employed all his influence to quaſh the preſent diſſenſions in the city, he ſucceeded ſo far as to be able to compel Imbiſe the chief magiſtrate, together with his factious adherents, to leave the city. He likewiſe put the magiſtracy into the hands of the more moderate reformers, ſet at liberty ſuch of the Walloon nobility as were

[c] Thuanus, lib. lxvi.

ſtill

ſtill in priſon, and procured for the catholic inhabitants, liberty of private worſhip, and ſecurity from moleſtation [f].

WILLIAM laboured with no leſs earneſtneſs to aſſuage the reſentment of the Walloons, who, although they had not been the firſt aggreſſors, perſiſted in their hoſtile diſpoſition, with the moſt unconquerable obſtinacy. By the artifices of Matthew de Moulard, biſhop of Arras, the count de La Lain, the marquis de Roubais, and others of the nobility, who beheld with deep malignity William's unrivalled credit and authority, the people had conceived the moſt incurable ſuſpicions, that, far from being actuated by a diſintereſted attachment to the civil or religious liberty of the provinces, he intended only his own exaltation, and was preparing to eſtabliſh it upon the ruins of the catholic faith. They lent a deaf ear therefore to every plan of accommodation that was propoſed, either by the prince himſelf, or by Matthias and the States; who, they knew, were entirely directed by his counſels [g].

THE prince of Parma was too ſagacious not to diſcern the advantage which this diſpoſition of the Walloons afforded him, for drawing

The prince of Parma gains over the Walloons.

[f] Grotius, lib iii.

[g] Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 29.

them

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them back to their allegiance. Soon after the death of Don John of Auſtria, he had, for this purpoſe, begun a negotiation with their leaders; upon which he had beſtowed particular attention, in the midſt of thoſe military occupations in which the ſiege of Maeſtricht had engaged him. In order to fruſtrate his endeavours, the prince of Orange and the States remonſtrated to the Walloons on the infidelity which would be juſtly imputed to them, if they ſhould enter into any ſeparate terms of agreement; and repreſented to them the danger to which they would thereby expoſe *themſelves*, as well as the other provinces, of being again enthralled by the Spaniards. The Walloons could not entirely diveſt themſelves of the ſcruples, which theſe remonſtrances were calculated to excite; nor were they free from thoſe apprehenſions of the Spaniſh tyranny, by which the other provinces were ſo much diſquieted. They had not forgot the ſcenes of treachery and violence, of which they had been ſo often witneſſes; and found it difficult to rely on the promiſes of thoſe, whoſe inſincerity they had ſo frequently experienced. On the other hand, their bigotry, joined with the inveterate jealouſy which the nobility entertained of the prince of Orange, formed an inſurmountable obſtacle againſt any agreement with the Flemings. *That* hatred with which they had

had been long actuated againſt the Spaniards, began to yield to a more implacable averſion againſt the proteſtants; and in this they were confirmed by the addreſs of the biſhop of Arras, and the other agents of the prince of Parma; whoſe propoſals of accommodation they were now inclined to embrace, provided it could be done conſiſtently with thoſe ſolemn engagements, under which they had lately come to the other provinces. To theſe engagements, according to the ſenſe in which they themſelves underſtood them, they adhered with inflexible fidelity; and perſiſted to the laſt in requiring that all foreign troops ſhould be immediately diſmiſſed; that the pacification of Ghent ſhould be fully executed; and that Philip ſhould recogniſe their right to form alliances either within or without the Netherlands, in caſe of any infraction, on his part, of the articles of this pacification. 1579.

The Spaniſh and Italian troops ſent out of the Netherlands.

Of their ſeveral demands, there was none which the prince of Parma found it ſo difficult to digeſt, as that of ſending away the foreign troops. *Their* place, he knew, could not be ſupplied by the undiſciplined forces of the country; and he dreaded that he ſhould be obliged to abandon the plan which he had formed, for ſubduing the maritime provinces. The king, to whom he applied for preciſe in-

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ſtructions, was no leſs averſe to this conceſſion. But Philip, conſidering the recovery of the Walloons (the moſt warlike of all the inhabitants of the Netherlands) as a matter of the laſt importance; eſpecially in the preſent juncture, when his exchequer was drained by the expence which he had incurred in the conqueſt of Portugal; and hoping, that by the indulgent meaſures which he had reſolved to eſpouſe in his treatment of the Walloons, he ſhould be able ere long to obtain their conſent to whatever he ſhould require of them, he ſent orders to Farneſe to haſten the concluſion of the treaty; and it was accordingly concluded in the following terms: That all foreign troops in the ſervice of the king, ſhould leave the Netherlands in ſix weeks, and never return thither without the conſent of the Walloon provinces: that an army of national troops ſhould be levied, to the payment of which the king might apply the ſubſidies to be granted by the States: that all perſons in public offices ſhould take an oath to maintain the catholic religion: that all the privileges of the provinces ſhould remain inviolate: and that the government ſhould be preſerved in the ſame form in which it had been left by the late emperor when he reſigned his dominions[h].

May 17th.

[h] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

THIS

THIS treaty was ſigned, on the part of the provinces, only by the deputies of French Flanders, Artois, and Hainault. The other provinces were not called, as Luxemburg had never concurred in any of the late tranſactions; and the greateſt part of Limburg and Namur had already ſubmitted to the king's authority.

The union of Utrecht.

THE prince of Orange, no ſtranger to the ſecret motives of the leading men among the Walloons, having foreſeen that this agreement would certainly take place, had, in order to provide a counterpoiſe againſt it, ſet on foot a new treaty of alliance among the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utretcht, Guelderland, Frieſland, Brabant, and Flanders. This alliance was called the Union of Utrecht, from the place where it was brought to a concluſion. It may juſtly be conſidered as the firſt foundation of the republic of the United Provinces. It is ſtill regarded as containing the fundamental laws of the conſtitution, and proves its author, by the wiſdom, moderation, and extenſive views which it diſcovers. It contains neither any avowal, nor any expreſs renunciation of their allegiance to Philip; but the provinces tacitly aſſume to themſelves the ſovereign authority, and lodge it partly in the general aſſembly of the States, and partly in the States

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of the ſeveral provinces. The principle articles of this confederacy are thoſe which follow: "That the ſeveral provinces contracting, unite themſelves together in one political body, renouncing for ever the power of ſeparating from each other; but reſerving each to itſelf all the rights which it poſſeſſed before.

"That the ſaid provinces ſhall aſſiſt each other to repel the attacks of any foreign power; and, in particular, to repel whatever violence may be offered to any of the contracting parties, in the name of the king of Spain, under the pretext of eſtabliſhing the catholic religion, or on account of any tranſaction in the Netherlands ſince the year 1558; leaving it always to the generality of the union to determine in what proportion each province ſhall be obliged to furniſh its ſupplies, either of money or of troops.

"That in Holland and Zealand, no religion but that which is already eſtabliſhed ſhall be openly profeſſed; and that the other provinces ſhall be at liberty to allow either of the proteſtant religion, or the catholic, or both, as they themſelves ſhall judge expedient: that reſtitution ſhall be made of the effects which belonged to the convents and churches, in all the provinces, except thoſe of Holland and Zealand;

land; and in theſe, that penſions ſhall be appointed to the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, to be paid them whereſoever they reſide.

"THAT all frontier and other towns, which the general and provincial States ſhall think proper to fortify, ſhall be fortified at the joint expence of the generality, and of the particular province in which they lie; but if the General States ſhall on any occaſion think proper to build new forts, without the conſent of the particular province in which they lie, the generality ſhall furniſh the whole expence.

"THAT all fortified towns ſhall be obliged to receive ſuch garriſons as the generality ſhall appoint, on condition that the troops ſhall, beſides their oath of allegiance to the General States, take a particular oath to the province and town in which they are ſtationed.

"THAT the General States ſhall not conclude any peace or truce, nor undertake any war, nor impoſe any taxes, without the conſent of the majority of all the provinces and towns of the union; and that, on the other hand, no town or province ſhall enter into any alliance with any foreign prince or power, without conſent of the generality.

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"THAT in case any Prince or State shall incline to accede to this alliance, he may be admitted, with the consent of all the members of the confederacy.

"THAT all the male inhabitants of the provinces, from the age of eighteen to that of sixty, shall, in a month after the publication of the present treaty, inscribe their names in a register to be laid before the General States at their first assembly, to assist them in judging what forces each province is able to furnish.

"THAT, in order to procure the money necessary for the support of the forces, all the taxes shall be farmed out publicly, to those who shall make the highest offer; and lastly, that the said taxes shall be heightened or lowered, according as the General States shall judge the exigencies of the confederacy to require."

THIS confederacy was not immediately attended with those advantages which it was designed and calculated to produce. It behoved the religious parties to experience, for some time longer, the mischievous effects of their intemperate zeal and bigotry, before they could live at peace. In several places, the people were still agitated by the most violent animosity against one another. In Bois-le-duc, the

the proteſtants and papiſts took arms, and coming to blows, had ſeveral hundreds of their number killed. Soon after this, the proteſtants, being ſeized with a ſudden panic, abandoned the town to their enemies, who immediately ſubmitted to the Spaniards. 1579.

Violence of the proteſtants.

In Antwerp, where the proteſtant party was the moſt powerful, the people inſulted the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, when employed in one of the ſolemn proceſſions of their religion; and in ſpite of Matthias and the prince of Orange, who interpoſed their authority to protect them, they obliged them to leave the city.

Count Egmont's attempt on Bruſſels.

These violences, which the reformers, impelled by their religious zeal, exerciſed in Antwerp and other places, ſerved only more eaſily to reconcile the catholics to the Spaniſh government; and contributed not a little to make ſeveral of the nobility forſake the party of the States. Among theſe was count Egmont, ſon of the great unfortunate count Egmont. This young nobleman had hitherto diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his zeal againſt the Spaniards; but reſolving now to make his peace with them, he attempted, with a regiment of Walloons, to render himſelf maſter of Bruſſels, in order to deliver it to Farneſe; and he ſucceeded ſo far in his deſign, as to get poſſeſſion of one of the

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gates, and introduce his troops into the city. The citizens ran inſtantly to arms; and, being joined by ſome regular forces in the ſervice of the States, they quickly recovered the gate by a ſingular ſtratagem. Having driven violently towards it ſome waggons loaded with hay and ſtraw, they ſet fire to theſe combuſtible materials, and the wind blowing the flame and ſmoke towards count Egmont's ſoldiers, they were obliged to betake themſelves to flight. The whole inhabitants had, in the mean time, got under arms, and Egmont, with the reſt of his men, was ſhut up in the market-place, hemmed in on every ſide, and without any proſpect of deliverance. There they remained during that day and the night following; neither of the two parties being inclined to begin hoſtilities. The citizens mean while indulged their reſentment, by reproaching the count with his treachery, in forſaking thoſe who had taken arms to revenge his father's death; calling out to him, that only eleven years before, on the ſame day of the year, and in the very place where he then ſtood, his father had died a martyr for that cauſe, which *he* now wanted ſo baſely to betray. This bitter remembrance drew tears from the young man's eyes. The people were moved with that compaſſion for the ſon which they owed to the memory of the father,

father, and consented to suffer him and his troops to leave the town[i].

Conferences for peace at Cologn.

During the course of these transactions, conferences for reconciling the Netherlands to Philip were held in the city of Cologn, at the request and under the mediation of the emperor, the pope, and the electors of Treves and Cologn. The pope sent thither Castagna, archbishop of Rossano, who afterwards attained the papal dignity, and assumed the name of Urban VII. The chief of the emperor's embassy was count Scwartzenburg. Philip named the duke de Terra Nuova for his ambassador, and the duke d'Arschot was at the head of the deputies from the States. From this nomination of persons of so great eminence and distinction, superficial observers were apt to imagine, that the negotiation committed to them could not fail to be brought to the desired conclusion. But this was not the judgment of persons of greater penetration. They considered, not only that the prince of Orange, and the other popular leaders by whom the States were governed, had already gone too far to expect forgiveness from the unrelenting temper of the king; but that the opinions of the reformers were more widely diffused, and their zeal, if

[i] Grotius, p. 64. Meteren, book ix. p. 250.

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poſſible, more ardent than ever. And as there was no reaſon to believe that they would ever be perſuaded to abandon their religion, ſo there was little ground to hope that Philip's bigotry would ſuffer him to agree to any terms of peace, whilſt they adhered to it. It was in reality this cauſe chiefly, by which the preſent negotiation, as well as all preceding ones, was fruſtrated. Philip acted on this occaſion with his uſual duplicity, and gave private inſtructions to his ambaſſador, of very different import from thoſe which had been communicated to the emperor[k]. At firſt he ſeemed willing to ratify the pacification of Ghent; and by one of the articles of that treaty, religion was to remain on its preſent footing, till a general aſſembly of the States ſhould alter it. But in the courſe of the conferences it appeared, that the re-eſtabliſhment of popery was a condition without which he would agree to no accommodation. Neither would he conſent to the convoking of the aſſembly of the States, nor to the ratifying the election of Matthias; and he ſtill inſiſted peremptorily, that all cities, forts, and military ſtores, ſhould be immediately delivered into the hands of the prince of Parma. In a word, the terms offered on this occaſion were, in every material article, the ſame with thoſe which had been

[k] Strada, lib. v.

formerly

formerly rejected by the provinces of Holland and Zealand, when they ſtood alone and unſupported by the other provinces; and therefore it is difficult to ſuppoſe that Phillip could, from the beginning, have intended any thing by the preſent negotiation, but to gratify the pope and emperor, at whoſe deſire it was begun.

Philip attempts to gain over the prince of Orange.

BEFORE the diſſolution of this congreſs, however, he humbled himſelf ſo far as to make private offers to the prince of Orange. Theſe were the payment of his debts, the reſtitution of his eſtates, a compenſation for the loſſes which he had ſuſtained during the war, and the liberty of his ſon the count of Buren, upon whom, if the prince himſelf ſhould incline to retire into Germany, the king promiſed to beſtow the government of Holland and Utrecht. Theſe offers were made in Philip's name by count Scwartzenburg, who pledged his faith for the ſtrict performance of them. William could not but be flattered with the teſtimony which was thus given, by an enemy ſo great and powerful, of the dread that was entertained of his abilities. But being ſuperior to the allurements of intereſt, he preferred the glory of ſaving from ſlavery a people who confided in his integrity,

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tegrity, to all the advantages which he or his family could have derived from the favour of the king. "He would liſten to no propoſal," he ſaid, "that related to himſelf only. He was conſcious, that in all his conduct, he had been animated by a diſintereſted affection towards the public good; and no conſideration would induce him to enter into any agreement, from which the States and people were excluded: but if *their* juſt claims were ſatisfied, he would not reject any terms for himſelf, which his conſcience and honour would ſuffer him to accept[1]."

Diſſolution of the congreſs.

SOON after this the congreſs was diſſolved; and no other effect was produced by it, except that the duke d'Arſchot, and ſome other deputies of the States, embraced the opportunity with which it furniſhed them, of reconciling themſelves to the king.

THE negotiations for peace did not entirely interrupt the operations of the war. By the aſſiſtance of the catholic inhabitants, the prince of Parma acquired poſſeſſion of Mechlin; and ſome time afterwards of Villebrock.

[1] Reidanus, p. 29. Grotius, p. 66.

Theſe

These losses were compensated to the States, by some acquisitions which their forces made under the count of Renneberg; who, besides reducing the province of Friesland, made himself master of Deventer and Groningen. In the southern provinces, the Flemings and Walloons were engaged in perpetual hostilities against one another; but no exploit was performed by either party, sufficiently interesting and important to deserve to be recorded.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

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1579. State of Portugal.

DURING the courſe of the preceding tranſactions in the Netherlands, Philip was aſſiduouſly employed in preparing to aſſert his claim to the kingdom of Portugal, an object fitted to inflame a more moderate ambition than that of Philip, and worthy of all the attention and expence which he beſtowed in order to acquire it. Under a ſucceſſion of kings, who placed their glory in promoting commerce among their ſubjects, and in making diſcoveries in the remoteſt regions of the globe, the Portugueſe had attained a degree of conſideration among the European nations, from which the narrow limits of the kingdom, and the neighbourhood

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bourhood of the Spaniſh monarchy, ſeemed for ever to exclude them. Beſides eſtabliſhing ſettlements in Africa, and the adjacent iſlands, they had doubled the Cape of Good Hope, which no European mariners had ever attempted, and had penetrated boldly into almoſt every corner of the great eaſtern ocean, diſcovering lands till then unknown, and founding cities, with a view to the advancement of their trade. And not ſatisfied with their acquiſitions in the Eaſt, they had turned their arms towards America, and planted in Braſil that valuable colony of which they ſtill retain poſſeſſion.

Don Sebaſtian.

JOHN the Third, the laſt of thoſe great kings under whoſe government the Portugueſe performed ſuch mighty atchievements, died ſeveral years before the preſent period, leaving his throne to Sebaſtian, his grandſon, who was then only three years old. This young prince gave early indications of many ſplendid accompliſhments, which excited in the minds of the Portugueſe the moſt ſanguine hopes of a proſperous and happy reign; but unfortunately for himſelf, as well as for his people, he was animated with the moſt chimerical ambition, which led him not to imitate the example of his illuſtrious anceſtors, by ſtudying to promote the true happineſs of his ſubjects, but prompted him to extend

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extend his dominions, in order to propagate the Romiſh faith.

His romantic ambition.

THIS paſſion was cheriſhed in him by Don Alexis de Menezes, his governor, and Lewis de Camarra, a jeſuit, his tutor or inſtructor; the former of whom was perpetually celebrating the praiſes of his predeceſſors, on account of their victories over the Moors in Africa and the Indies; while the latter impreſſed his young mind with a perſuaſion, that it was the firſt duty of a Chriſtian king, and the moſt acceptable ſervice which he could perform to the Deity, to extend the knowledge of the true religion. By theſe means, his ambition was inflamed to a degree of madneſs; and, in order to accompliſh that deſign which appeared ſo meritorious and honourable, he once reſolved to ſail with a fleet and army to India; nor could his courtiers perſuade him to relinquiſh that romantic project, till they propoſed that, in place of it, he ſhould undertake an expedition againſt the Mahometans in Africa. From this enterpriſe likewiſe his wiſeſt counſellors laboured with much ſolicitude to divert him; but their exhortations proved ineffectual. Sebaſtian adhered to his purpoſe with inflexible obſtinacy, and exerted himſelf, with great activity, in making preparations for carrying it into execution.

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State of Morocco.

In the midſt of theſe preparations an opportunity preſented itſelf, which he conſidered as a declaration of Heaven in favour of his deſign. On the death of Abdalla, king of Morocco, his ſon, Muley Mahomet, had ſeized upon the crown, in contradiction to an eſtabliſhed law of ſucceſſion, that the kingdom ſhould devolve to the brother of the deceaſed king. A civil war enſued, and Mahomet, after having loſt ſeveral pitched battles, was compelled to leave his uncle, Muley-Moluc, a prince of great abilities and virtues, in poſſeſſion of the throne. After attempting in vain to engage Philip to eſpouſe his cauſe, Mahomet applied to Sebaſtian, and offered, if he would reinſtate him in his dominions, to put certain towns into his hands, and to become tributary to the crown of Portugal.

Sebaſtian reſolves to invade Morocco.

Sebastian liſtened to theſe offers with the utmoſt pleaſure, and readily engaged to paſs over himſelf to Africa with a fleet and army.

To enable him to fulfil this engagement, he ſolicited aſſiſtance in troops from his uncle the king of Spain, from ſome Italian powers, and (which ſhews how anxious he was to inſure ſucceſs) from the prince of Orange.

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In answer to the application which he made to Philip, that monarch proposed an interview with him, in the town of Guadaloupe in Castile. Sebastian agreed to this proposal; and the Spanish historians relate, that, in the interview which was held soon afterwards, Philip endeavoured to dissuade him from his intended enterprise; but that, having found him inflexible, he promised, before they parted, to assist him with fifty gallies and five thousand men. They add, that not long after, Philip dreading that the great number of Turks in the service of Muley-Moluc might reduce Morocco under the dominion of the Sultan, made an offer of his friendship to that prince, who, being likewise under apprehensions of danger from the Turks, gladly accepted of it, and entered into the proposed alliance. The same historians inform us, that about this time Philip obtained, through the intercession of the Venetians, a truce of three years from the Sultan; and that he was prompted to humble himself so far, as thus to treat with the inveterate enemies of Christianity (which he had never vouchsafed to do before), by the anxiety which he entertained with regard to the transactions in the Netherlands [a].

[a] Ferreras, vol. x. p. 306. 312.

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THE prince of Orange was not leſs anxious concerning the iſſue of theſe tranſactions, yet his conduct was extremely different from that of Philip; whether it proceeded from his native magnanimity, joined with a deſire of giving proof, in the ſight of all Europe, of the ſtrength of the confederate provinces, or from the hopes of ſecuring Sebaſtian's friendſhip to the confederacy in ſome future period; by whichſoever of theſe motives William was influenced on this occaſion, he gave the kindeſt reception to Da Coſta, the Portugueſe ambaſſador, and afterwards ſent three thouſand Germans to the aſſiſtance of Sebaſtian [b].

His army.

THESE troops, with ten thouſand Portugueſe, and ſome Italians and Spaniards that were ſent him by Philip, notwithſtanding his late treaty with Muley-Moluc, made up an army of fifteen thouſand men. With this army, and a great number of pioneers, Sebaſtian ſet ſail from Portugal in the beginning of ſummer one thouſand five hundred and ſeventy-eight, and landed them all ſafe at Arzile and Tangiers, where he was joined by Mahomet, the exiled king, with a body of Mooriſh troops.

He arrives in Morocco.

Muley-Moluc.

MULEY-MOLUC, having received early intelligence of his deſign, had endeavoured to di-

[b] Thuanus.

vert

vert him from it, by offering him certain territories adjacent to thoſe ſea-coaſt towns in Africa which belonged to the crown of Portugal. This heroic prince had been the more ſolicitous to prevent Sebaſtian's invaſion, becauſe he laboured under an inveterate diſeaſe, which he believed would ſoon prove mortal; and he was deſirous to leave his dominions in peace to his brother, whom he conſidered as his rightful heir. But when he found Sebaſtian deaf to his propoſal, he had exerted all his native vigour in preparing for his defence, and had drawn together an army conſiſting of more than ſixty thouſand horſe and foot. 1579.

WITH this army he advanced towards the enemy, and when he had arrived within a few miles of their camp, as he doubted the fidelity of a part of his troops who had formerly been attached to the intereſt of his nephew, he publiſhed a proclamation, giving liberty to all, who ſhould incline, to paſs over to the Portugueſe. But few of them embraced this opportunity which was offered them. His magnanimity, and other virtues, had overcome their attachment to Mahomet, and determined them faithfully to ſupport their preſent ſovereign.

Imprudence of Sebaſtian.

SEBASTIAN was earneſtly entreated by his moſt experienced officers, and by Mahomet, who

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who was greatly discouraged at seeing so small a desertion from his uncle's army, to keep within his intrenchments, near the sea-coast, and not to expose his troops to the risk of a battle; but that obstinate, imprudent prince, rejected with disdain this wholesome counsel, because he thought that it savoured of timidity, and not only led out his army from the camp which he had fortified, but marched into the centre of the country to meet the enemy.

Moluc's distemper, in the mean time, had made the most rapid progress; yet the strength of his mind was unabated. If he had not dreaded the quick approach of death, he would have been satisfied with cutting off Sebastian's communication with the ships, and as the Portuguese were badly furnished with provisions, have brought the war to a conclusion without fighting; but he dreaded the effect which his death might produce upon his troops, and therefore resolved to bring on as soon as possible, a general engagement. Sebastian's rashness rendered it easy for him to execute this resolution. Without regard to the great superiority of Moluc's forces, that infatuated prince ventured to advance into an open country, where the whole Moorish army, horse as well as foot, could be employed. Moluc improved with great dexterity the advantage which was thus

thus afforded him. Having drawn up his army in the form of a half-moon, he went in his litter through all the ranks, exhorting his troops to remember, that their religion and liberty were at ſtake; and aſſuring them, that by whatever pretext Sebaſtian had offered to juſtify his preſent unprovoked invaſion, his real deſign was, to reduce the Moors to ſlavery, and to extirpate their religion. Then after he had given all the inſtructions which he thought neceſſary to enſure ſucceſs, finding his ſtrength almoſt quite ſpent, he committed the command of the army to his brother, and retired to a little diſtance from the field.

Battle of Alcazar.

THE battle was begun with a furious diſcharge of the artillery; but the two armies came ſoon to cloſe fight, and the Portugueſe infantry repulſed the Moors in different places with great ſlaughter. In the mean time the Mooriſh cavalry, amounting to thirty thouſand, having wheeled round from both wings, had incloſed the enemy on every quarter; immediately after which, they attacked them on the flanks, and in the rear, while they were purſuing the advantage which they had gained over the Mooriſh infantry. By the Portugueſe horſe, a body of the Moors was repulſed, and driven towards the place to which Moluc had retired. Fired with indignation at the ſight,

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he threw himſelf out of his litter, and having got on horſeback, by the aſſiſtance of his attendants, he rallied his flying troops, and was about to lead them back to the field of battle. But by this exertion the ſmall remains of his ſtrength were entirely exhauſted. His officers ſeeing him unable to ſupport himſelf on his horſe, carried him to his litter, where he fainted, and only recovered to deſire that thoſe about him would keep his death ſecret till the battle ſhould be decided; immediately after which, putting his finger on his mouth, as a further injunction of ſecrecy, he expired.

Death of Muley-Moluc.

His character.

A MORE ſtriking diſplay of ſtrength of mind occurs not in the annals of hiſtory. Moluc was beſides endued with every amiable and reſpectable accompliſhment, being no leſs conſpicuous for juſtice and generoſity, and (which were rare endowments in a native of Africa) integrity and candor, than for prudence, vigour, magnanimity, and fortitude. By his bravery and conduct he delivered his kingdom from the oppreſſion of a tyrannical uſurper; and if he had lived, he would have advanced it to a degree of proſperity and glory to which it has never attained.

HIS troops remained under a perſuaſion, that he was ſtill a ſpectator of their behaviour.

Great

Great numbers of them fell. The Portugueſe, the Spaniards, and Germans, fought with the moſt undaunted intrepidity; but the horſe being driven upon the foot, broke their ranks, and threw them into confuſion. The Mooriſh cavalry then preſſed forward in thouſands on every ſide, and made dreadful havoc among them, till almoſt all of them were either ſlain or taken priſoners.

SEBASTIAN himſelf, who ſtill ſurvived the fatal cataſtrophe, had, in the arrangement of his troops and in the beginning of the engagement, acted the part of an expert commander; and he gave afterwards many conſpicuous proofs of the moſt heroic valour, flying from rank to rank, encouraging and exhorting the troops; expoſing himſelf to every danger; and often mingling ſword in hand with the thickeſt of the enemy. Having had three horſes killed under him and his ſtandard-bearer ſlain, his ſoldiers, in the confuſion of battle, miſtook another ſtandard for his, which they flocked round, and left their king almoſt alone. The Moors called out to him, that if he would ſurrender, they would ſpare his life; "but you cannot," replied he, "preſerve my honour." Then accompanied only by the count of Vimioſo, Chriſtopher Tavora, and Nunno de Maſcaregnas, he threw himſelf into the midſt of the enemy,

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enemy, and fought desperately, till Vimioso and Tavora fell by his side, and he himself, breathless and exhausted, and unable any longer to wield his sword, was seized and disarmed by the surrounding Moors.

Death of Sebastian.

These men quarrelled with one another concerning their royal prisoner, and from words they had recourse to arms; when a Moorish officer coming up, put an end to the dispute, by discharging a furious stroke of his sabre on the head of the king [c].

In this manner perished the brave, but rash Sebastian; whose fate affords a striking instance of the pernicious tendency of courage and ambition, when they are not tempered with prudence and moderation. About eight thousand of his troops were killed, and all the rest, except a few who escaped to Arzile and Tangiers, were reduced to slavery. Of the nobility the greatest part were slain; and several of the most illustrious families in Portugal became extinct [d].

[c] The account of Sebastian's death rests entirely on the testimony of Don Nunno de Mascaregnas, who was an eye-witness; nor did De Thou think there was any reason for calling it in question; though some other authors insinuate, that Sebastian laid violent hands on himself.

[d] Mahomet, the exiled king, was drowned in attempting to make his escape; and Hamet, Muley-Moluc's brother, succeeded to the throne of Fez and Morocco.

Don

1579. Don Henry king of Portugal.

DON HENRY, grand uncle of Sebaſtian, a cardinal and a prieſt, ſucceeded to the throne; but being of a weak and ſickly conſtitution, and far advanced in years, there was little probability either that he would live long, or that he would leave any iſſue behind him: and his ſhort reign ſerved only to give the ſeveral pretenders to his kingdom an opportunity of preparing to aſſert their claims to the ſucceſſion.

Candidates for the ſucceſſion.

THE candidates were ſeven in number: the ducheſs of Braganza, the king of Spain, the duke of Savoy, Don Antonio prior of Crato, the duke of Parma, Catherine of Medicis, and the ſovereign pontiff.

THE four firſt were grand-children of Emanuel the Great, father of Henry. The ducheſs of Braganza was daughter of prince Edward, Emanuel's ſecond ſon; Philip was ſon of the empreſs Iſabella, his eldeſt daughter; the duke of Savoy, of Beatrix his younger daughter; and Don Antonio was a natural ſon of Lewis, who was a younger ſon of Emanuel, and brother to the preſent king. The duke of Parma was great grandſon of Emanuel, by a daughter of the above-mentioned prince Edward. The Queen-mother of France founded her claim on her ſuppoſed deſcent from Alphonſo III. who died

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died about three hundred years before the preſent period; and the pope pretended that Portugal was feudatory to the ſee of Rome, and belonged to him, ſince the male-heirs in the direct line were extinct. Gregory had conceived a violent deſire to make his natural ſon a king, and he had once flattered himſelf with the hopes of making him king of Ireland, through the aſſiſtance of Philip. But as it is inconceivable how he could ever expect to perſuade Philip to quit *his* claim, ſo nothing but folly or dotage could have determined him to proſecute his own, in oppoſition to ſo powerful an antagoniſt.

The pretenſions of Catherine of Medicis, and her hopes of ſucceſs, if ſhe entertained any, were not leſs chimerical than thoſe of the pope. It can hardly be believed, that this political princeſs could, in her preſent competition, have any other end in view, but to obſtruct the ambitious deſigns of Philip, and to furniſh the court of France with pretence for oppoſing him.

From the dukes of Savoy and Parma, Philip knew that he ſhould not meet with oppoſition; ſince, beſides that his claim was better founded than theirs, theſe princes were in cloſe alliance with him, and depended much upon his

his ſupport and protection. Could Don Antonio have proved his mother's marriage, his right to the throne would have been unqueſtionable. He attempted to prove it, but in vain. Still, however, he perſiſted in his purpoſe, and with ſome addreſs and great activity, he gained over a conſiderable party among the people. Moſt of the nobility, on the other hand, and the king himſelf, who knew the vanity of Antonio's pretenſions to legitimacy, were inclined to ſupport the claim of the ducheſs of Braganza[c]; whoſe right, they thought, was clearly preferable to that of Philip, not only becauſe ſhe was deſcended from Emanuel by a male, and Philip by a female; but becauſe an ancient and fundamental law required, that the crown ſhould not be inherited by a ſtranger. 1579.

Philip's title.

PHILIP's agents at the court of Liſbon allowed, that if the ducheſs of Braganza's father had been alive, his title would have been indiſputable; but they maintained, that ſince he had died without attaining poſſeſſion of the throne, nothing but the degree of conſanguinity to Emanuel ought to be regarded; and that as the ducheſs and he were equal in that reſpect, the preference was due to a male before a

[c] The duke of Braganza himſelf was ſprung, though not in a direct line, from the royal blood.

female.

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female. And they farther inſiſted, that the law which excludes ſtrangers from inheriting the crown, was not applicable to *him*, ſince Portugal had formerly belonged to the kings of Caſtile.

BESIDES theſe conſiderations, which had very little weight, except with thoſe who were for other reaſons inclined to eſpouſe Philip's intereſt, the duke de Oſſuna, his ambaſſador, endeavoured to impreſs the ſcrupulous and timid mind of Henry with a perſuaſion, that, in oppoſition to ſo powerful a competitor as the king of Spain, it would be impoſſible for the duke of Braganza to maintain poſſeſſion of the throne; and that the fruits of all the glorious diſcoveries and conqueſts which had been made by his father and brother, would be loſt, and the kingdom itſelf involved in the calamities of war.

Don Henry diſcuſſes the claims of the competitors.

HENRY'S deſire to prevent theſe unhappy conſequences, determined him to proceed with great deliberation in examining the pleas of the contending parties. He conſulted civilians in different parts of Europe, and called a convention of the States of the kingdom, to give him their opinion with reſpect to the meaſures proper to be purſued. The members of the convention differed widely in their ſentiments from each other, and while ſome of them adviſed him,

him, without delay, to nominate for his ſucceſſor whichſoever of the competitors he thought fit, others exhorted him deliberately to examine the ſeveral claims that had been offered. In compliance with this laſt advice, the candidates were cited to appear; and they all ſent commiſſioners, who pleaded the cauſe of the princes whom they repreſented, before Henry, as they would have pleaded an ordinary point of right before a civil judge.

Henry's deliberations.

THIS extraordinary trial, in whch ſo great attention ſeemed to be paid to juſtice, was ſuited to the feeble and irreſolute character, as well as to the habits of the king, who had ſpent his life in liſtening to the idle diſputes of theologians. But his conduct was ſeverely cenſured by all men of prudence and underſtanding. They conſidered that the fate of kingdoms can almoſt never be decided by the forms or principles of law; and they regarded this farcical trial, not only as uſeleſs for the purpoſe which was intended, but as calculated to divide the kingdom into factions, which muſt ſooner or later produce a civil war.

His imprudence.

HE ought in the beginning, it was ſaid, to have declared himſelf in favour of the ducheſs of Braganza, whoſe right, according to the moſt common and obvious law of ſucceſſion, was

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was unqueſtionable; and who, beſides, was much more acceptable to the nation than any other of the candidates. He ought, after this, to have cauſed her right to be recogniſed by the convention of the States, who would cheerfully have conſented to acknowledge it; he ought to have required an oath of allegiance to her, in the event of his own demiſe, from the army, and all perſons in public offices; and then, inſtead of loſing his precious time in conſulting and deliberating, he ought to have employed it, in putting the kingdom into a poſture of defence againſt the king of Spain.

But Henry was incapable of forming any reſolution that required ſo much courage, vigour, and activity. He was no leſs attached to the ducheſs of Braganza, and no leſs averſe from Philip, than his nobility and people; yet he ſtill continued to deliberate, as if he had expected to live for many years.

In order to extricate himſelf from this perplexity, Henry began to think ſeriouſly of a propoſal which had been made to him by ſome of his counſellors, to marry; and accordingly, notwithſtanding his great age, his infirmities, and his having borne ſo long the character of a prieſt, he ſent an ambaſſador to ſolicit a diſpenſation from the pope. There was little proba-

bility of his living to fulfil his intentions, and much leſs of his leaving any iſſue behind him; yet Philip, being greatly alarmed at his deſign, ſent Ferdinand de Caſtello, a Dominican friar, to diſſuade him from it, by reminding him of the offence which his marriage would give to all true catholics, and the triumph it would afford to the Lutherans and other ſectaries of the age; and when Henry refuſed to admit Caſtello to an audience, a circumſtance that furniſhed Philip with a ſtronger proof of Henry's alienation from him than any which he had hitherto received, he employed all his intereſt at Rome, to prevent the pope from granting the diſpenſation. 1579.

Philip's manifeſto.

In the mean time he ſpared no pains to conciliate the favour of the principal nobility; and having ſpread his emiſſaries over the kingdom, he publiſhed a manifeſto in vindication of his title, calling upon the people to turn their eyes towards *him*, as the only perſon who would have a right to the throne after the deceaſe of the preſent king. This manifeſto, while it incenſed Henry more than ever againſt him, ſerved in no degree the purpoſe for which it was deſigned. The Portugueſe entertained the thoughts of falling under the dominion of the Caſtilians with an hereditary and violent averſion; and there was nothing in the cha-

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racter of Philip by which their prejudice could be overcome.

If Henry had availed himself of this disposition of his subjects, and acknowledged the duchess of Braganza for his successor, almost the whole kingdom would have concurred to support her claim; and so great a force might have been prepared, as, with the assistance of foreign powers, would have either determined Philip to abandon his design, or have prevented him from carrying it into execution. But as the duke and duchess of Braganza were deterred from exerting themselves, by their dread of Philip, and the weak irresolute conduct of the king; so Henry still flattered himself with the vain conceit, that Philip as well as the other competitors, would submit to his decision.

Don Antonio declared illegitimate.

Towards his nephew, Henry acted with much less hesitation and reserve, than towards the other candidates. Having obtained a bull from the pope, empowering him to judge of Antonio's claim to legitimacy, he examined the witnesses whom Antonio produced to prove his mother's marriage; and, having extorted from two of them a confession of their having been suborned, while the other two contradicted each other in delivering their evidence, Henry,

Henry, on this foundation, joined with the circumſtance of the prior's being mentioned by his father in his latter will as his natural ſon, paſſed ſentence, declaring him to be illegitimate.

ANTONIO had influence afterwards to perſuade the pope to recall his bull, on the pretence of the king's having exceeded his powers. By this treatment Henry was highly exaſperated, both againſt the pope and Don Antonio; and he indulged his reſentment againſt the latter, by baniſhing him firſt from the court, and afterwards from the kingdom. In obedience to this ſentence, Antonio retired for ſome time into Caſtile, but he ſoon returned, and found that his uncle's conduct towards him had not produced that effect upon the people which Henry had expected. Their attachment to the prior remained as ſtrong as ever; and, as no pains were taken to form a party in the intereſt of the ducheſs of Braganza, great numbers of the people were entirely devoted to him, and regarded him as their only reſource againſt the tyranny of Spain.

Philip's military preparations.

FROM this diſpoſition of the people, together with the activity which Antonio diſplayed in augmenting the number of his partiſans, Philip perceived that he muſt not ſatisfy himſelf with

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arguments, manifeſtoes, and private applications to individuals, but muſt reſolve to ſupport his claim by force of arms. Agreeably to this reſolution, he iſſued orders for levying troops in Spain, Italy, and Germany; and gave inſtructions to the marquis de Santa Croce to hold the fleet in readineſs for action. He was aware how much reaſon he had to expect oppoſition from ſeveral of the European powers; and in order to prevent them from being alarmed, he cauſed a report to be propagated, that having entered lately into an alliance with the new king of Morocco, his preſent military preparations were intended for an expedition which he had agreed to undertake, in conjunction with that monarch, againſt Algiers. This pretext ſerved the purpoſe which he deſigned; and neither the king of France, nor the queen of England, nor any Italian or German prince, ſeemed to attend to his operations.

In the mean time, Henry's health declined daily, and all about him perceived that his death was faſt approaching. He appeared now more deſirous than ever to have his ſucceſſor fixed; and having for this purpoſe ſummoned the States to meet at Almerin, he ſeems to have reſolved to declare himſelf either in favour of the king of Spain, or the ducheſs of Braganza, according

according as he ſhould find the one or the other of theſe competitors moſt acceptable to the States. But the members of this aſſembly could not agree. Moſt of the nobility and eccleſiaſtics had, by different means, been gained over to the intereſt of Philip, while the deputies of the cities were animated with the moſt irreconcilable averſion to his perſon and government.

Death of Henry, Jan. 31ſt, 1580.

In the midſt of their deliberations and diſputes the king died, leaving the nomination of his ſucceſſor to five perſons, to whom he committed the regency of the kingdom.

The firſt act of the adminiſtration of the regents, was to ſend ambaſſadors to Philip, to diſſuade him from having recourſe to arms, till, according to the will of the late king, they ſhould deliver their judgment concerning his right to the ſucceſſion. But to this requeſt, Philip, whoſe preparations were now complete, gave the following reply: "That his right was clear and indiſputable; that he would not ſubmit it either to the regents, or to the States; and that he did not deſire to have any judgment whatever paſſed in confirmation of it."

By this anſwer the regents were thrown into great perplexity. A majority of them ſtood

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well affected towards Philip, but they were prevented from declaring in his favour, by their dread of the indignation of the people, and were obliged to iſſue orders for equipping the fleet, and ſtrengthening the fortifications and garriſons of the frontier towns. But the great exertion which had been made lately by Sebaſtian, and the exhauſted ſtate to which the kingdom had been reduced, by the numberleſs expeditions to India and America, from which no fruit had been yet derived, ſufficient to compenſate either for the expence which they had coſt, or the loſs of men which they had occaſioned, rendered it impoſſible for the regents, if they had been ever ſo much inclined, to ſecure the kingdom againſt ſo great a force as the Spaniſh monarch had prepared.

Philip's fleet and army.

His army, including four thouſand pioneers, amounted to thirty-five thouſand men, and his fleet conſiſted of thirty men of war, ſeventeen frigates, and ſeventy gallies and ſhips of burden loaded with proviſions and military ſtores. It was not likely that ſo great a fleet and army would find employment in ſubduing a kingdom ſo ill prepared for defence, and ſo much weakened by inteſtine diviſions, as Portugal at the preſent period. But beſides that Philip was, from natural temper, generally cautious to exceſs in his military enterpriſes, it ſhould ſeem that,

that, in the preſent caſe, he regarded the importance of the prize more than the difficulty of attaining it; unleſs it be ſuppoſed, that he ſtill had reaſon to apprehend that the French and Engliſh would interpoſe.

Commanded by Santa Croce,

He gave the command of the fleet to the marquis of Santa Croce, who was reckoned the ableſt naval officer in Spain. But he heſitated for ſome time with regard to the perſon whom he ſhould place at the head of his land-forces. His heſitation, however, did not proceed from any doubt which he entertained with regard to the merit and abilities of his generals. For the duke of Alva was ſtill alive; whom Philip knew to be poſſeſſed of every qualification requiſite to ſecure the ſucceſs of his intended enterpriſe.

and the duke of Alva.

Alva, upon his return from the Netherlands, had been admitted by Philip to the ſame degree of favour and confidence which he had formerly enjoyed. But his ſon, Don Garcia de Toledo, having debauched one of the maids of honour, under a promiſe of marriage, Philip had put him under arreſt, and given orders that he ſhould not be releaſed till he ſhould conſent to fulfil his engagement: notwithſtanding which, his father had aſſiſted him in making his eſcape; and, in order effectually to diſap-

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point the king's intention, had concluded a marriage between him and his couſin, a daughter of the marquis of Villena.

PHILIP, highly provoked with this contempt of his authority, had baniſhed the duke from court, and confined him to the caſtle of Uzeda. Alva bore this indignity with extreme impatience, and perſuaded the pope, and ſome other foreign princes, to employ their interceſſion in his behalf; but all his applications for forgiveneſs had hitherto been ineffectual, and he had remained almoſt two years in confinement. This ſeverity, exerciſed for ſo ſmall an offence, towards an old friend and ſervant, in the decline of life, was by ſome aſcribed to Philip's imperious temper, and his implacable reſentment; whilſt others ſaid, that he had been long diſguſted with Alva's arrogance; and that the duke's conduct in the affair of his ſon, was only a pretence which Philip made uſe of, to juſtify himſelf for diſmiſſing from his preſence a man whoſe temper and manners were become intolerable.

To whichſoever of theſe motives Philip's treatment of Alva could be aſcribed, it was expected, that neither his pride, nor his natural ſuſpicion and diſtruſt, would have ſuffered him to commit the charge of an enterpriſe of ſo great

great importance as the preſent, to one towards whom he had ſhewn himſelf ſo inexorable; and it excited great ſurpriſe, when he ſent two of his ſecretaries to the duke, to inquire whether his health would permit him to undertake the command of the army which he had prepared for the conqueſt of Portugal. To this inquiry, Alva, without heſitation, replied, that he was ready to devote the little health and ſtrength that were left him to the ſervice of the king; and immediately afterwards he ſet out for Barajas to receive his inſtructions. He deſired liberty to pay his reſpects to Philip at Madrid. But ſo ungracious was this prince even towards ſuch of his miniſters as he eſteemed the moſt, and ſo incapable of entirely forgiving any offence or injury, that he refuſed to grant him admittance into his preſence; and, having tranſmitted his inſtructions to him at Barajas, he ordered him to join the army as ſoon as poſſible. Thoſe who remembered the barbarous cruelty which Alva had exerciſed in the Netherlands, were not ſorry for the mortification which he ſuffered on the preſent occaſion; but they could not with-hold the tribute of applauſe which was due to him, on account of that inflexible fidelity, ſo becoming in a ſubject towards the ſovereign, which determined him, in the extremity of old age, to expoſe himſelf to all the hazards and hardſhips of war,

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war, in order to advance the intereſt of a prince by whom he had been treated ſo ungratefully.

March of the Spaniſh troops. June 1580.

FROM Barajas Alva went, as ſoon as he had received his inſtructions, to join the troops, which were aſſembled at Badajox; and ſoon afterwards he began his march towards Elvas and Olivença. Theſe, and all the other towns which lie north from the Tagus, as far as Setubal on the weſtern coaſt, though extremely averſe to the Spaniſh government, yet being utterly unprepared for reſiſtance, opened their gates and proclaimed Philip for their ſovereign.

THE marquis de Santa Croce, who had ſet ſail with the fleet from Port St. Mary near Cadiz, found the ſame facility in reducing Faro, Lagos, and other towns on the coaſt of Algarva and Antejo; and he came in ſight of Setubal, in a few days after the arrival of the land forces at that place.

Progreſs of the Spaniſh arms.

HITHERTO almoſt no blood had been ſhed, and neither the fleet nor army had met with any oppoſition to retard their progreſs. The duke of Alva intended next to march without delay to the capital, but it was neceſſary, he thought, to proceed now with greater circumſpection

ſpection than before, as Don Antonio had drawn together a conſiderable body of forces, had been admitted into Liſbon, where he was proclaimed king by the people, and had ſtrengthened ſeveral of the towns and forts by which the Spaniſh army muſt paſs in their approach to that city.

THREE ways of reaching Liſbon were propoſed in a council of war that was held on this occaſion. One of theſe was to croſs the Tagus, ſome miles above the city, at the towns of Almerin and Santeren; another, to ſend round the fleet to Almada, and to put the troops on board at that place, which lies almoſt directly oppoſite to Liſbon; and the third, to carry the army round by ſea from Setubal to Caſcaes. The two firſt of theſe ways was thought preferable to the laſt, by moſt of the officers, becauſe they were ſafer; yet the laſt was embraced by the duke of Alva. He acknowledged the juſtneſs of what his officers advanced in ſupport of their opinion; but he obſerved, that as the fleet was at hand, the army could be immediately put on board; that the paſſage to Caſcaes was not long, and that as the enemy were ill prepared for their defence, his ſucceſs would be greatly facilitated by the celerity of his approach.

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ALVA was not disappointed in his expectation of the effect which his sudden arrival was calculated to produce upon the Portuguese. They were drawn up along the shore, as if they had intended to dispute his landing; but no sooner had the ships begun to fire upon them, than they retired, and suffered him to land, and put his men in order, without giving him the smallest molestation. They might still have obstructed his approach to Cascaes, as his road thither lay over a hill, defended with a battery of cannon, and full of rugged rocks and brambles, of which Don Diego de Meneses, commander in chief of the Portuguese under Don Antonio, had taken possession, with between three and four thousand men. Alva ordered the Spaniards to attack them, without being deterred, either by the strength of the ground or the number of the enemy. An old experienced officer, of the name of Barriettos, an intimate friend of Alva's, asked him in a whisper, Whether his attemping, with so little precaution, to dislodge an enemy so strongly situated, did not resemble the action of an ardent young warrior, rather than that of an experienced general? Alva smiled, and replied, That a good general ought, on some occasions, to employ the prudence and circumspection of old age, and in others, the ardour

and confidence of youth. The event ſhewed that his conduct, though apparently raſh, was well adapted to the preſent circumſtances. The Spaniards, inſpired with their general's confidence, advanced boldly, and the Portugueſe (almoſt all of whom were raw and undiſciplined) retreated without waiting for their approach.

ALVA laid ſiege immediately afterwards to the town and caſtle of Caſcaes, and by the briſkneſs of his operations he ſoon compelled the garriſon to ſurrender. But on this occaſion he ſullied that renown which his wiſdom and vigour would have procured him, by the cruelty which he exerciſed towards ſuch of the Portugueſe as had thrown themſelves upon his mercy. In violation of his promiſe to Don Antonio de Caſtro, lord of Caſcaes, who had joined him upon his firſt arrival in the kingdom, he gave up the town to be plundered by the Spaniards, and having ſent all the ſoldiers in the garriſon to the gallies, he put to death, without any form of trial, Don Diego de Meneſes, a nobleman of an illuſtrious family, and one who, on account of his perſonal merit, was univerſally reſpected and beloved. To this barbarity Alva was prompted by private reſentment againſt Meneſes[d]; although it may

[d] Thuanus, lib. lxx. c. x.

be

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be presumed that he would not have ventured to indulge it on the present occasion, had he not known that his conduct was conformable to the sentiments of the king. It was calculated to inspire the Portuguese with terror, but it served likewise more than ever to alienate their affections; and considering how much superior the Spanish fleet and army were to any force which had been prepared to oppose them, it could not be coloured with the tyrant's ordinary plea of necessity.

FROM the town of Cascaes, Alva led his army against the forts of St. John and Belen, both which he soon reduced to the necessity of surrendering; and being seconded in his operations by the fleet, the example of these places was quickly followed by Almada, and almost all the other fortified towns on both sides of the river.

Don Antonio.

DURING these transactions, Don Antonio, after having, from a consciousness of the weakness of his party, essayed in vain to obtain advantageous terms from Philip, had pitched his camp, with all the forces which he could collect, on the east side of the river of Alcantara, on the road to Lisbon.

ALVA

ALVA amuſed him for ſeveral days with the hopes of an accommodation, in order to afford time for the operation of a ſpirit of deſpondency that prevailed in Antonio's army. Meanwhile he omitted not to procure the moſt accurate information concerning the ſituation and ſtrength of his camp; and, on the 25th of Auguſt, he reſolved to attack it. Before he could approach the intrenchments, it was neceſſary that he ſhould make himſelf maſter of the bridge of Alcantara, or lead his army to a conſiderable diſtance up the river, the banks of which were ſo ſteep and rugged, as rendered it impoſſible to tranſport either horſe or foot in ſight of the enemy. Having drawn up his main army in order of battle, directly oppoſite to the Portugueſe camp, he ſent the horſe under his ſon Ferdinand de Toledo, and two thouſand ſelect infantry, under Sancio d'Avila, to croſs the river ſeveral miles higher, where the banks were practicable, whilſt he ordered Colonna, with the Italians, to make an aſſault upon the bridge.

COLONNA's troops were twice repulſed; but in the third onſet, being ſupported by a body of Germans, which the duke ſent to their aſſiſtance, they drove the Portugueſe before them, and ſecured poſſeſſion of the bridge.

SOON

BOOK XVI.

1580. Defeat of the Portuguese under Antonio.

Soon afterwards Toledo and d'Avila appeared. The Portuguese, astonished at the sight of them, and dreading that their communication with the city might be intercepted, threw down their arms after a short resistance, and betook themselves to flight. The Spaniards pursued, and slew between two and three thousand before they could reach the town.

Don Antonio, who displayed on this occasion neither fortitude nor conduct, had fled with his troops to Lisbon. There he knew that he could not remain long in safety, as, besides the insufficiency of the fortifications, the magistrates, and many of the inhabitants, were disaffected to his interest; and therefore, immediately after releasing all the prisoners in the city (a poor expedient to recruit his ruined army), he set out, attended by the count de Vimioso, and the bishop of la Guarda, with a small number of troops, for the town of Santaren.

The magistrates of Lisbon did not hesitate a moment in resolving to submit to the conqueror, and the town was, immediately after the battle, delivered into his hands. The Portuguese fleet at the same time struck their colours to the marquis de Santa Croce, and received

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ed ſuch a number of his Caſtilians on board as gave him the entire command.

Cruel treatment of the Portugueſe.

It was now become Philip's intereſt to provide for the ſecurity of Liſbon and its ſuburbs, as much as for that of any of his towns in Spain; and Alva ſo far fulfilled his engagement with the magiſtrates, as to prevent any formidable number of his troops from entering the town; but he gave up the ſuburbs (which were at that time no leſs conſiderable than the town itſelf[e]) to be ranſacked and plundered, without making any diſtinction between the friends and enemies of the king. He ſuffered them likewiſe to pillage the houſes of ſuch of the inhabitants within the town, as had diſcovered any attachment to Don Antonio, and he allowed parties to go out and plunder all the country and villages in the neighbourhood. A Spaniſh hiſtorian ſays, that the ſoldiers committed theſe enormities without the duke's permiſſion, yet no puniſhment was ever inflicted on them, and no reſtitution was ever made to the many thouſand innocent perſons, who were involved in the ſame common ruin with the guilty.

After a conduct ſo barbarous and impolitic, there was little reaſon to expect that the people

[e] Thuanus, l. lxx. c. x.

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of Liſbon would be able ſoon to overcome their averſion to the Spaniſh government. From their dread of Alva's tyranny, they took the oath of allegiance which was preſcribed to them; and, from the ſame motive, they were preſent at thoſe public rejoicings which he appointed to be celebrated on account of his ſucceſs; but being unable to conceal the anguiſh of their minds, the acclamations which they uttered were feeble, and intermixed with ſighs and groans.

THE duke of Alva's joy, ſoon after his entrance into Liſbon, was interrupted by intelligence which he received from Spain, that Philip had fallen ſick, and that his phyſicians were extremely apprehenſive of the iſſue of his diſtemper. Alva knew that the king's death, at this criſis, would probably render all his labours and ſucceſs in Portugal abortive, and therefore he ſuſpended for a while the proſecution of the war.

New preparations of Don Antonio.

IN this interval, Don Antonio exerted himſelf with great activity, and employed every expedient which he or his partiſans could deviſe to raiſe another army, flattering himſelf with the hope of being able to maintain his ground, till the French, or ſome other foreign power, ſhould be perſuaded to eſpouſe his cauſe.

cauſe. In the town of Santaren he had lately been received by the people as their only rightful ſovereign, and every mark of affection and reſpect had been ſhewn him; yet ſo great a change had his defeat and flight produced, that they refuſed to admit him within the town till he engaged that he ſhould not remain in it beyond a limited time; and, immediately after his departure, they ſent ambaſſadors to the duke of Alva with an offer of ſubmiſſion.

From Santaren Antonio directed his courſe northwards, and in the province which lies between Minho and Douro, he prevailed upon eight or nine thouſand of the inhabitants to take up arms. With theſe tumultuary troops he procured admittance, partly by force and partly by perſuaſion, firſt into Aveiro, and afterwards into the city of Oporto; but in both theſe places he exerciſed a degree of ſeverity towards thoſe whom he ſuſpected to be his enemies, that was extremely ill calculated to increaſe the number of his friends.

He remained at Oporto till he was informed that the duke of Alva, being delivered from his anxiety with regard to the king's health, had ſent a part of his forces againſt him, under Sancio d'Avila, who was advancing towards the banks of the Douro with great rapidity.

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D'Avila had under his command only five or ſix thouſand horſe and foot, and Antonio's army conſiſted of about nine thouſand; but from paſt experience, the latter was deeply ſenſible of the difference between his undiſciplined forces and thoſe of d'Avila, and he was well acquainted with the character of that general; who, in the Netherlands and other places, had given the moſt conſpicuous proofs of military ſkill and intrepidity. His ſafety, he knew, depended on his preventing the Spaniards from croſſing the Douro, which, for many miles above Oporto, was ſo deep and rapid, that without boats they could not attempt to paſs it. He exerted himſelf therefore with diligence in removing the boats and barks from the ſouth ſide of the river, and planted his troops at different places on the north ſide, to watch the motions of the enemy.

Progreſs of the Spaniards under d'Avila.

In the mean time d'Avila advanced, and took poſſeſſion of Villanova, a little town which ſtands oppoſite to Oporto. From that place he ſent a party of his troops in ſearch of boats; who returned without ſucceſs: but d'Avila being reſolved to omit nothing in his power to accompliſh his deſign, ſent them back with orders to purſue their march a great way further up the river, which they did accordingly, and collected about twenty boats, from

from places at ſo great a diſtance from Oporto, that Antonio had judged it unneceſſary to remove them. Still, however, moſt of the Spaniſh officers thought it impracticable to effectuate their paſſage with ſo ſmall a number; and it was impoſſible to bring them down the river, on account of ſome armed veſſels which Antonio kept ready to intercept them. To remedy this inconvenience, d'Avila ordered a part of his troops to march up to the place where the boats lay, and there he tranſported them, without oppoſition, to the other ſide. Theſe troops had time to intrench themſelves, before the enemy received intelligence of their landing; and, under the ſhelter of their intrenchments, the reſt of the forces were immediately carried over in the ſame way.

Defeat of Don Antonio.

THIS unexpected ſucceſs in the beginning of his enterpriſe gave d'Avila the higheſt aſſurance of victory, and demonſtrated how little reaſon he had to dread the efforts of an enemy, who, on ſo critical an occaſion, had ſhewn themſelves ſo deficient both in courage and vigilance. Their conduct afterwards was ſuch as their negligence and cowardice, in permitting the Spaniards to land in ſmall bodies, one after another, gave reaſon to expect. D'Avila drove them before him, till, with very little bloodſhed, they were entirely routed and diſperſed.

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ſperſed. This active general loſt no time in ſending a party of horſe in purſuit of Don Antonio, who had fled, accompanied by a ſmall number of his partiſans, to Viana, a town on the ſea-coaſt near the northern frontier of the kingdom. Upon the approach of the Spaniards to that place, he attempted to make his eſcape by ſea, but was driven back by a violent ſtorm, which overtook him ſoon after he had embarked. He then diſmiſſed his attendants, and, diſguiſing himſelf in the dreſs of a common ſailor, eluded the ſearch of his purſuers. Philip had recourſe to his favourite weapon, a proſcription, and offered a reward of eighty thouſand ducats to any perſon who ſhould deliver him into his hands. Notwithſtanding this, ſo great was the averſion of the Portugueſe towards the Caſtilian government, or ſuch their attachment to Antonio, that no perſon was tempted by the proffered reward, either to ſeize him, or to give information of the place of his retreat. Antonio remained in the country between the Minho and Douro from November till May, living ſometimes in the houſes of the nobility, and ſometimes in monaſteries and convents, till he found an opportunity of going by ſea to France.

Entire ſubjection of Portugal;

AFTER the diſperſion of the prior's army, all the towns between the Minho and Douro opened their

their gates, and ſubmitted to the conqueror. The regents appointed by the late king had ſome time before declared themſelves for Philip; and the duke of Braganza, who ſeemed to have deſpaired from the beginning of being able to aſſert his wife's title to the throne againſt ſo potent an antagoniſt, had taken the ſame oath of fidelity and allegiance that was required from others.

of the colonies.

THE colonies in America, Africa, and the Indies, which belonged to the crown of Portugal, quickly followed the example of the mother-country; nor did Philip find employment for his arms in any part of the Portugueſe dominions but the Azores, where Antonio's agents had perſuaded the people to proclaim him king. Some troops which were ſent againſt them under an officer of the name of Valdes, were defeated by the governor of Angra. In the following year Antonio obtained from the court of France a fleet of ſixty ſhips, with about ſix thouſand troops, which he landed on one of the iſles called St. Michael; but the marquis of Santa Croce coming upon him with a fleet and army much ſuperior to his, obtained a deciſive victory over the French both by ſea and land, and afterwards reduced all the inha-

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bitants to a ſtate of entire ſubjection and obedience [f].

THE ſucceſs of Philip's arms, and the great acceſſion of dominion which he had thereby acquired, occaſioned much anxiety to the neighbouring powers; and excited in the Dutch and Flemings the moſt alarming apprehenſions. They had with infinite difficulty withſtood his efforts, while he was employed in the purſuit of that plan of conqueſt which he had now carried into execution; and they ſeemed, at this time, to have much greater reaſon than ever to dread that they ſhould ſoon be obliged to ſubmit to whatever terms of peace he ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe. Yet, as will appear from the ſequel, Philip's acquiſition of the Portugueſe dominions in India ſerved rather to expoſe him to the aſſaults of his revolted ſubjects, than to furniſh him with the means of ſubduing them, and contributed more than any other event to that wealth and greatneſs which they afterwards attained [g].

[f] Antonio eſcaped, and once more returned to France, and the marquis de Santa Croce treated all his French priſoners as pirates, becauſe war had not been declared between France and Spain.

[g] Thuani hiſt. ſui temp. an. 1579-80. Cabrera, l. xiii. Ferreras, part xv. &c.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVII.

1580. State of affairs in the Netherlands.

WHILE Philip's arms were employed in ſubduing the Portugueſe, the prince of Parma had little room for the exertion of that activity and enterpriſe, by which his character was ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed. Having according to his late agreement with the ſouthern provinces, diſmiſſed his Spaniſh and Italian forces, he had thereby weakened his army ſo much as to render it unable to keep the field. The States of theſe provinces had laboured in vain to fulfil their part of the agreement. Their finances were exhauſted, all their levies were carried on ſlowly, and their cavalry were ſo few in number, that they had been obliged to con-

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ſent that Farneſe ſhould retain ſome of the foreign horſe for his body-guard.

It was fortunate for him, that at this juncture the confederates were in a ſimilar ſtate of weakneſs. After the departure of their auxiliaries, only a ſmall number of troops remained; and after the revolt of ſo many of the nobility, and the death of the count de Boſſut, which happened about this time, there was ſcarcely a ſingle officer, a native of the Netherlands, whom they could intruſt with the chief command. Matthias, a young man of no experience, bore the name, but was incapable of diſcharging the duties of governor. The whole weight of the adminiſtration lay upon the prince of Orange, who was involved in an endleſs maze of the moſt intricate political negotiations; and without his continual preſence, activity, and vigilance, the weak frame of the confederacy would quickly have fallen to pieces. William was therefore obliged to leave the direction of military affairs to the count of Renneberg, La Noue, and Norris; and although theſe men were not deficient either in ſpirit and intrepidity, or in prudence and good conduct, yet they neither had forces ſufficient to undertake any important enterpriſe, nor means to ſupport ſuch as were under their command[a].

[a] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

The

THE greateſt part of Brabant and Flanders had acceded to the union of Utrecht; but the ſtrength of the confederacy was not proportioned to its extent. The union of the ſeveral members was not ſufficiently compact, the adminiſtration was not properly aſcertained, and there was no common centre of power and authority eſtabliſhed. The troops were ſcattered in ſmall bodies throughout the provinces; no adequate proviſion was made for their pay; they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants; and, as luxury is the conſtant attendant of licentiouſneſs, the country was miſerably oppreſſed and plundered, and the people reduced to an incapacity of furniſhing the neceſſary contributions and ſupplies. In this ſituation, many perſons lamented that they had not embraced the opportunity lately afforded them of making their peace with the king; and they began to accuſe the prince of Orange, who had adviſed them to reject the conditions that had been offered, of having preferred his private intereſt to that of the provinces. A ſpirit of diſcontent prevailed every where, except in Holland and Zealand, and it was generally believed, that they muſt ſoon either make their peace with the king of Spain, or elect ſome other ſovereign able to deliver them from the calamities with which they were overwhelmed.

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1580. The cauſes of their diſtreſs,

THE prince of Orange was at this time in Ghent, employed in quieting the diſturbances above-mentioned. At the deſire of the States he publiſhed a vindication of his conduct, together with his ſentiments concerning the cauſes of that diſtreſs in which the provinces were involved, and the means of their deliverance. As what he ſaid on this occaſion, and ſome weeks afterwards in the aſſembly of the States at Antwerp, contains an intereſting view of the ſituation of the Netherlands at the preſent period, it will not be improper to lay before the reader an abſtract of the principal particulars.

explained by the prince of Orange.

HE began with complaining of the injuſtice of thoſe by whom he had been accuſed of having contributed to render ineffectual the late negotiation for peace at Cologn. "For no perſon in the Netherlands, he ſaid, had greater reaſon than himſelf to wiſh for peace, ſince without it he could never hope to obtain either the liberty of his ſon, whom he had not ſeen for many years, or the recovery of the many rich inheritances which he had loſt, or the power of paſſing the remainder of his life, which now began to decline, free from labour and anxiety. But while for theſe reaſons, joined with compaſſion for the miſeries of the people, no perſon could more ardently deſire to have an end put to the war, he could not help conſidering

ſidering war, with all its calamities, as infinitely preferable to the proffered peace: by one article of which many hundred thouſands of the inhabitants would have been driven into exile; and by another, all who remained, expoſed to the cruelty of the Spaniards, without any ſecurity either for their liberty or their lives, but the promiſes of thoſe by whom the moſt ſolemn oaths had been often violated. Theſe were not his ſentiments only of the peace that had been offered, but the ſentiments likewiſe of the States, and of all the ſincere friends of their country; nor could that detraction and calumny in which many perſons had of late indulged themſelves, be aſcribed to any other cauſe but the ſecret machinations of thoſe who, from ſelfiſh views, were deſirous of reducing the Netherlands under the Spaniſh yoke.

"THERE was much ground, he acknowledged, for complaining of the irregularities of which the troops had been guilty in ſome of the provinces; but nothing could be more unjuſt than to throw the blame on thoſe who were intruſted with the reins of government. The governors of States ought to be judged of ſometimes by the orders which they iſſued, and not by the ſucceſs with which their meaſures were accompanied; for what could it avail to interpoſe

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poſe their authority, when they wanted power to enforce obedience? The diſregard ſhewn by many to the orders of the States and council, was the principal ſource of the evils complained of. In all the provinces, except Holland and Zealand, there was ſcarcely a ſingle town that would admit the garriſons appointed for its defence. To this was to be aſcribed that facility with which the enemy had made themſelves maſters of Alloſt, and other places; and it was owing to the ſame cauſe, that the troops were ſo much ſcattered throughout the provinces; the conſequence of which was, that the inhabitants of the country and of the open towns, ſuffering equally from the forces of the States that lived at free quarters upon them, and from the incurſions of the enemy, were totally diſabled from contributing their ſhare of the public expences. Thus there was no fund ſufficient for the regular payment of the troops; without which, it was in vain to expect either that they could be kept under proper diſcipline, or employed ſucceſsfully in any important enterpriſe.

"To remedy the abuſes complained of, the moſt effectual method was to place numerous garriſons in the frontier towns. For if this were done, the great number of ſmall garriſons would become unneceſſary; and the interior parts

parts of the provinces being thereby delivered both from the oppreſſions of their friends and the devaſtations of the enemy, the people would be more able to furniſh their proportion of the ſupplies, the troops would be paid more regularly, and diſcipline more eaſily maintained.

"THE States ought not however to ſtop there, but to exert themſelves ſtrenuouſly in drawing together ſuch an army of regular forces, as might face the enemy in the field, or at leaſt diſturb and interrupt their operations. It was their want of ſuch an army that had occaſioned the loſs of Maeſtricht; and, if care were not taken to ſupply that want, there was ground to apprehend, that the confederacy would ſoon be ſtript of all the towns in the inland provinces. But in order to carry this, or any other expedient into execution, it was neceſſary that, inſtead of ſuffering each town or province to diſpoſe of its troops and contributions as it thought fit, a ſenate or council ſhould be eſtabliſhed, with authority to determine every thing relative to the application of the public funds and the conduct of the war.

"HE was far from intending that this council ſhould be inveſted with the power either of impoſing taxes or of enacting laws. He meant only that it ſhould be empowered to levy ſuch taxes

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taxes as were impoſed, and to execute ſuch laws as were enacted by the general States of the union. That it ſhould not be ſubject to be controled by particular towns or provinces; nor obliged, in applying the public money, diſtributing garriſons, and regulating the motions of the troops, to have recourſe on every emergency to the States; but ſhould have ſuch a degree of diſcretionary power conferred upon it, as would enable it to ſeize the opportunities of action when they offered, and to conduct the operations of the war with ſecrecy and diſpatch."

William exhorts the confederates to renounce their allegiance.

BESIDES theſe and ſome other points of leſs importance, William ventured, both in the writing which he publiſhed, and afterwards in the aſſembly of the States, to explain his ſentiments concerning another ſubject, which he had long revolved, and concerning which he had ſounded the inclinations of many of the deputies. Having, before the preſent period, deſpaired that peace could ever be reſtored between the king and the confederated provinces, he exhorted the deputies to conſider, whether they were not now in a ſituation which required that, renouncing their allegiance to Philip, they ſhould transfer it to ſome other prince, who was able and willing to defend them.

IN

1580.

His reaſons.

In the eyes of the greater part of Europe, this propoſal appeared in the higheſt degree audacious. Philip had, ever ſince his acceſſion, been conſidered as the moſt powerful prince of the age; he had lately received an immenſe increaſe of power by the acquiſition of Portugal, and men could not doubt that the revolted provinces muſt ſoon yield to his ſuperior arms, and bitterly repent of the offence which they had given him.

Reasons however were not wanting to ſhew, that the meaſure propoſed was the beſt which the people of the Netherlands could embrace in their preſent circumſtances. If they could have entertained the proſpect of obtaining peace on tolerable terms, it might be difficult perhaps entirely to vindicate their conduct. The evils which accompany a change of government are generally ſo great, and the obligation to maintain the preſent ſo ſtrong and powerful, that nothing but the moſt urgent neceſſity can ever juſtify a people for ſhaking off their allegiance to their legal prince. But, from the iſſue of the late negotiations at Cologn, it was manifeſt, not only that Philip was unalterably fixed in his purpoſe to govern the Netherlands with deſpotic authority, in contradiction to their fundamental rights and laws; but that the utter extirpation of the proteſtants,

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who were now become a moſt conſiderable part of the people, was a condition, without which he was determined never to be reconciled. Deſolation therefore, and ſlavery, muſt have been the certain conſequences of peace, and no greater evil could be apprehended from a continuance of the war. "Even allowing (ſaid the prince of Orange, in the aſſembly of the States) that the king ſhould be perſuaded, by any mediating power, to grant us ſuch conditions as our conſciences would ſuffer as to accept, yet what ſecurity can we obtain for his fulfilling them? He has, before this time, been ſet at liberty by the pope from his moſt ſacred obligations. It is an eſtabliſhed maxim of Philip and his counſellors, that with heretics, ſuch as we are, no promiſes or oaths are binding. Although he were of himſelf inclined to fulfil his engagements, yet the Roman pontiff and the Spaniſh inquiſitors would reclaim, and ſoon perſuade him to alter his intention. It has been ſaid by ſome, continued William, that he is a prince of a compaſſionate diſpoſition, and that we may ſafely rely upon his mercy. Of the truth of this, we can beſt judge from what we have ſeen and known. Do the deeds that have been perpetrated by his command, in India, in Italy, or in Granada, authoriſe us to form this favourable judgment of his character? Has not every corner of the

Netherlands

Netherlands been overflowed with the blood of thouſands of our countrymen, barbarouſly butchered by his command? Are not all the neighbouring kingdoms filled with his ſubjects, who have been driven from their native land, either to enrich the countries that have afforded them protection, with our trade and manufactures, or to drag out a miſerable life in poverty and exile? We know how grievouſly our late conduct has offended him, and from what we have ſeen on former occaſions, we may judge of the meaſure of his reſentment. He may humble himſelf ſo far as to ſoothe us with the hopes of a more mild adminiſtration; but, we ſhould remember the diſcovery which we made lately, when, by the letters that were intercepted, it appeared, that, inſtead of the generous purpoſes that were pretended, nothing was meant but to employ ſome of the provinces as inſtruments of vengeance againſt the reſt."

Oppoſition of the catholics.

INFLUENCED by theſe conſiderations, which ſhewed that Philip had entirely loſt the confidence as well as the affections of his Flemiſh ſubjects, a great majority of the deputies were inclined to renounce his authority. Some of the catholic members, however, prompted partly by their political principles, and partly by concern for the ſafety of their religion, had

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the courage to remonſtrate. They expatiated on the greatneſs of Philip's power, and the danger to which the States would expoſe themſelves, by adding ſo great an affront to their former provocations. And to their repreſentations on this head they ſubjoined, that they could not adopt the ſtrong meaſure that was propoſed, conſiſtently with their oath of allegiance; ſince the King was unqueſtionably their rightful ſovereign, they had all ſolemnly recogniſed his right; and the provinces were his inheritance, which he had derived from a long uninterrupted line of illuſtrious anceſtors [b].

But this reaſoning had no weight with the prince of Orange, St. Aldegonde, and the other leaders of the proteſtants. They conſidered the breach between Philip and the confederated provinces, as irreparable; and knew, that long before the preſent period, he was animated againſt them with the moſt implacable reſentment. "It was too late," they ſaid, "to talk of keeping meaſures with the King; and no part remained to be eſpouſed, but to provide againſt the effects of his diſpleaſure. Nor was there the ſmalleſt reaſon for thoſe ſcruples by which the catholic members were diſturbed,

[b] Bentivoglio, part. ii. lib. i.

either

either with regard to the lawfulneſs, or the expediency of renouncing their allegiance. Kings were inveſted with authority, not for their own ſakes, but for the intereſt of the people whom they were appointed to govern. If the rights of princes were to be inveſtigated, they would be found, in moſt of the kingdoms in Europe, to have been derived from the will of their ſubjects, who, grown impatient under the injuries of former princes, had taken from *them*, and given to their ſucceſſors, what they had an undoubted right to beſtow. A prince was indeed ſuperior to each individual in a State; but neither his intereſt nor his pleaſure was to be put in the balance with the ſecurity and happineſs of the whole. On the contrary, he might be judged, and even puniſhed, for his abuſe of power, by the ſupreme council of the nation. If this truth were doubted of in other places, it could not be controverted in the Netherlands; where, till lately, both the name of king, and the meaſure of obedience which kings commonly require, were utterly unknown. In the Netherlands the engagements between the prince and the people were ſtrictly mutual; and in engagements of this ſort, it was a clear and univerſal maxim, that the infidelity of either of the two contracting parties abſolves the other from the ſacred obligation [c]."

[c] Meteren, lib. x. and Grotius, p. 70.

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Deliberations about electing another ſovereign.

THE proteſtant members, in compariſon with whom the catholics were few in number, being thus confirmed in their purpoſe of abjuring the dominion of Philip, the aſſembly proceeded next to conſider, whether they ſhould ſubſtitute another ſovereign in his place, or eſtabliſh a republican government, upon the plan of that confederacy which was already formed. The latter of theſe meaſures would have been embraced by all the deputies; by the proteſtants, from the conformity between the principles of a commonwealth, and thoſe of their religion; and by the catholics, from their perſuaſion that ſuch a government would neither be ſo highly affronting to the King, nor ſo effectually preclude the hopes of a future reconcilement. But the preſent feeble ſtate of the United Provinces obliged them to ſacrifice their inclination to their preſervation and ſecurity. From the repreſentation which the prince of Orange made of the diſorders that prevailed, together with the view which he exhibited of their ſtrength and reſources, they were convinced, that however ſtrenuouſly they might exert themſelves, they would be able to wage only a tedious defenſive war; by which their ſtrength would be gradually waſted, till they were at laſt compelled to accept of ſuch terms of peace as the King ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe. To have recourſe therefore to the aſſiſtance of ſome foreign

reign prince, ſeemed not only expedient, but neceſſary; and to engage the prince of whom they ſhould make choice to eſpouſe their cauſe with greater zeal and ſincerity than they had hitherto experienced in their allies, they reſolved to confer upon him the ſovereignty of the provinces, with all the prerogatives which had been enjoyed by the princes of the houſe of Burgundy.

Motives for chooſing the duke of Anjou.

NOTHING now remained but to fix upon the perſon to whom the offer of this high dignity ſhould be made. The prince of Orange, having before-hand ſounded the inclinations of the Emperor and other German princes, had found them utterly averſe to taking any concern in the affairs of the Netherlands. The queen of England, and the duke of Anjou, brother to the king of France, were the only princes at that time in Europe, between whom the States thought there was ground to heſitate; and they were determined to concur in giving the preference to Anjou, by the prince of Orange; who, beſides repreſenting to them the neceſſity of electing a ſovereign who would reſide in the country, informed them that their making choice of the duke would be highly acceptable to the queen. "For ſhe had writ to him on the ſubject, and given him aſſurances of granting the States her aſſiſtance, in caſe

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the ſovereignty were conferred on one with whom ſhe had ſo much reaſon to expect to live on amicable terms [d]."

FROM this it ſhould ſeem, that William had offered to employ his influence in favour of Elizabeth; and it may be preſumed, that unleſs he had found her averſe to his propoſal, neither he nor the other proteſtant leaders would have been inclined to give the preference to Anjou. Very different motives indeed were aſſigned for the prince's conduct, by his enemies. His principality of Orange, they obſerved, lay in the centre of France. He had lately married Charlotte de Bourbon, of the blood royal of that kingdom [e]. For many years he had maintained an intimate correſpondence with the leaders of the Hugonots; and he flattered himſelf with the hopes of enjoying the entire direction of the duke of Anjou, a weak prince, who would probably be more attentive to his pleaſures, than to the affairs of government. Theſe intereſted conſiderations, it is likely, were not entirely without their influence; but the other circumſtance above mentioned ſeems to afford a ſtill more ſatisfactory account, ſince there was in reality no room

[d] Meteren, lib. x.

[e] Daughter of the duke de Montpelier.

for

for hesitation between Elizabeth and Anjou; and Elizabeth, as will appear in the sequel, would certainly have rejected the sovereignty, in case an offer of it had been made to her. This political princess expected to derive advantage from that animosity which the election of Anjou was likely to produce between the courts of France and Spain. And the prince of Orange knew, that as it would be easier to reconcile the catholics in the United Provinces to the election of a prince of the same religion with themselves than to that of a protestant; so, without making such a choice, there was little probability that he should ever prevail on the Walloons to accede to the confederacy. Whatever were William's motives, a great majority of the deputies entered readily into his opinion, and they would have proceeded instantly to the election, had it not been deemed a matter of too much consequence to be decided without consulting their constituents.

La Noue taken prisoner.

In the mean time the operations of the war were not wholly discontinued, although neither of the two contending parties was in a condition at this period to make any great or vigorous exertion. By means of a stratagem conducted by count Egmont, Farnese acquired possession of Courtray in Flanders, as he did by the like means of some other places. On the

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other hand, count Egmont and his brother were taken priſoners by La Noue, in the town of Ninove: and not long afterwards La Noue himſelf loſt his liberty. This gallant officer having been attacked unexpectedly by the marquis de Roubais, commander in chief of the Walloon forces, was overpowered by numbers, and obliged, through the diſadvantage of his ground, to ſurrender himſelf a priſoner of war. The States were ſenſibly affected by the loſs of a perſon of ſuch uncommon abilities, and they offered to give in exchange for him count Egmont and the baron de Selles, who had been taken priſoner at Bouchain. But the prince of Parma refuſed to conſent to this exchange, ſaying, that he would never agree to give one lion for two ſheep. La Noue was conducted to the caſtle of Limburg, where he remained long; and, during his confinement, employed himſelf in writing thoſe military and political diſcourſes which were afterwards publiſhed, and much admired by his cotemporaries. Count Egmont's relations, and thoſe of de Selles, ſolicited Philip with great importunity to conſent to the exchange propoſed: but this prince, who never hearkened to the voice of gratitude or compaſſion where his intereſt interfered, declined complying with their requeſt; and, rather than yield to the enemy ſo great an advantage as the recovery of La Noue, he choſe to

to leave his friends to languiſh in priſon for ſeveral years.

THESE two noblemen bore this indignity with extreme impatience. De Selles, conſcious of having exerted himſelf with the moſt fervent zeal in detaching the Walloons from the revolted provinces, fell a ſacrifice to the indignation and chagrin which the King's ingratitude and his own unfortunate ſituation were calculated to inſpire. The ſame cauſes produced a different, but no leſs melancholy effect, on count Egmont, whom they deprived of the uſe of his underſtanding. Through the tender aſſiduous care of his ſiſter, whom the States permitted to attend him, he recovered from this diſtreſs. But Philip ſtill declined conſenting to the exchange till the year one thouſand five hundred and eighty-four, when La Noue engaged in the ſtricteſt manner never to bear arms againſt him in the Netherlands; and the king of Navarre, the duke of Lorrain, and others, became ſureties for his fulfilling this engagement. It is difficult to determine whether Philip's conduct afforded on this occaſion a more ſtriking proof of puſillanimity or ingratitude, while no ſtronger teſtimony could have been given of the extraordinary merit of La Noue, and the dread which

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which his enemies entertained of his abilities [f].

Defection of count Renneberg.

ABOUT the time when La Noue was taken priſoner, the confederacy ſuſtained another loſs by the defection of count Renneberg. This young nobleman having been appointed governor of Frieſland by the States, had ſubdued the cities of Deventer and Groningen, beſides ſeveral other places of conſiderable conſequence; and his zeal and ſervices were the more highly valued, as all his relations adhered to the Spaniſh intereſt, and he himſelf was of the catholic perſuaſion. But theſe circumſtances, which gave him ſo much merit in the eyes of his countrymen, were the means by which he was enticed to abandon the cauſe which he had hitherto ſo illuſtriouſly ſupported. The prince of Parma readily perceived the advantage which they afforded for gaining him over from the confederates; and, with this view, he employed the count's ſiſter and her huſband, the baron de Monceaux, to offer him the following terms of accommodation: That he ſhould be confirmed in the government of Frieſland, and have that of Overyſſel annexed to it; that twenty thouſand crowns ſhould be immediately

[f] Bentivoglio, part. ii. lib. i. Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 39. and Meteren.

paid

paid him, beſides an annual penſion of twenty thouſand florins; that a town, of which he was feudal ſuperior, ſhould be erected into a marquiſate; and that he ſhould have two regiments of troops to be diſtributed throughout his governments, in whatever ſtations he ſhould think fit. Beſides theſe enticements, another object was held forth to him, more tempting perhaps than any of the reſt; he was flattered with the hopes of obtaining in marriage the counteſs of Megen, of whom he was greatly enamoured, and who poſſeſſed one of the richeſt fortunes in the Netherlands. His religious principles conſpired with theſe allurements, and made him lend an open ear to his ſiſter's repeated repreſentations of the danger to which the catholic faith was expoſed, and of the deſigns formed by the prince of Orange for its deſtruction. He heſitated however for ſome time, and trembled at the thoughts of the infamy in which he was about to be involved; but at laſt he conſented to accept of the terms propoſed, reſolving to conceal his having done ſo, till he ſhould take proper meaſures for delivering the towns and forts into the hands of the Spaniards.

His deſign could not entirely eſcape the penetrating eye of the prince of Orange. Various circumſtances concurred to alarm William's appre-

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apprehenſions, and make him reſolve, without delay, to prevent, if poſſible, the fatal effects of the count's intended treachery. He inſtantly went into Frieſland, under the pretence of quelling ſome diſturbances in that country, and ordered ſome officers to draw their troops together, and lead them againſt Lewarden, Harlingen, and Staveren. Theſe orders were executed with ſecrecy and diſpatch, and all the three places were wreſted out of the hands of thoſe to whom count Renneberg committed them.

THE count, who reſided at this time in Groningen, was thunderſtruck when he received intelligence of this diſaſter, which at once ſhewed him that his perfidy was detected, and put it in a great meaſure out of his power to fulfil his engagements to the prince of Parma. Still, however, he was either not prepared, or he had not courage, to throw off the maſk. He complained loudly of the affront that had been offered him, and of the ingratitude with which his ſervices had been repaid. Among the officers who beheld his confuſion on this occaſion, there were two, to whom, as he knew their fidelity to the States to be inviolable, he had not communicated his deſigns. Theſe men, thinking it ſtill practicable to preſerve him in his duty, exhorted him to go immediately

diately to the prince of Orange, in order to clear himſelf from the ſuſpicions which were entertained againſt him. "This is the only expedient in your power," ſaid one of them, "if you are conſcious of innocence; nor can I doubt that you are, when I conſider, that by perſiſting to act the part which your duty and honour require, you muſt promote your intereſt more effectually, than by violating theſe ſacred obligations, and involving your name in perpetual infamy." Renneberg liſtened attentively to this diſcourſe, changed colour frequently, and at laſt burſt into tears. He repeated his complaints of the treatment which he had met with, but he would not explain his intentions, nor follow the counſel that was given him. The two officers then left him; and after acquainting the chief magiſtrate of what had paſſed, they withdrew privately from the city. 1580.

By a popular and inſinuating behaviour, accompanied with ſtrong aſſeverations of the falſehood of the reports which had been propagated, Renneberg laid aſleep the ſuſpicions both of the magiſtrates and the people, till the plot which he had formed was ripe for execution. Having brought in ſecretly a body of troops, which he concealed in the palace, and put arms into the hands of his domeſtics; with theſe,

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theſe, and the catholic inhabitants devoted to the Spaniſh intereſt, he overpowered the garriſon; and having thus made himſelf maſter of the town, he proclaimed himſelf governor, in the name of Philip, and then mounted the fortifications with the troops which he had introduced.

Renneberg's remorſe and death.

BUT he did not long enjoy any of the advantages which he expected to derive from his revolt, and ſome of them he never attained. The money promiſed him was never paid, and the counteſs of Megen was given in marriage to another. His health being impaired by the fatigues which he had undergone in his military enterpriſes, the remembrance of his treachery filled his mind with anguiſh and remorſe, which preyed upon his ſickly frame, and carried him off in the prime of his age, lamented even by thoſe whom he had betrayed, who felt for his misfortunes, on account of his many amiable accompliſhments [g].

Election of Anjou.

THE loſſes which the confederacy ſuffered from La Noue's impriſonment, and the infidelity of Renneberg, ſerved only to confirm them in their reſolution of conferring the ſovereignty on ſome foreign prince; and the reaſons above

[g] Grotius and Meteren.

mentioned,

mentioned, joined to the influence of the prince of Orange, determined the States of the ſeveral provinces and towns to give the preference to the duke of Anjou. The election was made accordingly in due form by the General States, and a ſolemn embaſſy ſent to give intimation of it to the duke, who readily accepted the offer, and conſented to all the conditions that were required. They were contained in a treaty ſigned by him and the ambaſſadors of the States at Pleſſiles-Tours, on the 29th of September; and the principal articles were thoſe which follow: That the States of the United Provinces having elected Francis de Valois, duke of Alençon and Anjou, for their ſovereign, did thereby confer upon him all the titles and prerogatives which their former princes had enjoyed. That in caſe the duke ſhould die without iſſue, the States might elect another ſovereign, and that the Netherlands ſhould in no event be annexed to the crown of France. That in caſe the duke ſhould die leaving ſeveral ſons behind him, the States ſhould have power to determine which of them ſhould ſucceed him in his ſovereignty; and that if the prince whom they ſhould make choice of were under age, they might aſſume the government into their own hands till he ſhould arrive at the age of twenty. That the duke ſhould maintain inviolate all the rights

The conditions of it.

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and privileges of the people; that he ſhould ſummon the general aſſembly of the States to meet at leaſt once a year; and that, if he ſhould fail to iſſue letters of convocation, they ſhould themſelves have power, agreeably to ancient form and cuſtom, to meet together as often as they ſhould judge expedient. That the duke ſhould fix his reſidence in the Low Countries; but if his affairs ſhould, on any occaſion, call him thence, he ſhould nominate for governor ſome nobleman, a native of the Netherlands, with the conſent and approbation of the States. That all his counſellors ſhould be natives of the provinces, except two or three of the French nation, who might be admitted into the council, provided the States ſhould give their conſent. That he ſhould make no innovation in religion, but afford his protection equally to the proteſtants and catholics. That Holland and Zealand ſhould, both in reſpect of government and religion, remain in their preſent ſtate, being obliged, however, to contribute their proportion of the ſupplies requiſite for the ſupport of the confederacy. That the duke ſhould ſpare no pains to engage his brother the king of France to aſſiſt him in carrying on the war; that he ſhould accede to all the treaties that ſubſiſt between the States and foreign powers, and ſhould not himſelf form any new alliance without their conſent. That all foreign

foreign ſoldiers ſhould be diſmiſſed on the firſt requiſition of the States: And laſtly, That if the duke ſhould fail in performing any of the foregoing conditions, his right to the ſovereignty ſhould ceaſe, and the Provinces be no longer bound to yield obedience to his authority."

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As this treaty was negotiated in France, Philip complained to Henry of the breach of friendſhip in permitting it; and Henry affected to be much offended with his brother's conduct, but in reality did not feel the diſpleaſure which he pretended. On the contrary, he ſecretly rejoiced in the proſpect of being delivered from a brother, whoſe levity and caprice had given him much inquietude; and it is ſaid, he aſſured the States privately, that he would ſend them either troops or money, as ſoon as the troubles of his kingdom were compoſed.

Philip's proſcription of the prince of Orange.

But whatever reaſon Philip had to be offended with the French monarch, he was much more highly incenſed againſt the prince of Orange, whom he conſidered as the contriver, as well as the chief promoter, of the revolution that had taken place. Having oftener than once attempted, by negotiation and artifice, to free himſelf from an enemy, who had furniſhed

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employment to his ableſt generals and beſt diſciplined forces for ſo many years, he had recourſe, on this occaſion, to the ignoble expedient of exciting ſome wretch or deſperado to make an attempt upon his life. For this purpoſe he publiſhed an edict of proſcription againſt him, in which he accuſed him of having excited and fomented that ſpirit of diſcord, which had proved the ſource of ſo much miſery to the Netherlands; interdicted all the ſubjects of the crown of Spain from holding communication with him, and from ſupplying him with bread, or drink, or fire; and offered to any perſon, who ſhould deliver him dead or alive, or take away his life, the ſum of twenty-five thouſand crowns, beſides making him and his aſſociates noble, if they were not already noble, and granting them a full pardon of all crimes, however enormous, of which they had been guilty.

THIS practice of commanding aſſaſſination, almoſt unheard-of ſince the days of the Roman triumvirate, was ſuitable to the dark, revengeful, and ungenerous nature of Philip. The prince of Orange could have retaliated the injury; but he ſcorned ſo ignoble a revenge, and choſe rather to reſt his defence on an appeal to the world for his integrity.

HIS

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His Apology.

His Vindication and Apology, addreſſed to the aſſembly of the States, and of which he ſent copies to the ſeveral courts in Europe, is one of the moſt precious monuments in hiſtory. It contains an intereſting relation of many particulars, which throw light, not only on William's own character and that of Philip, but likewiſe on the characters of ſeveral of the other principal actors in the Netherlands. The author has, in ſome parts of it, indulged himſelf in the language of keen reſentment, and ventured to aſſert boldly ſeveral facts, of which the cotemporary hiſtorians have ſpoken with reſerve. Some allowance perhaps muſt be made for that juſt indignation with which he was inflamed; but when it is conſidered, that no perſon had better acceſs to information; that no prince poſſeſſed a higher character for ſincerity and truth, having never, in a ſingle inſtance, been convicted by his numerous enemies of inſincerity and falſehood; that the relation of the facts which he aſſerts was publiſhed at the time when they are ſaid to have happened, and when it was eaſy for the perſons accuſed, if accuſed unjuſtly, to have confuted him; that their intereſt and honour called loudly for a confutation; and yet, that no ſuch confutation, nor any vindication of their characters, which had been arraigned as odious at the bar of the univerſe, was ever attempted; when all theſe

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circumſtances are duly conſidered, there does not appear any ſufficient reaſon for calling in queſtion the facts contained in this Apology, although ſome of them are of ſuch a nature as to require the ſtrongeſt evidence to juſtify the reader for yielding his aſſent [h].

Adopted by the States.

THE conduct of the confederated States on this occaſion was ſuch as William had reaſon to expect. After employing ſeveral days in examining his Apology, they voted him an affectionate addreſs, in which they atteſted the falſehood of thoſe imputations on which Philip had founded his proſcription. They declared, that as the prince had been regularly elected into the ſeveral offices which he held, ſo he had never accepted of any office but in conſequence of their moſt earneſt intreaties. They prayed him ſtill to exerciſe the authority with which they had inveſted him, expreſſed their gratitude for his many eminent ſervices to the commonwealth, and promiſed to yield a ready and cheerful obedience to his commands. They concluded with expreſſing their anxiety for his life, and made him an offer of maintaining a company of horſe-guards, of which they intreated him to accept, being perſuaded that on his preſervation their own ſecurity depended.

Dec. 17.

[h] An abſtract of his Apology is ſubjoined to the concluſion of this work.

IN

1581. Solemn renunciation of their allegiance to Philip.

In a few days afterwards they gave him another proof of that zeal and ſincerity with which they had eſpouſed his cauſe. Their election of the duke of Anjou was a virtual renunciation of their allegiance to their former ſovereign; yet all public acts ran as before in the name of Philip and that of the States; the oath adminiſtered to perſons entering upon public offices had not been altered, and the people in ſome of thoſe cities in the confederacy, which had conſented to Anjou's election, were extremely averſe to alter it, from that attachment which men often diſcover to exterior forms, even after the inſtitutions on which they were originally founded have been aboliſhed; but the States, ſenſible at laſt of the incongruity between theſe forms and the ſteps which they had lately taken, and apprehenſive of danger from leaving it in any reſpect ambiguous to whom the people owed their allegiance, agreed now to remove all ground of ambiguity by a ſolemn abjuration of Philip as their ſovereign.

An act of abjuration was accordingly paſſed, with great unanimity, in an aſſembly held on purpoſe at the Hague, conſiſting of deputies from Brabant, Guelderland, Zutphen, Flanders, Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Overyſſel, and Frieſland. In this act, after enumerating

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the principal grievances which had prompted them to form their preſent reſolution, they declared it to be a right inherent in every free people, to withdraw their allegiance from a prince who obſtinately refuſes to fulfil the duty which he owes them; and much more from one who violates the fundamental laws, and acts the part of a tyrant and oppreſſor. They pronounced Philip to have forfeited for ever all authority in the Netherlands. They forbad all judges and others to uſe his name, arms, or ſeal; and they required the magiſtrates of towns, and all other perſons in public offices, to bind themſelves by an oath to oppoſe him and his adherents to the utmoſt of their power.

THESE reſolutions were carried into immediate execution. All Philip's ſeals were broken, all commiſſions and letters patent in his name were cancelled, and the new oath was adminiſtered to every perſon who poſſeſſed any civil or military employment. It was not without difficulty that the magiſtrates in ſome towns were perſuaded to take this oath. Some remaining ſcruples of conſcience, ariſing from a regard to their former oaths, gave uneaſineſs to ſeveral; and others doubted of the expediency of ſo ſtrong a meaſure at the preſent criſis, on account of the ſhips and merchandiſe belonging to

to the people of the Netherlands, which were in the ports of Spain. But no pains were ſpared to remove theſe objections, and at laſt almoſt the whole inhabitants of the above-mentioned provinces entered into the views of the States, and took the oath that was preſcribed them[i].

Departure of Matthias.

About this time Matthias left the Netherlands, after having reſided there between three and four years, without having acquired either reputation to himſelf, or any advantage to the people whom he had been called to govern. He had employed all his influence to perſuade the States to make choice of him for their ſovereign; but the motives above explained having determined them to give the preference to the duke of Anjou, it ſhould ſeem that the prince of Orange had been able to ſatisfy Matthias as to the neceſſity of that meaſure, ſince he remained in the country for

[i] Upon a repreſentation of the prince of Orange, the States formed at this time ſeveral uſeful regulations relative to the adminiſtration of juſtice, to the finances, and the troops. That council of State likewiſe was eſtabliſhed, of the neceſſity of which William had laboured to convince them, which was inſtituted partly to remedy the inconveniences ariſing from the ſlowneſs with which the deliberations of the States were unavoidably conducted, and partly to ſerve as a check upon the future ſovereign. Grotius An. l. iii. Meteren, &c.

a con-

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a conſiderable time afterwards, and accepted of an annual penſion of fifty thouſand guilders from the States [k].

DURING the courſe of theſe civil and political tranſactions, the troops were not wholly unemployed. In Frieſland, the king's forces were commanded by Schinch and Verdugo, between whom and colonel Norris and count Hohenloe ſeveral ſharp rencounters paſſed, with various ſucceſs; but the only important event which happened at this time in the northern provinces, was the acquiſition of Breda, into which the Spaniards were treacherouſly admitted in the night by ſome of the garriſon, whom the agents of the prince of Parma had found means to corrupt [l].

THE prince himſelf was, in the mean time, intent on the reduction of Cambray. But not having a ſufficient number of troops to carry on the ſiege with vigour, he was obliged to convert it into a blockade. D'Inchi, the governor, had recourſe for relief to the duke of

[k] Matthias had afterwards a better fortune. His brother reſigned to him the kingdom of Hungary in 1608, and that of Bohemia in 1611, and the year following he obtained the Imperial crown. Strada, lib. vii. Meteren, p. 317.

[l] Meteren, p. 313.

Anjou,

Anjou, and was warmly ſeconded in his application by the States and the prince of Orange. Anjou perceiving how deeply his honour was concerned to gratify this firſt deſire of his new ſubjects, publiſhed at the court of France his intention of attempting to raiſe the ſiege. This was no ſooner known, than a great number of the nobility flocked from all parts of the kingdom to his ſtandard. With their aſſiſtance, he collected in a few days an army of near twelve thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, and marched directly towards Cambray. The prince of Parma, too prudent to contend with an army, which, beſides being greatly ſuperior to his own in number, was conducted by a brave and warlike nobility, quitted his intrenchments and retired. In this manner was Cambray delivered, after it had been blockaded for ſeveral months, during which the inhabitants had been reduced to great diſtreſs. Anjou having brought along with him an ample ſupply of proviſions, it was immediately introduced; and ſoon after, he made a magnificent entry into the city, amidſt the applauſes of the people, who ſaluted him the Protector of their Liberty. He then laid ſiege to Chateau-Cambreſis, and quickly compelled the garriſon to ſurrender [m].

[m] Meteren, p. 315. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. ii.

THIS

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THIS ſucceſs which attended Anjou's firſt enterpriſe, afforded inexpreſſible pleaſure to the confederate provinces, and ſerved to heighten their expectations of his future government. He was earneſtly entreated by the States to improve the preſent opportunity, and to advance with his army towards Flanders. But it was not in his power, he told them, to comply with their requeſt. All his troops but a few were volunteers, who had engaged in his ſervice only for a ſhort time, and for the ſingle purpoſe of the relief of Cambray. He could not prevail upon them to remain with him much longer; and he had not yet provided money for their pay. But he hoped to return ſoon with a powerful army; and he would in the mean time employ his utmoſt influence to intereſt his brother and the queen of England in their cauſe.

Anjou ſolicits aid from his brother.

THERE were not wanting powerful motives to induce the French king to grant Anjou that aſſiſtance for which he now applied; ſince, beſides being delivered from the fickle, reſtleſs ſpirit of a brother, who had greatly increaſed the troubles of his reign, he would have thereby avenged himſelf of Philip, who had ſecretly undertaken the protection of the catholic league, which, as will be afterwards related, had been lately formed by the duke

of Guiſe, on pretence of providing for the ſecurity of the catholic religion, but in reality to controul the ſovereign's authority. But Henry was not in a condition at this time to make an open breach with Philip. By his indolence and voluptuouſneſs, added to the numberleſs calamities in which his kingdom was involved, his finances were exceedingly reduced; and the king of Navarre on the one hand, and the duke of Guiſe on the other, furniſhed more than ſufficient employment to all the policy and power which he poſſeſſed. Promiſes therefore of future aid were all that Anjou could obtain from him, and his diſappointment determined the duke to ſet out immediately for England, where it ſhould ſeem he had better ground to hope for aſſiſtance than in his native country.

ELIZABETH had for ſome time paſt appeared to lend a favourable ear to a propoſal of marriage which he had made to her; and his expectations were at preſent raiſed to the greateſt height. On his arrival in England, ſhe gave him the moſt gracious reception. Soon afterwards, he ordered the miniſters to prepare the marriage contract; and in the preſence of many ſpectators, after a long diſcourſe with

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with him apart, she took a ring from her own finger, and put it upon his; which both the spectators and the duke interpreted as a declaration of her consent. It is impossible to believe with some historians, that Elizabeth meant only to amuse Anjou, and thereby to advance some political design. It is inconceiveable how any design whatever could be promoted by carrying her dissimulation to so great a length. This wise princess, notwithstanding the many extraordinary accomplishments which adorned her character, was not exempt from the weaknesses that are peculiarly incident to her sex. Flattered by the court which Anjou had long assiduously paid her, she appears to have entertained the most partial sentiments of affection towards him, and seriously to have intended to listen to his proposal. But at last her prudence, her ambition, and that love of independence which she had cherished through her whole life, prevailed over the temporary passion into which she had been betrayed. She made an apology to Anjou for her change of resolution, and gave him the strongest assurances of assistance and support in his new dominions. The marriage was no more mentioned, and the duke, after the stay of three months in England, set sail for the

Low

Low Countries; eſcorted by a fleet, on board which there was a great number of nobility and gentry, whom the queen had deſired to attend him, as a proof to his new ſubjects, that although the intended marriage had not taken place, yet ſhe was deeply intereſted in his proſperity.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVIII.

1582. Anjou's arrival in the Netherlands.

AFTER a paſſage of three days, the duke of Anjou landed on the tenth of February at Fluſhing. From Fluſhing he went to Middleburgh, and was conducted from thence by a fleet of fifty ſhips of war to Antwerp. The banks of the Scheld, the entrance into the town, and the ſtreets which led to the palace, were lined by the citizens, to the number of twenty thouſand in arms; and no expence was ſaved, which a wealthy commercial city could afford, to expreſs their attachment and reſpect. After having taken the uſual oath to maintain their rights and privileges, he received from the States the oath of allegiance; and then entered

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tered upon the ſovereignty, while all around him wore the face of happineſs and joy.

In Antwerp, the public exerciſe of the catholic religion had for ſome time paſt been prohibited. But now, in order to gratify the new ſovereign, it was permitted in one of the churches; and all catholics were allowed to worſhip there, according to the rites of their religion, upon condition that they ſhould abjure the king of Spain, and ſwear allegiance to the duke. A few perſons only accepted of this indulgence, while the greater part choſe rather to forego the privilege held forth to them, than ſo ſolemnly renounce their former ſovereign. On this occaſion the States, as well as the duke, were not a little alarmed; and thought it neceſſary without delay to provide againſt the danger that might ariſe from perſons who gave ſo clear a diſcovery of their diſaffection to the preſent eſtabliſhment. They firſt publiſhed *one* edict, impoſing a fine of two hundred guilders on thoſe who ſhould decline taking the oaths; and ſoon afterwards another, by which the recuſants were baniſhed from the Netherlands [a].

Attempt to aſſaſſinate the prince of Orange.

In the midſt of theſe tranſactions, that joy which Anjou's arrival had diffuſed throughout

[a] Meteren, p. 325.

the

the provinces was interrupted, by an attempt which was made not many days after his inauguration, upon the life of the prince of Orange. The design was first conceived in Spain, by a man of the name of Ifonca; and it was ſuggeſted by him to Gaſpar Anaſtro, a Spaniſh banker in Antwerp, of ruined circumſtances, as an expedient for retrieving his affairs. To induce Anaſtro to undertake the execution of the bloody purpoſe, Iſonca ſent him a ſign-manual of the king, in which Philip engaged to pay him eighty thouſand ducats as ſoon as the aſſaſſination ſhould be perpetrated. Anaſtro had not courage himſelf to execute ſo bold and deſperate an enterpriſe, and therefore he communicated Iſonca's propoſal to John Jauregui, a menial ſervant in his family, a young Biſcayan, of a thoughtful melancholy diſpoſition, whom he knew to be both truſty and audacious. With this young man Anaſtro found there was little need for perſuaſion. "I am ready," ſaid he, "to perform inſtantly what the king ſo earneſtly deſires. I deſpiſe equally the proffered reward, and the danger to which I ſhall be expoſed; for I know that I ſhall die. I only aſk that you will aſſiſt me with your prayers to God, and employ your intereſt with the king, to provide for my father in his old age." Jauregui was the better qualified to ſucceed in his deſign, as he ſpoke

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the German language fluently, and was in no danger of being known to be a Spaniard. He was confirmed in his purpoſe by a prieſt of the name of Timmerman; from whom he received abſolution of his ſins, and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that by putting to death ſo great an heretic as the prince of Orange, he would infallibly ſecure the favour of God and everlaſting happineſs.

UNDER a full conviction of the truth of what the prieſt had declared, this deluded wretch ſet out for the caſtle, and having taken his ſtation near the door of the apartment in which the prince had dined, he watched the opportunity of his coming out; when ſtepping up to him, he diſcharged a piſtol at his head, loaded with a ſingle ball. The ball entered a little beneath his right ear, and paſſing under his palate, and upper teeth, came out on the other ſide. William was deprived for a moment of his ſenſes; which he no ſooner recovered, than he deſired his attendants to ſave the life of the aſſaſſin. But the guards, tranſported with ſudden rage, had diſpatched him. The appearance of the prince's wound, from the effuſion of blood, was extremely formidable, and as he was deprived of his ſpeech by the ſame cauſe, the ſpectators believed him to be at the point of death. The news of this diſaſter ſpread quickly over

over the town, and excited, in all ranks of men, inexpreſſible anguiſh and deſpair. The citizens poured in crowds from every quarter to learn the particulars of that calamity which had befallen them; and, as if each individual had loſt his own proper parent, as well as the common parent of the ſtate, there was nothing to be heard but the voice of ſorrow and lamentation.

In the midſt of this diſtreſs, a rumour was propagated, that the French were the authors of the murder, and that it had been perpetrated in order to deliver the duke of Anjou from the reſtraints which had been impoſed on his authority. This report gained eaſy credit from the people. Their grief was now converted into fury, and they flew to the palace with an intention to execute a ſpeedy vengeance.

In the mean time it was known at the caſtle, that the aſſaſſin was a Spaniard, from papers found in his pocket by Maurice the prince's ſon[b]. Of this diſcovery, notice was immediately carried to the prince, who had now recovered his ſpeech; and he was informed, at the ſame time, of the danger to which Anjou

[b] Maurice was at this time only fifteen years of age, but was even then remarkable for his attention and ſagacity.

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and his countrymen were expoſed. This intelligence affected William in the moſt ſenſible manner; and notwithſtanding his preſent critical ſituation, he wrote, with his own hand, a billet in exculpation of the French. By this, joined with the pains which were taken by St. Aldegonde, the people were undeceived and pacified. The aſſaſſin's body having been expoſed to public view, it was ſoon diſcovered that he had been a domeſtic of Anaſtro. Anaſtro himſelf had fled; but his ſecretary, whom he had left behind to wait the iſſue of Jauregui's attempt, and Timmerman the prieſt, were ſeized, and having confeſſed their guilt, they were condemned to ſuffer death. At the deſire of the prince of Orange, who never neglected an opportunity of inculcating humanity upon his countrymen, no tortures were inflicted on them. They were firſt ſtrangled and then quartered, and their heads and limbs fixed over the gates of the city [c].

WILLIAM's recovery was dubious for ſome time, on account of the difficulty which the phyſicians found in ſtopping the effuſion of blood;

[c] They remained there till the city fell into the hands of the prince of Parma, when they were taken down by the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, and buried with every mark of veneration which their ſuperſtition could deviſe.

but

but after all their applications had failed, they made a number of perſons ſucceed one another in preſſing the mouth of the wound with their thumbs, without intermiſſion, for the ſpace of ſeveral days and nights; and this expedient proved at length ſucceſsful [d].

ANASTRO having gone from Antwerp to Tournay, where the prince of Parma then reſided, affirmed confidently that William had died of his wound. Farneſe too raſhly believed him, and wrote letters to the citizens of Antwerp, and other places, exhorting them to return now to their duty, ſince that perſon was removed by whom they had been led aſtray. Theſe letters would not have been calculated, in the preſent diſpoſition of the people, to promote the prince of Parma's deſign, even if the information on which he proceeded had been true; but as they did not arrive till after the people were delivered from their apprehenſions with regard to William's life, they ſerved only to excite their ridicule and indignation [e].

[d] While his life was in danger, a public ſupplication was offered up to heaven for his recovery; and when it was accompliſhed, a ſolemn thankſgiving was celebrated.

[e] Bentivoglio, p. 263. Meteren, p. 326. Thuanus, lib. lxxv.

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1582. Return of the Spaniſh troops.

MEANWHILE the operations of the war were not diſcontinued by either of the contending parties. The States acquired poſſeſſion of the town of Alloſt, and the prince of Parma made himſelf maſter of Steenwick and Lierres. He was ſoon after enabled to act with greater vigour than the weakneſs of his army had hitherto permitted him to exert. Having conſented, with great reluctance, to the diſmiſſion of the Italian and Spaniſh troops, he had employed all his addreſs to convince the Walloons that it was in vain for them to expect, with their own forces alone, to bring the war to a concluſion. He found it extremely difficult to overcome their diffidence, and was obliged to obſerve the utmoſt caution, in order to avoid awakening thoſe ſuſpicions which they had long indulged againſt the Spaniards. At length, however, he accompliſhed his deſign through the marquis de Roubais, who, as was mentioned above, had acted a principal part in promoting the reconcilement of the ſouthern provinces. With this nobleman, Farneſe had formed an intimate connection, and had laboured aſſiduouſly to make him ſenſible how neceſſary it was that the troops ſhould be permitted to return. The marquis, flattered with the familiarity to which he was admitted, and prompted by the view of advancing his credit with the king, yielded at laſt to the prince's ſolicitations, and then

then employed his influence with the States so effectually, that they not only consented to the return of the forces, but even petitioned the king for it in the most earnest terms [f]. 1582.

As nothing could be more acceptable to Philip than this application, orders were immediately sent to Italy for the march of four regiments of veterans, consisting of near ten thousand men; who, together with several thousand Burgundians and Germans, arrived in the Netherlands towards the end of the summer one thousand five hundred and eighty-two. After the arrival of this reinforcement, the prince of Parma's army amounted to sixty thousand foot and four thousand horse; but finding it necessary to leave more than the half of that number in garrisons, he could keep only about thirty thousand in the field; and a part of these was employed in Friesland under Verdugo, while the rest were under his own immediate command in the southern provinces. With these last he took Chateau Cambresis, Ninove, Gaesbec, and several other places; he attacked the army of the States, which he compelled to retire under the cannon of Ghent; and then he laid siege to Brussels, but the severity of the season, and the difficulty of finding provisions

[f] Bentivoglio, p. 258.

in

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in a country which had been ſo long the ſeat of war, obliged him to deſiſt from his attempt, and to put his troops into winter-quarters [s].

State of the confederacy.

THE United States, on the other hand, diſcovered great alacrity and zeal in ſupporting their new eſtabliſhed government. They raiſed their yearly revenue from two millions four hundred thouſand, to four millions of guilders, with which they maintained, beſides their native troops, a conſiderable number of Britiſh, French, and German forces. But ſo great a proportion of theſe forces was neceſſary for defending the forts and towns, that no army could be aſſembled ſufficient to contend with the enemy in the field, nor even to raiſe the ſiege of any of thoſe places which the prince of Parma attempted to ſubdue. Thus the number of towns belonging to the confederates was daily diminiſhed, while their acquiſitions were few and inconſiderable. And as the enemy was now much more formidable than before, they were filled with the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions when they looked forward to the opening of a new campaign. Anjou, who participated with them in the anxiety which ſo critical a ſituation was fitted to excite, did every thing in his power to procure from France the

Anjou ſolicits aſſiſtance from his brother.

[s] Meteren, p. 334.

ſuccours

succours which he had given them reason to expect. After many delays, the duke de Montpensier and mareschal Biron arrived in the Netherlands in the end of November, with between seven and eight thousand men, partly Swiss and partly French. With this reinforcement, under so able a general as Biron, Anjou perceived that he might retard the progress of the prince of Parma's arms, but that he could not hope either to expel him from his new conquests, or to bring the war to a conclusion; he therefore renewed his solicitations at the court of France, and endeavoured to engage his brother more heartily to espouse his cause.

Henry's deliberations.

Henry's counsellors were much divided in their opinions with regard to the measures proper to be pursued on this occasion. By some of them, the present opportunity was represented as the happiest that could offer for uniting the Netherlands to the crown of France. But, as these men did not intend to advance the interest of Anjou, they did not employ any argument addressed to Henry's friendship or generosity; and, instead of exhorting him to afford his brother aid sufficient to establish himself securely in his new sovereignty, they advised him only to give him such assistance as might enable him to stop the progress of the Spanish arms. To this counsel they subjoined,

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joined, that Henry ought to maintain a fleet in the Channel, and an army on the frontier of Luxemburgh, in order to prevent the prince of Parma from receiving ſupplies from Spain or Italy. And in this poſture, they ſaid, he ought to wait, without expoſing his troops to the hazards of war, till the contending parties ſhould exhauſt their ſtrength, when it would be eaſy for him to drive the Spaniards out of the Netherlands, and his brother and the States, in order to obtain his protection, would gladly accept of whatever terms he ſhould think fit to impoſe. But ſuch a plan, which the great abilities of Farneſe would have diſconcerted, was too refined, and required too much labour, patience, attention, and expence, to be reliſhed by a prince ſo indolent and voluptuous as Henry, who was ſo improvident of the future, and whoſe affairs were ſo exceedingly involved.

Henry refuſes to grant his requeſt.

He liſtened with leſs reluctance to a propoſal made him by ſome others of his counſellors, who being well acquainted with his character, perceived that his heſitation proceeded in a great meaſure from the ſhame of deſerting his brother, and that in reality he wiſhed for a pretence to reject his application. Theſe men, ſecret enemies to the duke, and partiſans of Philip, whoſe money it was believed they had accepted,

accepted, were afraid to declare openly againſt a meaſure in which the heir-apparent of the crown, ſupported by the queen-mother, was ſo deeply intereſted. They affected to approve highly of the granting Anjou's requeſt, provided the king could comply with it conſiſtently with the intereſt of his kingdom. But both the intereſt and honour of France, they thought, required that the States ſhould previouſly agree, that, in the event of the duke's death without iſſue, the king and his heirs ſhould ſucceed him in the ſovereignty of the Netherlands. They knew that the States would not conſent to this condition. It was, however, propoſed to them, and having met with that reception from them which there was reaſon to expect, notice was ſoon afterwards ſent to Anjou by the queen-mother, and his other friends, of the unſucceſsful iſſue of their endeavours to ſerve him [h].

Anjou's attempt on Antwerp and other places.

THIS diſappointment, which rendered it impoſſible for him to fulfil the expectations of his new ſubjects, was calculated to give him the moſt ſenſible concern. A candid and grateful prince would have thought himſelf bound more ſtrongly than ever to exert himſelf in their behalf; and, by a careful attention to their intereſts, joined to a faithful diſcharge of his

[h] Thuanus, lib. xxvii. c. ix. Meteren, lib. xi.

other

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other obligations, to atone for his failure in that engagement which he was unable to perform. Widely different were the ſentiments which aroſe in the mind of the faithleſs ungenerous Anjou. Apprehenſive that the Flemings, diſguſted on account of their diſappointment in thoſe hopes of aſſiſtance with which they had been deluded, might withdraw their allegiance from him, and reconcile themſelves to their former ſovereign; he reſolved to prevent them from executing this deſign, in caſe they ſhould conceive it, and in violation of all the oaths which he had ſworn ſo lately, he formed a plan of depriving them of their liberty, by making himſelf maſter of all the towns into which his troops had already found, or could by force or ſtratagem find, admiſſion.

This ſtrange deſign, it is ſaid, was firſt ſuggeſted to him by his partiſans in France, in order to induce Henry to grant him the aſſiſtance which he ſolicited; and it was ſtrongly recommended by Fervaques, and other French nobility who had accompanied him to the Netherlands. Theſe men were all real or pretended friends to Anjou, and affected to be deeply concerned for his honour, with which they perſuaded him, that ſuch a limited authority as he poſſeſſed was utterly incompatible. Had they been his moſt inveterate enemies, they could

could not have adviſed him to a meaſure more likely to prove fatal to his intereſt. Yet this weak prince, without communicating his intention to Biron or Montpenſier, who would have refuſed their conſent, readily embraced the counſel that was given him, and immediately proceeded to deliberate with his adviſers concerning the means of carrying it into execution [i]. 1582.

It was agreed, that the French troops, in all the towns where they were quartered, ſhould, under the pretence of a mutiny, take up arms, and expel the garriſons; and in this manner he got poſſeſſion of Dunkirk, Dixmude, Dendremonde, and ſeveral other places; but his principal object was the city of Antwerp. It would have been in vain, he believed, to attempt making himſelf maſter of ſo ſtrong a place by open force, with ſo ſmall a number of his troops as were within the city; and therefore, in conjunction with his counſellors, he exerted all his ingenuity in contriving how force and artifice might be united. On this occaſion, Fortune ſeemed to favour his deſign. Towards the middle of January, after the froſt had continued for ſome time, the States ſignified their intention to have his troops employed 1583.

[i] Thuanus, l. xxvii. c. 10. Meteren, p. 336.

in

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in an expedition againſt ſome of the enemy's towns in Frieſland, which, on account of their wet ſituation, were acceſſible only in the time of froſt. Anjou pretended to enter with great alacrity into this deſign. He immediately gave orders to have his troops conducted to the villages in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, where he held them ready to march upon the ſhorteſt notice; and, under various pretences, he brought to his court at Antwerp almoſt all the French nobleſſe, who had been diſperſed throughout the Netherlands.

BEING thus prepared, his plan was to ſeize upon the gate of Cronenburg, which lay next to the palace, with his body-guards, and to introduce his army ſilently in the night; but, on the day immediately preceding, an obſcure report of his intention was circulated among the citizens, and a general alarm excited. The prince of Orange and the magiſtrates thought it proper to inform the duke of this report, and propoſed to hang up lights in the city, and to ſtretch chains acroſs the ſtreets and gates, in order to quiet the apprehenſions of the people. Anjou could not, without confirming the ſuſpicions entertained againſt him, refuſe his conſent to this propoſal; but as he poſſeſſed a conſiderable ſhare of his mother's duplicity and artifice, he aſſumed, with ſo much ſeeming ſincerity,

rity, and appearance of indignation againſt the authors of the report, accompanied with ſuch ſtrong profeſſions of attachment to the Netherlands in general, and the city of Antwerp in particular, that not only the magiſtrates, but even the prince of Orange was almoſt perſuaded of his innocence. The ſtreets however were barricaded, the whole town was illuminated, and many of the citizens were under arms.

THESE circumſtances having made it neceſſary for Anjou to change his plan, he went early next morning to the prince of Orange's apartment in the caſtle, and after informing him that he had ordered his troops to be drawn out for a general review before their departure for Frieſland, he deſired the prince to accompany him to the field. Whether William had ſtill any ſuſpicion of his deſign is uncertain; but he declined complying with his requeſt, alleging the badneſs of the day, and the ſtate of his wound, as an excuſe for his refuſal; and he adviſed the Duke to put off the review till ſome future day, when the people would be entirely delivered from thoſe apprehenſions with which they were at preſent diſquieted. Anjou pretended that he would comply with his advice, and left him; but ſoon afterwards he ſent him notice, that, finding the day cleared up, he ſtill

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reſolved to hold the review, as he had firſt intended. He then gave orders to remove the barricades in the ſtreet which leads to the gate of Ripdorff, and ſet out, attended with a retinue in arms, amounting to between two and three hundred men.

He had no ſooner paſſed the gate and the draw-bridge, than his attendants fell, ſword in hand, upon the guards, and having butchered ſome of them, obliged the reſt to take ſhelter in the guard-houſe. The orders which he had ſent to the camp had been punctually executed. The whole army was in motion, and ſeventeen companies of foot, ſix hundred lances, and four troops of horſe were at hand, and ready to enter the city. They ruſhed in impetuouſly; and, having ſet fire to ſome houſes near the gate, as a ſignal for the reſt of the troops to haſten forward, they ſpread themſelves over the town, crying out, "May the maſs flouriſh! the city is taken."

The citizens had been in ſome meaſure freed from their apprehenſions, by Anjou's proteſtations on the evening before; but they had not been put entirely off their guard. They flew inſtantly to arms, and quickly formed a cloſe compacted body, of ſufficient ſtrength to make head againſt the enemy. Their number was

ſoon

ſoon augmented by others, who flocked to their aſſiſtance from every quarter of the city. None declined expoſing themſelves to danger, or truſted to others for their defence. They remembered the devaſtations which had been committed ſome years before by the mutinous Spaniards, and were perſuaded, that they could not now avoid a repetition of the diſaſters which they then ſuffered, by any other means, but by exerting their utmoſt vigour, and ſhewing, each man for himſelf, a contempt of danger. Animated therefore by the dread of that ruin with which their fortunes, their friends, their wives and children, were about to be overwhelmed; and fired with indignation againſt their ungrateful, perfidious enemy, they advanced with a degree of fury which the French troops were unable to withſtand. Many of the French had entered the houſes for the ſake of plunder. Theſe men were quickly ſurrounded by the citizens, and put to the ſword: the reſt were driven back towards the gate. There they expected, either to be ſupported by their friends from the camp, or to make their eſcape out of the city; but, having neglected to ſecure the portcullis, the ſoldiers, who had ſhut themſelves up in the guard-houſe, had ſallied out and let it down. By this circumſtance the French were thrown into deſpair, and the reſolution and ſpirit of the citizens augmented.

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The ſituation of the former was now truly deplorable: diſappointed of that aſſiſtance from without on which they had depended, and crowded together into a narrow ſpace; while the citizens, who purſued, poured their ſhot upon them without a moment's intermiſſion; they fell in heaps above one another, till the gate was choked with the dead and wounded.

The citizens made next a deſperate attack on a body of French troops who had mounted the rampart, and either put them to the ſword, or tumbled them headlong from the wall. Of this ſcene, Anjou himſelf, and the Swiſs troops, who had attempted in vain to burſt open the gate, were ſpectators. At firſt he thought it was the citizens that were thrown down, and believed it muſt have been by accident that the portcullis had been ſhut. He could not ſuppoſe that the inhabitants, unaccuſtomed to the uſe of arms, could, in the ſpace of an hour, have diſcomfited ſo great a number of diſciplined forces; but he was ſoon undeceived in his conjecture. The citizens, ſtill inflamed with indignation, on account of his unprovoked, atrocious attempt, pointed their cannon towards the place where he ſtood, and killed a conſiderable number of the Swiſs.

THE prince of Orange, who lodged in the caſtle, at the oppoſite end of the city, remained ignorant for ſome time of what had paſſed, and when intelligence of it was brought him, he at firſt believed it to be ſome accidental ſcuffle between the inhabitants and ſoldiers; but at laſt receiving more certain information of the truth, he ſet out with a part of the garriſon for the ſcene of action. In his way thither he met Fervaques advancing towards him with a body of French troops, which had been left behind in the palace. At the firſt onſet, Fervaques himſelf was taken priſoner, and his troops diſheartened by the loſs of their commander, and ſtill more by the conſciouſneſs of their treachery, were eaſily overcome. William then proceeded to the gate of Ripdorff, where he arrived in time to prevent the citizens from wrecking an uſeleſs, though merited, vengeance upon the priſoners.

NOTHING could be more affecting, ſays an hiſtorian[i] whoſe information was derived from eye-witneſſes, than the ſpectacle at the gate: the dead bodies piled one upon another to a conſiderable height, and the wounded mingled with the dead, weltering in blood, uttering the moſt doleful lamentations, and ſtruggling to diſengage themſelves from each other, or

[i] Van Meteren.

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from the bodies of their ſlaughtered friends. At the prince's interceſſion the lives of all the priſoners were ſpared, and many of the wounded recovered, through the attention and tenderneſs of thoſe to whoſe care they were committed.

THE number of the French found dead in different parts of the city, amounted to fifteen hundred, among whom were upwards of three hundred perſons of diſtinction. And the priſoners, including thoſe who ſurrendered to the prince of Orange, were computed at two thouſand. So great was the loſs which Anjou ſuſtained from this ill-concerted enterpriſe; while only one hundred of the inhabitants were killed, and the ſame number wounded. It would be impoſſible, notwithſtanding the deſperate bravery of the citizens, to account for this extreme diſparity betwixt the loſs on the one ſide, and that on the other, were it not for a circumſtance which one of the hiſtorians [k] has mentioned, that the French, either from negligence, or their general's confidence of ſucceſs, had brought very little ammunition with them, and, during the greateſt part of the combat, ſtood expoſed to the enemy's fire, without having any other weapon to defend them but their ſwords.

[k] Reidan.

In

It is easier to imagine than describe the confusion with which Anjou must have been overwhelmed, when he reflected on the egregious folly into which he had been betrayed. He passed the night in a neighbouring fort called Berchem, where there was neither furniture nor provisions. From that place he wrote a letter to the senate of Antwerp, in which, after boasting absurdly of the proofs which he had given of his attachment to the Netherlands, he subjoined, That although the misfortune which had happened, had arisen from the unworthy treatment which he had met with, yet he was deeply penetrated with sorrow and repentance on account of it; that he still retained all his wonted affection towards them, and had sent them this letter, partly to inquire what were their intentions with respect to him, and partly to desire that they would send him his papers, furniture, and servants; hoping that these last, who were entirely innocent of what had been done, should not suffer any harm [1].

To this letter the senate made no return, but referred it to the consideration of the prince of Orange and the States; and in the mean time Anjou, being utterly destitute of every thing necessary for the support of his troops, left Berchem and directed his march towards

[1] Meteren, p. 339.

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Dendremonde. He intended to have gone thither by the ſhorteſt road, but the citizens of Antwerp having ſent a number of armed veſſels to oppoſe his paſſage over the Scheld, he was obliged to turn back, and to fetch a compaſs round by Duffel, Mechlin, Rimenant, and Vilvorden. In this march, beſides ſuffering the greateſt hardſhips in his own perſon, he loſt a conſiderable number of his troops by an inundation of the river Nethe. From Duffel he wrote letters to the governors of Bruſſels, and other places, in which he threw the whole blame of what had happened on the inhabitants of Antwerp, and repreſented the affair as a tumult, in which his troops, when upon their way to the camp, had interfered, but which had ariſen in conſequence of the ill uſage which he himſelf had received. This diſingenuous conduct ſerved to exaſperate the people of Antwerp more than ever againſt him, and they publiſhed a vindication of their conduct, ſetting forth, "That they had in all reſpects demeaned themſelves towards him as became good and faithful ſubjects. They had given him even more than their proportion of the ſupplies, and had raiſed the ſum of ſeventy thouſand guilders; which, inſtead of applying it to pay the arrears due to the army, he had diſtributed among his French and Swiſs troops to encourage them in their late atrocious attempt.

tempt. Nothing could be more palpably unjuſt than to impute that attempt to the citizens of Antwerp, ſince, on the ſame day, the French troops had offered the ſame violence in other places. By the kind providence of Heaven, the plan concerted to enſlave them, had been fruſtrated, in ſuch towns as were of the greateſt importance; and it was their earneſt prayer, that the duke might become ſenſible of the iniquity of his conduct, and reſolve for the future to govern the provinces conformably to thoſe fundamental laws of the conſtitution, which, at his acceſſion, he had ſolemnly ſworn to obſerve."

THE news of what had happened, having been quickly diffuſed throughout the provinces, excited univerſal aſtoniſhment and indignation. The prince of Parma, deſirous to improve the opportunity which was preſented to him, attempted to reconcile the people to their ancient government. But his endeavours were not more ſucceſsful now than formerly. The confederates were deaf to his propoſals; and even refuſed to appoint ambaſſadors to treat with him concerning peace.

Deliberations of the States.

THE States in the mean time were deliberating concerning the letter which Anjou had written to the ſenate of Antwerp. Had they liſtened

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liſtened to that juſt reſentment with which they were inflamed, they would not have heſitated to declare that he had forfeited the ſovereignty. But they conſidered how extremely critical their ſituation was become, while Anjou was maſter of ſeveral of their fortified towns, and the prince of Parma hovered round them with an army, againſt which they were unable to contend. In this perplexity, they entreated the prince of Orange, who had hitherto remained ſilent, to aſſiſt them with his counſel. No perſon felt more ſenſibly for the diſtreſs into which Anjou's temerity had plunged the confederacy; and no perſon had a juſter ground of provocation. It was by his means chiefly that Anjou had obtained the ſovereignty; and yet it could not be doubted, that in ſending Fervaques with troops to the caſtle, as above related, the intention was to deprive him either of his life or of his liberty. Notwithſtanding this, William had at firſt interpoſed to prevent the citizens from uſing any violence againſt the priſoners; and he now gave the following conciliatory advice to the States in writing, as he generally did in matters which he deemed of high importance.

It was not, he ſaid, without reluctance, that he had reſolved to deliver his opinion on the difficult queſtion which was now before them,

them, as it had of late been the practice of many perſons to blame him for every misfortune that had befallen the confederacy. Even if he had been inveſted with abſolute authority, their cenſure would have been unjuſt, ſince the iſſues of things belong to God only, and no man can anſwer for the ſucceſs of the beſt concerted enterpriſe. Conſidering his age, and the injuſtice with which he had been treated, it would be prudent perhaps not to expoſe himſelf again to the obloquy of his detractors. But his concern for the proſperity of the Netherlands would not ſuffer him to maintain that ſilence, which a regard to his perſonal eaſe and ſecurity required; eſpecially as they aſſured him that they would take in good part, and interpret favourably, whatever counſel he ſhould offer.

Nothing was farther from his intention than to attempt to juſtify that atrocious violence which had been lately perpetrated: on the contrary, he thought the conduct of the duke had been ſuch as proved, beyond a poſſibility of doubt, that he had forfeited his title to the ſovereignty. Notwithſtanding this, no perſon, he believed, who ſuffered himſelf to conſider attentively the courſe of events ſince their firſt connection with the duke, would deny that this connection had been attended with

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with advantages. By his troops, not only the ſiege of Cambray, but that of Lochem too, had been raiſed, and the whole province of Guelderland thereby ſaved from the depredations of the enemy. In conſequence of his election, peace had been eſtabliſhed between the catholics and proteſtants in France, and the latter left at liberty to enter into the ſervice of the States. Not to mention what they ought perhaps to prize more than any thing elſe, that, by electing the duke for their ſovereign, not only the authority, but the name and arms of Spain, had been aboliſhed in the Netherlands, and a foundation laid, upon which their liberty might be firmly eſtabliſhed, provided they ſhould exert themſelves with their wonted zeal and vigour. When theſe things were conſidered, there would not appear much ground for the cenſures paſſed on thoſe by whom the duke's election had been promoted. But whether they had judged wiſely or unwiſely, the States muſt now reſolve either to make peace with the king of Spain, or truſt for the future to their own ſtrength, or enter into terms of accommodation with the duke.

With regard to the firſt of theſe, he obſerved, that beſides that all the ſame reaſons ſtill ſubſiſted againſt returning under the Spaniſh yoke, which had formerly determined them to ſhake

ſhake it off; it muſt appear prepoſterous to think of reconciling themſelves as ſubjects to a prince, whoſe name and enſigns were obliterated, and whoſe authority they had ſo ſolemnly renounced. There was truth in what ſome perſons (friends of Spain more than their native country) had ſuggeſted, that it was more deſirable for the people of the Low Countries to be ſubject to a diſtant, than to a neighbouring prince, as it muſt be more difficult for the former, than for the latter, to encroach upon their liberty. But this maxim could not, in the preſent divided ſtate of the Netherlands, be urged in favour of the dominion of the king of Spain; who, beſides poſſeſſing a powerful army ready to overwhelm them, was abſolute maſter of ſeveral of the provinces; and was therefore, in reality, much nearer to the confederacy than any other prince.

Prompted by this and other conſiderations, they had beſtowed the ſovereignty on the duke of Anjou; and *he*, it could not be denied, had forfeited his title to it. This was acknowledged even by the duke himſelf, who was now ſenſible of his folly. But notwithſtanding his repentance, there was much ground to doubt of the expediency of entering into a ſecond agreement with one by whom the firſt had been ſo groſsly violated. There was ground to dread that

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that the ſame evil counſellors, by whom the duke had been once deluded, might again deceive him; and there was reaſon to ſuſpect, that confidence could not be ſoon reſtored between the French troops and the people of the Netherlands.

On the other hand, he thought it is duty to to call their attention to the conſequences which muſt attend their refuſing to be pacified. The duke would deliver all the fortified towns which he poſſeſſed, into the hands of the Spaniards. Both he and his brother, the king of France, would from friends be converted into the moſt bitter enemies; from whom all that miſchief might be expected, that can be contrived and executed by thoſe who are ſtimulated by ambition, and inflamed with animoſity and reſentment. An immediate ſtop would be put by the French king to their commerce with his ſubjects; and while he would ſhut his harbours againſt their ſhips, he would open a paſſage through his dominions for the troops of the king of Spain. Even the queen of England, though highly diſſatisfied with the duke's conduct, yet were ſhe to be informed that the States had obſtinately refuſed to be reconciled, would be exceedingly offended. And if they ſhould loſe her favour, as well as that of France, to what other friend could they have recourſe, either

either able or willing to ſupport them? They muſt for the future truſt for their preſervation entirely to themſelves. They muſt, without delay, make a numerous augmentation of their forces; and yet he knew not where theſe forces could be raiſed, ſince the devaſtation of the war had been ſo great in every province of the confederacy, that ſcarcely a ſufficient number of the people remained to carry on their trade and manufactures. In order to maintain ſuch an army as was neceſſary, much larger ſums of money were requiſite, than had hitherto been collected. What theſe were, would appear from the ſcheme which he now delivered to them, containing a particular deſcription of all the ordinary and extraordinary expences of the war. From the difficulty which they had experienced in procuring money for paying the garriſons alone, they might judge whether they were poſſeſſed of funds adequate to the expence both of theſe and of an army in the field; without which, it was impoſſible that they could for any conſiderable time reſiſt the enemy.

He was far from cenſuring thoſe who adviſed them to truſt to the Almighty for protection. The counſel of theſe perſons was pious and well-intended; but he thought, that to engage in any difficult enterpriſe without the means

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means of carrying it into execution, was more properly to tempt the Divine Providence than to truſt in it; and that thoſe only could be ſaid to exerciſe a proper truſt in God, who, after embracing the moſt favourable opportunities of action, had recourſe to Heaven by prayer, to crown their undertakings with ſucceſs. It behoved them therefore ſtill attentively to conſider their ſtrength and their reſources; and if, without foreign aſſiſtance, they ſhould find them ſufficient for the purpoſes which they had in view, they would, in his opinion, judge wiſely in reſolving to retain the ſovereignty in their own hands.

THERE was a time when the people of the Netherlands might have eſtabliſhed themſelves in this happy ſtate of freedom and independence; when, in ſpite of the king of Spain, they might have expelled his brother John of Auſtria from the provinces. But our preſent ſituation, continued William, is widely different from what it was at the time of which I ſpeak. A powerful Spaniſh army, ſeconded by thoſe who were then our friends, is at our gates. The ſtrength of the confederacy is impaired. Even with the aſſiſtance of the French troops, we have been unable to ſtop the progreſs of the enemy. If nevertheleſs you ſhall, upon inquiry, find that you are able, by making

ing greater exertions, to do more alone, than when you were aſſiſted by others, baniſh for ever all thoughts of an accommodation with the duke, and reſolve henceforth, alone and unaſſiſted, to oppoſe both him and the Spaniards. Proceed inſtantly to the execution of your deſign. But I dread that before you can make the preparations neceſſary for entering upon action, before you can collect either the troops or the money requiſite, and even before you can appoint a general to command your forces, many of your towns will be taken; and many of them, deſpairing of relief, will enter into terms of accommodation with the Spaniards. For theſe reaſons you will judge, perhaps, that in your preſent circumſtances the wiſeſt reſolution which you can form, is to enter into a treaty of reconcilement with the duke. And if this ſhall be the reſult of your deliberations, I have only one other counſel to ſuggeſt, which is, to give particular attention in your new agreement to prevent the fortified towns from being expoſed on any future occaſion to that danger from which the city of Antwerp has ſo narrowly eſcaped; and for this purpoſe to require, that no officer or ſoldier ſhall be admitted into garriſons without taking an oath of allegiance and fidelity to the States[o]."

[o] Van Meteren and Thuanus.

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1583. Reconcilement of the States with Anjou. March 8th.

THIS reaſoning of the prince of Orange produced the deſired effect upon a great majority of the deputies, and a negotiation was immediately begun, and ſoon afterwards a treaty of peace and reconciliation was concluded on the following conditions: That all the French priſoners in Antwerp ſhould be ſet at liberty, the duke's papers and other effects reſtored, and ninety thouſand guilders given him for diſcharging the arrears due to his troops. That he ſhould deliver up all the towns which he had ſeized, retire to Dunkirk with four hundred foot and three hundred horſe, and remain there till every point of difference ſhould be entirely ſettled; that he ſhould renew the oath which he took at his inauguration, to govern the provinces according to the fundamental laws, and that all his troops ſhould take an oath of allegiance to the States, binding themſelves to ſerve them faithfully againſt their enemies, and never to be concerned in any attempt to the prejudice of their authority.

Attempts on the life of the prince of Orange.

As in promoting this agreement the prince of Orange appears to have acted under a conviction, that there was no other expedient by which the confederacy could be ſaved from ruin; ſo, in being able to perſuade the States to adopt it, he gave the moſt convincing proof of his unlimited influence over that aſſembly. The people

people in general, especially in Flanders and Brabant, were extremely averse to any accommodation. Their hereditary antipathy against the French had, on this occasion, risen to the greatest height. Many of the deputies too were animated with the same aversion and resentment; nor can it be doubted, that if they had not been prevented by that deference which they had been long accustomed to entertain for William's opinion, they would have proceeded against Anjou to the utmost extremities, and have resolved never more to acknowledge his authority. The Spaniards were not ignorant by whom the States had been prevented from forming this resolution; and they were now convinced, that, till the prince of Orange were removed, no event, however promising, would induce the confederates to return to their allegiance. They had recourse therefore to the dishonourable means of private assassination; and to attempt it, different persons were instigated about this time by Philip or his ministers; one of them by Philip himself, according to the declaration of the criminal; but more probably by his ministers at Madrid; another by his ambassador at the court of France; and a third by the marquis de Roubais and the prince of Parma. The conspiracy of the two former was detected, and they suffered death; and the last, a French officer, whom Roubais had taken pri-

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ſoner, and who had pretended to agree to the propoſal in order to procure his liberty, gave information to William's friends of the arguments which had been employed to perſuade him, and ſhewed, by his conduct afterwards in the ſervice of the States, the ſincerity of his abhorrence of that unhallowed deed which he had been ſolicited to perform [p].

Diſcontents of the people.

THE danger to which the prince was ſo often expoſed from the inveterate reſentment of the Spaniards, ought to have endeared his perſon and counſels to his countrymen, and they produced this effect in a high degree upon all thoſe who were able to comprehend the wiſdom and moderation with which he had conducted their affairs. But great numbers having formed their judgment of Anjou's election to the ſovereignty, from the late unhappy conſequences with which it had been accompanied, could not refrain from aſcribing ſome ſiniſter intention to thoſe who had been active in promoting it. They were incapable of diſcerning the ſtrength of the motives by which William had been prompted to adviſe the States to renew their agreement, and they even foſtered ſuſpicions of his having attached himſelf to the duke, with a view to the attaining of ſome private

[p] Meteren, p. 348.

advantage.

advantage. This ſpirit of diſcontent was not confined to the vulgar, but likewiſe infected ſeveral of the deputies of the States, who became ſullen and refractory; and by their contentious oppoſition to almoſt every meaſure that was propoſed, diſturbed and retarded the deliberations of that aſſembly. A great majority, however, of the members agreed to employ the French and Swiſs troops under mareſchal Biron, whom the duke had appointed to command them. Biron having not only had no concern in the attempt upon Antwerp, but having been conſidered by Anjou as one by whom it would have been oppoſed, was the moſt unexceptionable perſon to whom the command could have been committed, and he had been long diſtinguiſhed for his military ſkill and experience. At firſt his arms were attended with ſucceſs. He compelled the fort of Wouda to ſurrender, and with inferior forces he repulſed the prince of Parma, who had attacked his lines near the town of Roſendal. But it was impoſſible for him with ſo ſmall an army to ſtop the progreſs of the Spaniards in other places, or to face them in the open field. Farneſe therefore puſhed his conqueſts with great rapidity, and made himſelf maſter of Endove, Dieſt, and Weſterlo, while he practiſed every art of negotiation and intrigue againſt Bruges, Ghent, and other places.

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DURING the courſe of theſe tranſactions, the duke of Anjou fell into a lingering illneſs at Dunkirk, which was generally ſuppoſed to be the effect of thoſe hardſhips which he ſuffered in his retreat from Antwerp. Whether he believed himſelf inſecure in his preſent ſituation, while the prince of Parma was ſo briſkly carrying on his conqueſts in the neighbourhood, or found that his health required a change of air, and a relaxation from the fatigues of buſineſs, or whether he had conceived hopes at this time of obtaining, by a perſonal interview with his brother, more powerful aſſiſtance than he had hitherto received, does not appear with ſufficient evidence. But whatever was the motive which determined him, he left Dunkirk, and ſet out for France.

Progreſs of the prince of Parma's arms.

THE prince of Parma was no ſooner informed of his departure, than he quitted Herentals, and led his troops to Dunkirk. The States, aware of the importance of that place, ordered mareſchal Biron to march with all his forces to its relief. But ſuch was the reſentment which the Ghenteſe and other Flemings had conceived againſt the French, that no conſideration could prevail upon them to ſuffer Biron to paſs through their territories. They had reſolved, they ſaid, never to accede to the late agreement with the duke, whom they could not truſt,

truſt, and they would not be indebted to his troops for their defence. The conſequence to be expected followed. The garriſon of Dunkirk, which conſiſted wholly of French, gave up the town in a few days to the prince of Parma. He then laid ſiege to Nieuport, and took it with ſo much facility as gave ground for a ſuſpicion of treachery on the part of the garriſon. He intended next to have inveſted Oſtend, but having learnt that the prince of Orange had taken particular pains to provide for its ſecurity, he relinquiſhed his deſign; and having turned his arms againſt Dixmude and Meningen, he ſubdued theſe and ſeveral other places with a degree of celerity with which the people of the Netherlands had never been accuſtomed to ſee any military enterpriſes carried on. But his ſucceſs ſerved only to dazzle and confound the confederates, inſtead of opening their eyes to the fatal conſequences of that diſcord which had expoſed ſo great a number of their aſſociates an eaſy prey to the Spaniards. Except augmenting the garriſons of two or three towns, in the preſervation of which ſome of the deputies were perſonally intereſted, no vigorous reſolution of any conſequence was formed by the States, although they held their ſeſſions daily, and were daily alarmed with freſh accounts of ſome new loſs which the confederacy had ſuſtained.

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1583. Injurious ſuſpicions againſt the prince of Orange.

About this time an incident fell out at Antwerp, which ſtrongly marks the ſpirit by which the Flemings were actuated on this occaſion. The prince of Orange having given orders for building an additional rampart for the greater ſecurity of the caſtle, ſome ſecret partiſans of Spain took ocaaſion from thence to inſinuate, that he intended to deliver the fortreſs to the French, and was now preparing it for their reception. The people too eaſily believed this injurious ſuggeſtion; and having taken up arms, they ran tumultuouſly to the caſtle, with a reſolution to expel the garriſon. William immediately preſented himſelf before them. The ſight of a perſon whom they had been ſo long accuſtomed to revere, joined to the evidence which they received on the ſpot of the utter falſehood of that report which they had ſo raſhly credited, appeaſed the fury of the greater number, and quelled the tumult. But there were ſome among them more audacious and malignant than the reſt, who called him by the contumelious names of deſerter and traitor of his country. This treatment, ſo unmerited from a people whom he had ſaved from ruin, affected him in the moſt ſenſible manner. He admoniſhed the magiſtrates to take cognizance of the licentiouſneſs of which they had been ſpectators. But finding that, on account of the great number of the guilty, they

1583. He retires to Zealand, July 22.

they were afraid to exercise their authority, he left Antwerp, and retired into Zealand, after having delivered directions to the magistrates in writing, for the government and defence of the city, and nominated the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, chief magistrate, or governor, for the ensuing year [q].

William did not intend, by changing the place of his residence, to withdraw his attention from the southern provinces. He interested himself as much as ever in their affairs, and meant only to provide for his own security, and to remove the assembly of the States (which was summoned to meet at Middleburg) to a situation in which the deputies would not be so much

[q] Of the affection of the maritime provinces towards the prince of Orange, and of the trust and confidence which they reposed in him, he received about this time a conspicuous proof, by a resolution into which all the cities entered, except two, of creating him earl of Holland and Zealand, with all the powers and privileges which belonged to that ancient dignity. How far the prince himself contributed to their forming this resolution, does not appear from the cotemporary historians. It did not contradict the treaty between the United States and the duke of Anjou; as, by that treaty, the maritime provinces had only bound themselves to contribute their share of the public expences. Yet it was matter of some obloquy against the prince, of whom it was said, that he had not been inattentive to his private interest.

influenced

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1583. influenced by the emiſſaries of Spain, nor ſo much diſturbed in their deliberations by the tumultuous diſpoſition of the people. He ſtill employed all his intereſt to reconcile the cities of Brabant and Flanders to the continuance of the French troops in the Netherlands. And his endeavours proved effectual with Bruſſels, and ſome other towns which lay neareſt to the enemy; but Ghent, and moſt of the other cities, remained as inflexible as ever, and reſolved never to admit the French within their territories, or to be indebted to them for protection. The States therefore found it neceſſary to give orders for the departure of theſe troops, at a time when every friend of his country, who ſuffered himſelf to reflect on the critical ſituation of the confederacy, thought that the provinces ought rather to have made conceſſions to Anjou and the French king, in order to induce the latter to augment their number. Biron put them on board tranſports at Birvliet, and thence conducted them by ſea to France.

Auguſt 27. THE Spaniards were now at liberty to purſue their conqueſts almoſt without oppoſition. Farneſe immediately formed the blockade of Ipres. Alloſt was ſold to him by an Engliſh and Walloon garriſon for the payment of their arrears. The country of Waes, and the town of

of Ruplemonde on the Scheld, were ſubdued, and Zutphen too was taken by ſurpriſe; the conſequence of which was, that the Veluwe, an extenſive territory between the Iſſel and the Rhine, was laid open to the incurſions of the enemy.

In the mean time the ſecret partiſans of Spain were daily increaſing in Bruges, Ghent, and other places. Many perſons had declared themſelves againſt Anjou with ſo much violence, that they dreaded his return. Many were intimidated by the rapidity of the prince of Parma's conqueſts. Some having been intruſted with the public money, were afraid of being called to account for their management of it by the prince of Orange and the States, and all of them were allured to their firſt allegiance by the moderation with which Farneſe treated ſuch as had already ſubmitted to him, and the ſtrict fidelity with which he adhered to his engagements.

Among the perſons who, prompted by theſe motives, were deſirous of again reducing their country under the Spaniſh government, the prince of Orange had the mortification to find his brother-in-law, count Heremberg. This nobleman, weak, inconſtant, and governed by his wife, who was the prince's ſiſter, but had

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for ſome time been at variance with her brother, had formed the deſign of delivering the province of Guelderland, of which he had been appointed governor, into the hands of the Spaniards. His plot having been detected before it was ripe for execution, he was ſeized and impriſoned by an order of the States. But having been afterwards ſet at liberty upon his parole, he gave irrefragable proof of his guilt by flying over to the enemy.

Treachery of the prince of Chimai.

The prince of Chimai's intrigues in Flanders were more ſucceſsful than thoſe of Heremberg. He was eldeſt ſon of the duke d'Arſchot, and had been educated in the catholic faith; but ſome time before the preſent period, he had openly profeſſed the reformed religion, and attached himſelf with much apparent zeal to the party of the prince of Orange and the States. Conſcious that both his religion and patriotiſm were mere grimace, he had laboured with conſummate artifice to remove any ſuſpicions that might be entertained of his ſincerity. He was perpetually ſurrounded with the proteſtant miniſters, with whom he lived on the moſt familiar terms; and he publiſhed an apology for his conduct, in which, with the higheſt encomiums on the proteſtant faith, he mingled the bittereſt invectives againſt Philip, beſtowing on him every reproachful epithet

which the moſt implacable hatred could ſuggeſt. By theſe means he had inſinuated himſelf into the favour of great numbers of the proteſtants, and particularly thoſe of Bruges, who conferred upon him the government of their town. 1583. The prince of Orange having received information of a ſecret correſpondence which he held with the catholics, had at firſt attempted to perſuade the people of Bruges from electing him their governor, and he now gave ſecret inſtructions to the magiſtrates, to employ colonel Boyd, a Scotch officer, who commanded one of the regiments in garriſon, to deprive Chimai of his authority. 1584. Boyd affected to enter heartily into the plan propoſed, but he betrayed the magiſtrates, and gave immediate information of their deſign to Chimai; who, through an artful miſrepreſentation of their conduct, was enabled to expel them from the city. He then put others into their place who were devoted to his intereſt, and ſtill pretended all his wonted zeal for the reformed religion, till having obliged many of the principal citizens to withdraw, he made himſelf maſter of the town, and then delivered it to the prince of Parma, May. upon condition that the prince ſhould confer upon him the government of the province. To the obtaining this requeſt, which was granted by Farneſe, and confirmed by Philip, Chimai thought himſelf the better entitled, as he had contributed in the ſame perfidious manner

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1584. manner to the reduction of Ipres, which after a blockade of nine months had lately been obliged to ſurrender. Not long after this he threw off the maſk of religion, and both he and one of the proteſtant miniſters, who had been a principal inſtrument of his deceit, publicly abjured Calviniſm, and declared themſelves converts to the popiſh faith [r].

An attempt of the ſame nature with that of Chimai on Bruges was made by Imbiſe, and other agents of Farneſe, to reduce Ghent and Dendremonde under the Spaniſh power. In order to ſecond their endeavours, the prince of Parma had pitched his camp between Ghent and Bruges; but the plan which had been formed for the ſurpriſe of Dendremonde was diſcovered, and Imbiſe, the principal contriver, who was chief magiſtrate of Ghent, a factious and turbulent old man, was condemned and executed.

Death of Anjou.

During theſe tranſactions, the prince of Orange was employed in eſtabliſhing a thorough reconcilement between the States and the duke of Anjou, whoſe return with a numerous army William conſidered as the only remedy for the increaſing calamities of the commonwealth. There was more reaſon now than ever to expect that Anjou would ſoon be able to fulfil his

[r] Meteren, p. 357. Thanus, lib. lxxix. c. xv.

engage-

engagements. Through the queen-mother's interceſſion, Henry had openly declared his reſolution to exert himſelf with vigour in the ſupport of his brother's intereſt in the Netherlands. An ambaſſador had been ſent by the States to congratulate with the duke on this deſirable event, and to acquaint him of their having conſented to certain conditions which he had propoſed. His joy on this occaſion was extreme, and he now indulged the moſt flattering expectations; but he did not long ſurvive theſe events, which gave him ſo much pleaſure. Having never enjoyed perfect health ſince the hardſhips which he underwent in his retreat from Antwerp, he was ſeized about this time with an illneſs which might have been eaſily accounted for, from the unſound ſtate of his conſtitution; but which, agreeably to the practice of the age, was attributed to poiſon[s]. Whatever was the cauſe, he died in great pain, at Chateau-Thierry, on the 10th of June 1584, at the age of thirty.

Beginning of June.

SUCH was the concluſion of the reſtleſs life of this prince, whoſe weakneſſes and vices were equally pernicious to himſelf, to the Netherlands, and to France. Improvident of the

His character.

[s] It was ſuppoſed to have been given him by his phyſician, bribed by the court of Spain.

future,

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future, and unable to judge for himſelf, he was a ſlave to the ſelfiſh purpoſes of others, as well as to his own humour and caprice. He ſeems likewiſe to have been incapable of diſcerning the merit or demerit of thoſe who approached him, or the ſoundneſs or folly of the counſels which they offered. He was not void of friendſhip or attachment, and he was active and ambitious; but he was entirely deſtitute of that patience, ſteadineſs, and reſolution, which are neceſſary in carrying on any important enterpriſe; and his conduct towards the United Provinces, above related, too clearly juſtifies what was ſaid of him by his ſiſter Margaret, that if fraud and infidelity were to be baniſhed from the earth, there was in him a ſtock ſufficient from which it might be ſoon repleniſhed [t].

Aſſaſſination of the prince of Orange.

YET his death, at the preſent criſis, was a real calamity to the people of the United Provinces; but the memory of it was ſoon effaced by a much greater calamity, which in a few weeks afterwards befel them, in the death of the prince of Orange; againſt whom one of thoſe atrocious attempts, to which Philip's proſcription gave birth, proved at laſt ſucceſsful. It was planned, and afterwards executed in Delft, by Balthazar Gerard, a native of Ville-

[t] Bentivoglio, 275. Davila, l. vi. &c.

fans,

fans in Burgundy. This man, in order to facilitate his admiſſion into the prince's preſence, had called himſelf the ſon of a French proteſtant, of the name of Guion, who had ſuffered for the ſake of his religion. By this fictitious account of his extraction, joined to an artful affectation of zeal for the reformed religion and the ſervice of the States, he became known to the prince; and William was ſo far deceived by this impoſtor, that he put him into the train of an ambaſſador to the court of France. This mark of confidence did not divert him from his ungenerous deſign; on the contrary, he had no ſooner returned from France, than he reſolved to carry it into execution; and he would have done ſo, as he afterwards declared, on his firſt arrival, when he was admitted with letters into the prince's apartment, if he had not neglected to furniſh himſelf with arms. But in a few days after, having returned to the palace, on the pretence of applying for a paſſport, he placed himſelf at the door of that apartment, in which the prince was at dinner with his wife Louiſa de Cologni, and his ſiſter the counteſs of Scwartzenburgh, and waited there, with a cloak caſt round him, till they were retiring into another room. The princeſs, obſerved him look confuſed and pale, was greatly alarmed, and enquired what he wanted. He comes for a paſſport, anſwered the prince;

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when the aſſaſſin, ſtepping forward, ſhot him in the body with a piſtol loaded with three balls. William had time only to ſay, "God have mercy on me, and this afflicted people: I am grievouſly wounded." Immediately after which he fell down, and in a few moments afterwards expired[q]; the princeſs, overwhelmed with anguiſh, looking on; whoſe peculiar fate it was to ſee her ſecond huſband murdered, as her illuſtrious father, and her firſt huſband, the amiable Teligni, had been, in the maſſacre of Paris, ſome years before.

July 10th.

THE murderer in the mean time had made his eſcape out of the palace by a back-door, and had almoſt reached the ramparts. He was preparing to throw himſelf into the ditch, which was full of water, in the hopes of being able to ſwim over, when he was overtaken by two of the prince's guards.

UPON his firſt examination he declared, that, ſix years before the preſent period, he had formed the deſign of putting the prince to death; that he had then been deterred from his purpoſe by his friends; that he had again reſumed it, when the king publiſhed his edict of proſcription; that having been in the ſervice of Du Pré, ſecretary to count Manſveldt, he had procured from him ſome blank ſubſcrip-

[q] In the fifty-ſecond year of his age.

tions

tions of the count's, which, in order to gain credit, he had delivered to the prince; that he had communicated his deſign to four jeſuits in Treves and Tournay, who aſſured him, that if he ſhould die in the execution of it, he would be deemed a martyr by the church.

To theſe circumſtances, after the torture was applied, he ſubjoined, that the reward promiſed in the proſcription had been his principal motive; that he had made known his purpoſe to the prince of Parma, and had been deſired by him to converſe with his ſecretary, Chriſtopher Aſſonville; that Aſſonville had deſired him to reflect on the difficulties which he muſt encounter; but had aſſured him, that he could not perform a more acceptable ſervice either to the King or the prince of Parma; that he might depend, with perfect ſecurity, upon receiving the money promiſed in the King's edict of proſcription; but exhorted him repeatedly to deny, in caſe of his being ſeized, that the Prince of Parma had approved of his deſign; although the prince, he ſaid, had in reality approved of it, and had conſented to his uſing the blank ſubſcriptions.

When he was informed of the ſentence pronounced againſt him, in which it was ordained, that his right hand ſhould be burnt off, and

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the flesh of his body torn from the bones with burning pincers, he was at first thrown into the most dreadful consternation, and lamented bitterly that he had suffered the thirst of wealth to betray him into an action, which had plunged him into such intolerable misery; but he soon recovered his natural fortitude, and said, that, far from repenting of what he had done, he was conscious of having merited the favour of God, and was sure of being admitted into a state of eternal happiness. And in this temper of mind he remained, both in the interval before his execution, and in the time of it, during which he exhibited a degree of composure and tranquillity that filled the spectators with astonishment.

The highest encomiums were bestowed on this deluded wretch by the popish ecclesiastics in the southern provinces; and in many cities they would have lighted up bonfires, and celebrated public rejoicings, if the consent of the people could have been obtained; but even the prince of Parma's troops refused to join in these rejoicings, and openly declared their condemnation of an act, which they found repugnant to the dictates of their hearts, whatever might be said in justification of it, on the principles of crooked politics, or the popish faith.

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IT will be unneceſſary to inform the reader of the grief and conſternation, which this melancholy event diffuſed throughout the confederated provinces. Each perſon mourned as for his parent, his guardian, and friend, and felt for the loſs which the State had ſuſtained, as men are wont to feel for their private and domeſtic calamities. Being now deprived of the perſon whoſe wiſdom had, for many years, been their principal ſupport, they conſidered themſelves as deſtitute and forlorn, and were overwhelmed with the moſt gloomy apprehenſions of their future fate [w].

Character of the prince.

NEVER was any perſon better fitted than the prince of Orange for the difficult ſituation in which he was placed, or better qualified for the arduous taſk of delivering an injured people from the yoke of their oppreſſor. Even his bittereſt enemies allow him to have been poſſeſſed of vigilance, application, penetration, and ſagacity, joined with a peculiar dexterity in governing the inclinations of men, and in conciliating and preſerving their affections. To theſe accompliſhments both the hiſtory of his life, and the teſtimony of the beſt informed hiſtorians, authoriſe us to add the virtues of fortitude and magnanimity, of juſtice and equi-

[w] Van Meteren, p. 363. Bentivoglio, lib. xii. Thuanus, in hoc anno.

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ty, of patience, equanimity, and moderation, which were never perhaps found united in one perſon in ſo eminent a degree[x]. Amidſt all the variety of fortune which he experienced, he was never either elated or depreſſed; but whether the events in which he was intereſted were proſperous or adverſe, he preſerved on all occaſions the ſame compoſure and ſerenity of ſoul.

By a reſpectable popiſh hiſtorian[y], he is accuſed of avarice and rapacity; yet that author has not been able to produce a ſingle fact to juſtify his charge. It appears not from any hiſtorian, that he was ever guilty of employing his power for the purpoſe of advancing his private intereſt, to the prejudice either of individuals or the public. He always declined taking any concern in adminiſtering the finances. He did not even exact payment of the revenue which the States had appointed him; and at his death he left his private affairs ſo much encumbered, that the States found it neceſſary to make proviſion for the ſupport of his widow and children[z].

The ſame hiſtorian has loaded him with the imputation of fraud and hypocriſy, of which,

[x] Thuani Hiſtoria. [y] Bentivoglio. [z] Wickfort, lib. ii.

however,

however, no proof was ever given but general invective, nor a ſingle inſtance of deceit produced by his moſt inveterate enemies. Before his rupture with Philip, he teſtified on all occaſions his diſapprobation of the meaſures that were purſued; and after it, he acted uniformly the part of an open foe. He had no religion, ſay ſome catholic writers, but what his intereſt and ambition dictated. Yet he was decent and irreproachable in his conduct, as well as punctual in diſcharging the functions of that religion which he profeſſed; nor do theſe authors pretend to offer any other evidence to juſtify their ſurmiſe, but that he gave up the catholic religion, in which he had been educated at the court of the emperor, and returned to that with which his mind had been tinctured in his earlieſt infancy. His religion was not indeed of the ſame ſpirit either with that of thoſe whom he forſook, or of many of thoſe whoſe cauſe he adopted. It ſuffered him not to regard either ſpeculative opinions or external rites, as ſufficient ground for haraſſing and butchering thoſe from whom he differed in opinion. But in an age of cruel gloomy ſuperſtition, with which almoſt all the companions of his youth were deeply infected, his religion, conformably to the example and precepts of its author, was mild, moderate, and humane. Nor was it to one ſect of Chriſtians only that his

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his moderation and humanity extended. As he did what he could, while he adhered to the catholic faith, to put a ſtop to the perſecution of the proteſtants; ſo, after he had embraced the reformed religion, he exerted his moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to protect the catholics from violence, and to procure liberty for them to exerciſe their religion as far as was conſiſtent with the public peace. To infer from this conduct that he had no religion of his own, is going a great deal farther than to aſſert the lawfulneſs of perſecution; it is equivalent to maintaining that no chriſtian can be ſincere who can live at peace with thoſe who differ from him in his religious perſuaſion.

It is not to the purpoſe which the popiſh hiſtorians intended to ſerve by their portraits of William's character, to ſay of him that he was ambitious; in itſelf, ambition merits neither praiſe nor blame, but is culpable or laudable according to the end at which it aſpires, and the means which it employs. But if we judge concerning the character of the prince of Orange according to this criterion, it muſt be impoſſible for perſons ſo oppoſite in their principles, as the catholic and proteſtant hiſtorians, to agree.

If, with the former, we place the rights of all ſovereigns on the ſame foundation, without

diſtinguiſhing between an abſolute prince and the ſovereign of a free people, and believe that every prince is, by an indefeaſible and divine right, entitled to exerciſe a deſpotic power over the religion and liberty of his ſubjects; if we believe, that, with the permiſſion of the pope, a king may violate his moſt ſolemn oaths, and that the obligations of his ſubjects to obedience remain in force, even after every condition upon which they entered into them has been violated: if, with ſuch principles as theſe, we judge of the character of the prince of Orange, it will be difficult not to conſider him as guilty both of perjury and rebellion; and in this caſe, the moſt favourable verdict that can be paſſed upon his conduct, is to ſay, that it proceeded from a criminal ambition.

But if, on the other hand, we regard the pontiff's pretenſions to the power of ſetting men at liberty from their oaths as abſurd and impious; if we regard the rights of ſubject as no leſs ſacred than thoſe of kings; if we diſtinguiſh between a prince inveſted with unlimited authority, and one whoſe power is circumſcribed by the fundamental laws of the ſtate; between a prince whoſe right to his dominions is indefeaſible, and one who obtained his ſovereignty only upon certain terms, which he ſwore to fulfil, while his ſubjects engaged to yield

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yield their obedience on condition of his fulfilling them; in this caſe, our judgment of William's character will be extremely different from what it was on the former ſuppoſition. We ſhall not be ſatisfied with barely aſſerting his innocence of thoſe crimes of which his enemies have accuſed him, but ſhall confer upon him the glorious appellations which his countrymen beſtowed, of the father of his country, and the guardian of its liberty and laws, who generouſly ſacrificed his intereſt, eaſe, and ſafety to the public good, and who, firſt by counſel and perſuaſion, and afterwards by force of arms, did more to reſcue his fellow-citizens from oppreſſion, than was ever done in ſuch unfavourable circumſtances by any patriot in the world before *.

* William left iſſue, four ſons and eight daughters. By his firſt wife, Anne of Egmont, counteſs of Buren, he had Philip-William, who was detained for thirty years a priſoner in Spain; and Mary de Naſſau, who was married to count Hohenloe.

By his ſecond wife, Anne, daughter of Maurice, elector of Saxony, he had prince Maurice, ſo much celebrated in the hiſtory of the Netherlands, and a daughter, named Emilia, who married Emanuel, ſon of Don Antonio, prior of Crato.

By his third wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the duke de Montpenſier, he had ſix daughters, viz.

1ſt, Louiſa Juliana, who was married to Frederic IV. Elector Palatine.

2d, Elizabeth,

2d, Elizabeth, whom he gave in marriage to Henry de la Tour, duke of Bouillon; and who, beſides other children, bore her huſband the celebrated Viſcount de Turenne.

3d, Catharine, who married Lewis, count de Hanau.

4th, Charlotte Brabantina, married to Claude, duke de la Trimouille, to whom ſhe bore the celebrated counteſs of Derby, who diſtinguiſhed herſelf during the civil wars in England; and from whom are deſcended the preſent noble families of Derby and Athol.

5th, Charlotte Flandrina de Naſſau, who embraced the Catholic religion, and died abbeſs of St. Croix in Poitiers. And,

6th, Emilia de Naſſau, who was married to the duke of Lanſberg.

By his fourth and laſt wife, Louiſa de Coligni, daughter of the great admiral de Chatillon, William had one ſon, Henry-Frederic, who ſucceeded his brother Maurice in the principality of Orange, and in his authority in the United Provinces.

Beſides this numerous offspring, William left a natural ſon, Juſtin de Naſſau, who was highly reſpected for his bravery and conduct, was intruſted with ſeveral important commands, and is often mentioned in the ſequel.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

Printed by A. Strahan,
Printers-Street.